Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Zwangsrekrutierung Minderjähriger (Konzentration auf 14-16-jährige, regionale Unterschiede) [a-11806]

31. Jänner 2022

Das vorliegende Dokument beruht auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen sowie gegebenenfalls auf Auskünften von Expert·innen und wurde in Übereinstimmung mit den Standards von ACCORD und den Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI) erstellt.

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Kurzbeschreibungen zu den in dieser Anfragebeantwortung verwendeten Quellen sowie Ausschnitte mit Informationen aus diesen Quellen finden Sie im Anhang.

Diese Anfragebeantwortung verwendet ausschließlich Quellen aus den Jahren 2020 und 2021. Die Informationen werden chronologisch, beginnend mit der neuesten Information wiedergegeben. Die Anfragebeantwortung inkludiert alle berichteten Arten von Kinderrekrutierung, da sich auf Basis der vorhandenen Informationen oft keine Unterscheidung zwischen völlig freiwilliger Rekrutierung, auf ökonomischen oder sozialen Zwängen beruhender Rekrutierung und Zwangsrekrutierung im engen Sinne (z.B. unter Androhung von Gewalt) treffen lässt.

Überblick der Rekrutierung Minderjähriger in Syrien in Zahlen

Laut des Berichts über Kinder und bewaffnete Konflikte des UNO-Generalsekretärs im Mai 2021, hätten die Vereinen Nationen zwischen Jänner und Dezember 2020 die Rekrutierung und den Einsatz von 813 Kindern (777 Jungen, 36 Mädchen) verifiziert, darunter durch Haiat Tahrir asch-Scham (390); syrische bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen, früher bekannt als Freie Syrische Armee (FSA) (170); die kurdischen Volksverteidigungseinheiten und Frauenverteidigungseinheiten (YPG/YPJ) (119) unter dem Dach der Demokratischen Kräfte Syriens (SDF); regierungsfreundliche Milizen (42); Ahrar al-Sham (31), Nur al-Din al-Zanki (3) und Armee des Islam (Jaysh al-Islam) (3), die alle seit Oktober 2019 nominell unter dem Dach der oppositionellen Syrischen Nationalarmee (SNA) operieren würden; die Patriotische Revolutionäre Jugendbewegung (YDG-H) (30); die Kräfte der inneren Sicherheit (13); Hurras al-Din (6); Islamischer Staat (4); und syrische Regierungstruppen (2) verifiziert. Fälle seien hauptsächlich in Idlib (477) und Aleppo (119) bestätigt worden. Von allen insgesamt verifizierten Fällen seien 99 Prozent (805) im Kampf eingesetzt worden. Darüber hinaus sei die Rekrutierung und der Einsatz von weiteren 24 Kindern (20 Jungen, 4 Mädchen) durch Haiat Tahrir asch-Scham (7), syrische bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen, früher bekannt als FSA (6), YPG/YPJ (8), Islamischer Staat, regierungstreue Milizen und die Kurdische Revolutionäre Jugend (je 1) zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt verifiziert worden (UNGA, 6. Mai 2021, S. 24).

Im April 2021 wird der Bericht des UNO Generalsekretärs an den UNO Sicherheitsrat zu Kindern im bewaffneten Konflikt in Syrienveröffentlicht. Im Zeitraum vom 1. Juli 2018 bis zum 30. Juni 2020 habe es 1.423 bestätigte Fälle (1.306 Jungen, 117 Mädchen) von Rekrutierung und Einsatz von Kindern gegeben, davon 274 im zweiten Halbjahr 2018, 837 im Jahr 2019 und 312 im ersten Halbjahr 2020. Etwa 1.388 der Kinder (98 Prozent) hätten in einer Kampfrolle gedient. Zum Zeitpunkt der Rekrutierung seien 250 Kinder (18 Prozent) jünger als 15 Jahre alt gewesen. Die Anwerbung und der Einsatz von Kindern sei in 11 von 14 Provinzen verifiziert worden, wobei 73 Prozent der Fälle im nordwestlichen Teil Syriens (Idlib, Aleppo und Hama) und 26 Prozent im nordöstlichen Teil bestätigt wurden (Raqqa, Hasaka und Dayr al-Zor).

Verifizierte Fälle seien mindestens 25 verschiedenen Konfliktparteien zugeschrieben, darunter Haiat Tahrir asch-Scham (507); die kurdischen Volksverteidigungseinheiten (YPG, 318) und Frauenverteidigungseinheiten (YPJ, 99); bewaffnete syrische Oppositionsgruppen, früher bekannt als FSA (Freie Syrische Armee) (328), Ahrar al-Sham (55) und Nur al-Din al-Zanki (11), die seit Oktober 2019 nominell unter dem Dach der oppositionellen Syrischen Nationalen Armee operieren würden; andere SDF (Demokratischen Kräfte Syriens)-Komponenten (37); die internen Sicherheitskräfte (34); Regierungstruppen (13); regierungstreue Milizen (10); Islamischer Staat (6); die Afrin Liberation Forces (3); und nicht identifizierte bewaffnete Gruppen (2).

Bei der Rekrutierung und dem Einsatz von Kindern durch Haiʾat Tahrir asch-Scham sei mit 36 Prozent aller verifizierten Fälle ein signifikanter Anstieg beobachtet worden. Jungen im Alter von nur 10 Jahren seien aus 11 verschiedenen Distrikten in Idlib, Aleppo und Hama rekrutiert worden.

Für 35 Prozent aller bestätigten Fälle seien unterschiedliche Fraktionen der Selbstverwaltung in Nord- und Ostsyrien verantwortlich. Die Rekrutierung von Kindern durch die SDF und die internen Sicherheitskräfte sei jedoch im Berichtszeitraum deutlich zurückgegangen, insbesondere nach der Unterzeichnung eines gemeinsamen Aktionsplans mit den Vereinten Nationen im Juni 2019 zur Beendigung und Verhinderung der Rekrutierung und des Einsatzes von Kindern. 67 Prozent der verifizierten Vorfälle hätten sich vor der Unterzeichnung des Aktionsplans ereignet. Seit dessen Unterzeichnung seien 160 Fälle aufgetreten, darunter 23 Kinder unter 15 Jahren und 149 Kinder, die in einer Kampfrolle gedient hätten. Die meisten Fälle seien in den Distrikten Raqqa (42) und Manbij (40) aufgetreten.

Mindestens 12 syrische bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen, früher bekannt als FSA, sowie Ahrar al-Sham und Nur al-Din al-Zanki, seien für 28 Prozent aller bestätigten Fälle verantwortlich. Die Zahlen seien konstant hoch.

Insgesamt 23 Fälle der Rekrutierung und des Einsatzes von Kindern durch Regierungstruppen (13) und regierungstreue Milizen (10) seien verifiziert worden und Regierungstruppen in Daraa (5), Hasaka (4) und Aleppo (4) zugeschrieben, sowie regierungstreuen Milizen in Damaskus.

Faktoren bei der Rekrutierung von Kindern seien finanzielle Anreize; Rache für den Tod von Angehörigen; die Zugehörigkeit von Vätern, Brüdern und Onkeln; sozialer Status und Druck der Gemeinschaft; Zugang zu Dienstleistungen und Waren; Angst vor Verhaftung und Inhaftierung; sowie der Drang, ihre Gemeinschaften zu schützen (UN Security Council, 23. April 2021, S. 3-5).

Rekrutierung Minderjähriger durch Streitkräfte der syrischen Regierung und loyale Milizen (Provinzen Daraa, Damaskus, Hama, Aleppo)

Laut dem Jahresbericht des Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) über Kinder in Syrien vom November 2021 rekrutiere das syrische Regime regelmäßig Kinder. Am besten bekannt für die Rekrutierung von Kindern seien die mit dem Regime verbundenen Streitkräfte, wie die National Defense Force (NDF) sowie die Bataillone und Brigaden ausländischer und lokaler Milizen. Kinder würden auch in den Kampf geschickt werden. Laut SNHR sei es zu beobachten, dass in Gebieten, in denen das syrische Regime die Kontrolle wieder übernommen habe, eine Zunahme der Häufigkeit der Rekrutierung von Kindern stattfinde. Dies sei in den Provinzen Damaskus, Daraa und Aleppo beobachtet worden (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 31). SNHR schätzt, dass zum Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung mindestens 1.374 Kinder in den Streitkräften des syrischen Regimes dienen würden. SNHR habe außerdem mindestens die Fälle von 78 Kindern dokumentiert, die für iranische Milizen oder vom Iran unterstützte Milizen rekrutiert worden seien. Diese Kinder würden hauptsächlich von der Fatemiyoun-Brigade und der Al-Quds-Brigade rekrutiert werden (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 32).

The New Arab schreibt in einem Artikel vom Juni 2021, dass Menschenrechtsgruppen über die aktive Rekrutierung von Kindern für die Streitkräfte des syrischen Regimes und die mit ihnen verbundenen iranischen und libanesischen Hisbollah-Milizen in Damaskus und Umgebung berichtet hätten. Regimekräfte und angegliederte Gruppen würden Kinder aus verarmten Gebieten, manchmal ohne die Erlaubnis oder das Wissen ihrer Eltern, rekrutieren (The New Arab, 23. Juni 2021).

Das Danish Immigration Service (DIS) führte im Februar 2020 eine Fact-Finding-Mission in Istanbul und Beirut zum Thema Militärdienst in Syrien durch und interviewte in dem Zusammenhang mehrere Expert·innen. Laut Elizabeth Tsurkov, Fellow des Foreign Policy Research Institute, rekrutiere die Syrisch-Arabische Armee keine Personen unter 18 Jahren. Regierungsnahe Milizen, wie die syrische Hisbollah oder die Local Defense Forces (LDF) würden dies jedoch in großer Zahl tun. Laut Tsurkov würden sich Minderjährige den Milizen aus wirtschaftlicher Notwendigkeit anschließen, sowie aus Angst von der Regierung Syriens als illoyal wahrgenommen zu werden (DIS, Mai 2020, S. 54). Auch weitere Interviewpartner·innen hätten gegenüber DIS angegeben, dass die Syrisch-Arabische Armee ihres Wissens nach keine Personen unter 18 Jahren rekrutiere (DIS, Mai 2020, S. 65/89). Laut Fadel Abdul Ghany vom Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) sei die Rekrutierung von unter 18-jährigen innerhalb regierungsnaher Milizen, wie den National Defense Forces (NDF) weit verbreitet. Dies geschehe mit der Zustimmung der syrischen Regierung. Abdul Ghany habe Informationen von einem 16-jährigen Jungen aus der Stadt Salamiya (Provinz Hama), dem mit Verhaftung gedroht worden sei, wenn er sich nicht einer regierungsnahen Miliz anschließe (DIS, Mai 2020, S. 89).

Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) schreibt in einem Bericht über Kinderrekrutierung in Syrien vom Mai 2020, dass die Rekrutierung von Kindern in Gebieten, die von den regulären syrischen Streitkräften und loyalen Milizen kontrolliert würden, im Jahr 2018, begonnen habe, nachdem letztere die vollständige Kontrolle über die Stadt Damaskus und ihre umliegenden ländlichen Gebiete übernommen hätten. Milizen wie die National Defense Force, die Al-Nujaba-Bewegung und die libanesische Hisbollah würden Kinder in ihre Reihen rekrutieren (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 17).

Im Jahr 2019 habe die Kinderrekrutierung in diesen Gebieten einen Aufschwung erlebt, da die Milizen die schlechte finanzielle Lage vieler Familien ausgenützt hätten. STJ beschreibt die Situation zweier 16-jähriger Jungen aus dem ländlichen Damaskus und aus Ost-Ghouta, die 2019 rekrutiert worden seien (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 18).

Rekrutierung durch Haiat Tahrir asch-Scham (Provinz Idlib)

Laut SNHR sei im August 2021 ein 16-jähriger Junge, Muhammad Nour Hussein Abdul Qader, aus dem Dorf Al-Bashiriya (Provinz Idlib) in die Reihen von Haiʾat Tahrir asch-Scham rekrutiert worden (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 37).

North Press Agency (NPA) berichtet im März 2021, dass laut einer informierten Quelle eine große Anzahl von Kindern von Haiʾat Tahrir asch-Scham (HTS) und anderen bewaffneten Gruppen rekrutiert werde im Nordwesten Syriens. NPA schreibt über einen zehnjährigen Jungen, der für eine Oppositionsgruppe gearbeitet habe und ums Leben gekommen sei. Ein 16-Jähriger arbeite in einer HTS-Waffenfabrik in Jisr al-Shughour, südwestlich von Idlib. Ein 15-Jähriger arbeite als Kinderrekrutierer für die Sham Legion [Faylaq Al-Scham]. Ein 17-Jähriger erklärt gegenüber NPA, dass er und drei Freunde sich drei Jahre zuvor der HTS angeschlossen hätten und er an einem Kampf gegen die syrischen Regierungstruppen in Al-Ays, südlich von Aleppo, teilgenommen habe. Er habe einen seiner 16-jährigen Freunde verloren (NPA, 10. März 2021).

Im September 2020 berichtet NPA, dass Haiʾat Tahrir asch-Scham (HTS) in den vergangenen Jahren mehrere Kampagnen gestartet habe, um Kinder zu rekrutieren, so auch Anfang 2020. Die schlechten Lebensbedingungen würden die Schulkinder aus Idlib dazu verleiten, gegen Geld an den Kämpfen teilzunehmen. NPA schreibt über einen 16-jährigen Jungen, der sich nach dem Tod seines Vaters einer Fraktion innerhalb der HTS in Idlib angeschlossen habe, da er keine andere Arbeitsmöglichkeit gefunden habe. Er arbeite in einer Gruppe von 20 Personen, von denen vier unter achtzehn Jahre alt seien. Sie würden nachts die Militärkontrollpunkte bewachen. Der Artikel beschreibt außerdem die Situation eines 14- und eines 15-jährigen Jungen, die sich der HTS angeschlossen hätten (NPA, 5. September 2020).

STJ schreibt in seinem Bericht vom Mai 2020, dass in Gebieten außerhalb der Kontrolle der syrischen Regierung, insbesondere in der Provinz Idlib, das Phänomen der Kinderrekrutierung mit der Ausbreitung islamistischer Fraktionen zugenommen habe. Die prominenteste Fraktion sei Haiʾat Tahrir asch-Scham. Mit dem Beginn der Militärkampagne, die die regulären syrischen Streitkräfte und Verbündeten im Mai 2019 gegen die Provinz Idlib gestartet hätten, habe HTS zusammen mit anderen Gruppen eine Reihe von Kampagnen im Nordwesten Syriens (Idlib, ländliches Aleppo, Hama) gestartet, und unter anderem Kinder zum Kampf aufgerufen (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 15). STJ berichtet von zwei 16-jährigen Jungen, die Ende 2019 von HTS rekrutiert worden seien. Einer von ihnen sei bei Zusammenstößen der HTS mit der syrischen Armee eingesetzt worden (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 17).

Rekrutierung durch die Syrische Nationale Armee (SNA) und andere von der Türkei unterstützte Milizen (Teile der Provinz Idlib, Aleppo und von der Türkei besetzte Gebiete)

Das ASO News Network zitiert im Juli 2021 eine Militärquelle aus der Syrischen Nationalen Armee (SNA, ein von der Türkei unterstützter syrischer Truppenverband, der durch die Zusammenführung mehrerer Rebellengruppen entstand, Anmerkung ACCORD). Laut der Militärquelle seien ungefähr 30 Prozent der Mitglieder der Fraktionen minderjährige Kinder. Kinder würden an Checkpoints arbeiten sowie an die Front geschickt werden. Kinder an der Front würden die Basis der Syrischen Nationalen Armee und dschihadistischer Gruppen in Syrien darstellen. Rekrutierung von Kindern sei ein systematischer Prozess und würde die schwierigen Lebensbedingungen der Bevölkerung ausnützen, insbesondere die Situation binnenvertriebener Familien und Familien, die sich in von der Türkei besetzten Gebieten wie Afrin und Sari Kani/Ras Al-Ayn niedergelassen hätten. Ein Militärbeamter der Syrischen Nationalen Armee habe gegenüber ASO News Network ausgesagt, dass die meisten Militärkräfte Kinder rekrutieren würden. Die meisten gebe es jedoch in der „Al-Sham Legion“, gefolgt von der „Al-Hamzat Division“ und der „Sultan Suleiman Shah Division“.

Der Journalist Khaled Al-Hamadan aus Hama, der zur Zeit der Veröffentlichung im Norden der Provinz Aleppo lebe, habe gegenüber ASO News Network bestätigt, dass es allgemein bekannt sei, dass die Syrische Nationale Armee Kinder rekrutiere. Es gebe eine große Anzahl an Kindern, die an relevanten Checkpoints stationiert seien (ASO News Network, 9. Juli 2021).

Al-Monitor berichtet Anfang Juli 2021, dass das US-amerikanische Außenministerium die Türkei einer Liste von Ländern hinzugefügt habe, die in die rechtswidrige Rekrutierung oder den Einsatz von Kindersoldaten verwickelt seien. Im Artikel wird im speziellen die türkische Unterstützung der Sultan-Murad-Division, die Teil der Syrischen Nationalen Armee sei und Kinder rekrutiere, genannt (Al-Monitor, 1. Juli 2021).

STJ schreibt im Mai 2021 über Schwierigkeiten, Kinderrekrutierung innerhalb der SNA unter Kontrolle zu bringen. Im Mai 2020 habe das Verteidigungsministerium der syrischen Übergangsregierung die Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen innerhalb der SNA verboten und die Entlassung bereits rekrutierter Kinder angeordnet. STJ habe jedoch verifiziert, dass Kinder weiterhin in Fraktionen der SNA rekrutiert worden seien (STJ, 25. Mai 2021, S. 3). Zwei befragte Kommandanten aus separaten SNA-Fraktionen hätten angegeben, dass mehrere Fraktionskommandanten weiterhin Kinder anwerben würden. Die Rekrutierung von Kindern sei jedoch laut der Befragten seit Mai 2020 erheblich zurückgegangen (STJ, 25. Mai 2021, S. 4/5). Feldforscher von STJ hätten detaillierte Informationen zu frei Fällen von Kinderrekrutierung erhalten, die in einem jungen Altern rekrutiert worden seien und weiterhin militärische Aufgaben innerhalb der Sultan-Murad-Division und der Suleiman-Shah-Brigade ausführen würden, obwohl sie unter 18 Jahre alt seien. Ein Kämpfer der Sultan-Murad-Division habe bestätigt, dass sich 21 Kinder unter 18 Jahren im März und Mai 2020 im Militärausbildungslager Abdul Qader Saleh im Grenzdorf Sajo in der Nähe der Stadt Azaz im Norden von Aleppo befunden hätten. Nach ihrer Ausbildung seien die Minderjährigen in verschiedenen Gebieten eingesetzt worden, unter anderem in Tell Abyad und Ras Al-Ayn/ Sari Kani (STJ, 25. Mai 2021, S. 6).

Im Mai 2020 berichtet STJ, dass die Fraktionen der SNA Kinder im Gebiet Ras Al-Ayn/Sari Kani um die Zeit der türkischen Militäroperation „Peace Spring“ im November und Dezember 2019 rekrutiert hätten (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 11). Die Sultan Murad Brigade, die Hamza Brigade / al-Hamzat und die Ahrar Sharqiya/Rebels of the Eastern Area seien für die meisten Fälle von Kinderrekrutierung in Ras Al-Ayn/Sari Kani verantwortlich. Eltern rekrutierter Kinder, die mit STJ gesprochen hätten, hätten angegeben, dass ihre Kinder in der Stadt Tal Halaf, 5 km südwestlich von Ras Al-Ayn / Sari Kani rekrutiert worden seien. STJ schreibt über einen 15-jährigen und einen 16-jährigen Jungen aus Tal Halaf, die um den Jahreswechsel 2019/2020 rekrutiert worden seien (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 12). Darüber hinaus dokumentiert STJ in einem im März 2020 erstellten Bericht, dass die von der Türkei unterstützten Fraktionen der SNA Kinder aus dem nördlichen ländlichen Aleppo rekrutiert hätten, die gegen monatliche Geldsummen an die Fronten nach Libyen versetzt worden seien (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 14).

Rekrutierung durch kurdische Gruppierungen (Aleppo, Manbij, Raqqa, Hasakah, Qamishli)

Das Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) schreibt im November 2021, dass die Demokratischen Kräfte Syriens (SDF) im großen Umfang Kinder zwangsrekrutieren würden. Kinder würden freiwillig oder zwangsweise rekrutiert, indem sie mit versprochenen Privilegien angelockt oder auch entführt würden. Sobald sie in Trainingscamps seien, sei es Kindern nicht mehr möglich, mit ihren Familien zu kommunizieren.

Die Revolutionäre Jugend (Joanne Schurchkar), die Frauenverteidigungseinheiten (YPJ) und die Volksverteidigungseinheiten (YPG) zählten zu den prominentesten Parteien, die für die Rekrutierung von Kindern und ihre Eingliederung in die Ausbildungslager und Kampfeinheiten der Demokratischen Kräfte Syriens verantwortlich seien (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 42).

SNHR berichtet Mitte Dezember 2021, dass seit Anfang November mindestens 19 Kinder, davon zehn Mädchen, (11 in der Provinz Hasaka, 8 in Aleppo) entführt und rekrutiert worden seien, davon seien seither nur drei wieder demobilisiert worden (SNHR, 16. Dezember 2021, S. 6). SNHR liefert in seinem Bericht eine detaillierte Darstellung einiger der rekrutierten Kinder und der Umstände ihrer Rekrutierung. Die berichteten Fälle inkludieren zwei 12-jährige Mädchen, ein 14-jähriges Mädchen, vier 15-jährige Mädchen, einen 13-jährigen Jungen, einen 14-jährigen Jungen und zwei 15-jährige Jungen. Detaillierte Informationen zu den verschiedenen Fällen befinden sich im Anhang (SNHR, 16. Dezember 2021, S. 7/8/11).

Hibr Press, eine 2013 in Aleppo gegründete syrische Wochenzeitschrift, berichtet Anfang Dezember 2021, dass Eltern in der Stadt Qamishli eine Mahnwache abgehalten hätten, um die Freilassung ihrer von PYD/PKK rekrutierten Kindern zu fordern (Hibr Press, 7. Dezember 2021).

The New Arab (Al Araby Al Jadeed), ein 2014 in London gegründetes Medienunternehmen, berichtet in einem Artikel auf seiner Nachrichtenwebseite vom September 2021 von Hinweisen, dass die Revolutionäre Jugend im Nordosten Syriens Entführungen Minderjähriger durchführe und sie in Rekrutierungslager bringe. Al-Araby Al-Jadeed habe von Anfang des Jahres bis Ende August die Entführung von sechs Mädchen (Dana Imad Suleiman (15), Fatima Idris Naasan (15), Ahd Abdel Ghani (16), Simaf Al-Othman (13), Ariana Bahri (13), Delphine Al-Omari (13)) und acht Jungen (Wael Adnan Ibrahim (14), Ahmed Ramou (15), Mohammed Ibrahim Saleh (16), Ibrahim Jarwa, (16), Mazen Khalil Al-Hassan (16), Abdul Aziz Houidi (17), Hahmoud Hassan Adel (17), Massoud Seif Eddin, (17)) dokumentiert. Die SDF hätten die Verantwortung für die Rekrutierung der Kinder bestritten (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 5. September 2021). Die Namen der rekrutierten Kinder korrelieren mit Informationen aus dem Bericht von SNHR vom November 2021 (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 43-45).

Al-Monitor berichtet im Juli 2021, dass das Kinderschutzbüro, das der kurdisch geführten Autonomieverwaltung in Manbij angegliedert sei, damit begonnen habe, Arbeitskarten für Kinder im Alter von 10 bis 18 Jahren auszustellen. Laut eines Mitarbeiters des Kinderschutzbüros sei das Ziel der Karten, Zwangsrekrutierungen durch die Demokratischen Kräfte Syriens zu verhindern. Die SDF hätten Anfang 2021 eine Wehrpflichtkampagne gestartet und unter anderem Minderjährige im Alter von 14 bis 16 Jahren verhaftet (Al-Monitor, 6. Juli 2021).

Middle East Monitor (MEMO) berichtet im Juni 2021 von Protesten in der Stadt Manbij gegen die Praxis der Zwangsrekrutierung von Minderjährigen durch die Volksverteidigungseinheiten (YPG). Auf die Protestierenden sei mit scharfer Munition geschossen worden. Laut MEMO würden die YPG regelmäßig überwiegend arabisch besiedelte Städte und Dörfer überfallen, um Minderjährige zu entführen und sie zur Wehrflicht zu zwingen (MEMO, 4. Juni 2021).

Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) dokumentiert Anfang Juni 2021, dass die Revolutionäre Jugend (Revolutionary Youth’s Union, RYU) mindestens 19 Minderjährige zwischen Anfang Mai 2020 und Ende 2020 rekrutiert habe. Darüber hinaus verzeichnet STJ die Demobilisierung von vier weiblichen und drei männlichen Rekruten, nachdem Eltern Beschwerden bei den SDF eingereicht hätten. Im Laufe des ersten Quartals 2021 habe STJ dokumentiert, dass die RYU weitere sieben Minderjährige rekrutiert habe (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 4). Laut der Mehrheit der befragten Familien sei die RYU hauptsächlich für die Rekrutierung von Kindern im Nordosten Syriens verantwortlich. Mitglieder der RYU im Teenager-Alter würden Kinder in der Schule oder auf der Straße ansprechen, Freundschaften schließen, sie dann zu Vorträgen und Kursen einladen und sie schließlich dazu verleiten, sich militärischen Gruppen anzuschließen (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 5). Von den von STJ verifizierten rekrutierten Kindern im ersten Quartal des Jahres 2021 sei ein Kind 13 Jahre, ein Kind 14 Jahre, ein weiteres Kind 15 Jahre und zwei Kinder 16 Jahre alt gewesen (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 6/9/10). Auch in den Jahren 2019 und 2020 habe STJ die Rekrutierung von 14-, 15-, und 16-jährigen Kindern (Mädchen und Jungen) bestätigt (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 15/16/18/20-24).

Auch Syria Direct bestätigt in einem Artikel vom September 2020, dass laut mehreren Quellen, unter anderem den Eltern von entführten Kindern, die Gruppe Revolutionäre Jugend für viele der Entführungen und Rekrutierungen verantwortlich sei. Die Revolutionäre Jugend sei in Schulen und Bildungseinrichtungen präsent. Sie würden dort Grooming und Rekrutierung von Kindern betreiben. Sie würden Kinder dazu anleiten, Kurse zu besuchen, bevor sie in ein Trainingslager geschickt würden. Viele Familien würden ihre Kinder nie wiedersehen. Darüber hinaus wisse Syria Direct von mindestens 17 Fällen von Rekrutierung Minderjähriger im Jahr 2020 durch die Frauenverteidigungseinheiten (YPJ) und die Volksverteidigungseinheiten (YPG). (Syria Direct, 15. September 2020).

Weitere ältere Informationen zu Zwangsrekrutierungen von Kindern finden Sie in folgenden Anfragebeantwortungen von ACCORD:

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Provinz Ar-Raqqa: Zwangsrekrutierungen durch die SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), insbesondere Angehörige der arabischen Volksgruppe betreffend, Einsatz der Rekruten [a-11612-1], 9. Juli 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2055775.html

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Provinz Al-Hasaka: Zwangsrekrutierung von 16-jährigen Arabern (Sunniten) durch die syrische Armee oder kurdische Kräfte [a-11596-1], 5. Juli 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2055767.html 

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Zwangsrekrutierung Minderjähriger durch Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) [a-10274], 18. August 2017
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1410546.html 

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Zwangsrekrutierung von Minderjährigen, insbesondere durch kurdische Milizen [a-9608-2 (9609)], 19. April 2016
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1138542.html

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Zwangsrekrutierung von Minderjährigen, insbesondere in Qamischli, Provinz Al-Hassaka [a-8715], 13. Juni 2014
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1041982.html

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 31. Jänner 2022)

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Provinz Ar-Raqqa: Zwangsrekrutierungen durch die SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), insbesondere Angehörige der arabischen Volksgruppe betreffend, Einsatz der Rekruten [a-11612-1], 9. Juli 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2055775.html

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Provinz Al-Hasaka: Zwangsrekrutierung von 16-jährigen Arabern (Sunniten) durch die syrische Armee oder kurdische Kräfte [a-11596-1], 5. Juli 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2055767.html 

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Zwangsrekrutierung Minderjähriger durch Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) [a-10274], 18. August 2017
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1410546.html 

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Zwangsrekrutierung von Minderjährigen, insbesondere durch kurdische Milizen [a-9608-2 (9609)], 19. April 2016
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1138542.html 

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Zwangsrekrutierung von Minderjährigen, insbesondere in Qamischli, Provinz Al-Hassaka [a-8715], 13. Juni 2014
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1041982.html

·      Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: Die Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen im Nordosten Syriens geht weiter... zwischen "SDF" und "Revolutionärer Jugend"

[تجنيد القصّر مستمر شمال شرقي سورية... بين "قسد" و"الشبيبة الثورية"], 5. September 2021
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/society/%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%91%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%22%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF%22-%D9%88%22%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9%22

·      Al-Monitor: US adds Turkey to list of countries using child soldiers, 1. Juli 2021
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/us-adds-turkey-list-countries-using-child-soldiers

·      Al-Monitor: Syrian Kurdish authorities issue work cards for children, 6. Juli 2021
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/syrian-kurdish-authorities-issue-work-cards-children#ixzz7HHqPWeUh

·      ASO News Network: Trafficking in human beings by recruiting children… Violations of the Syrian National Army in military actions without any accountability, 9. Juli 2021
https://aso-network.com/en/archives/26724

·      DIS – Danish Immigration Service: Syria Military Service, Mai 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2031493/Report_Syria_Military_Service_may_2020.pdf

·      EASO - European Asylum Support Office: Country Guidance Syria 2021, Overview: areas of control, November 2021
https://easo.europa.eu/country-guidance-syria-2021/overview-areas-control

·      Hibr Press: SDF lösen eine Mahnwache gegen die Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen in Qamischli auf (Fotos)

[قسد تفض وقفة احتجاجية على تجنيد القاصرين بالقامشلي (صور)], 7. Dezember 2021
https://hibrpress.com/v2/%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%B6-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1/

·      MEMO – Middle East Monitor: Kurdish militia shoots anti-child conscription protesters, 4. Juni 2021
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210604-kurdish-militia-shoots-anti-child-conscription-protesters/

·      NPA – North Press Agency: HTS recruits child soldiers in Syria’s Idlib, 5. September 2020
https://npasyria.com/en/46341/

·      NPA – North Press Agency: Syrian opposition groups recruit child soldiers in Idlib, 10. März 2021
https://npasyria.com/en/55749/

·      SNHR – Syrian Network for Human Rights: On World Children’s Day: Tenth Annual Report on Violations against Children in Syria, 20. November 2021
https://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/On_World_Childrens_Day_Tenth_Annual_Report_on_Violations_against_Children_in_Syria_en.pdf

·      SNHR - Syrian Network for Human Rights: At Least 156 Children Still Conscripted by Syrian Democratic Forces, 16. Dezember 2021
https://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/At_Least_156_Children_Still_Conscripted_by_Syrian_Democratic_Forces_en.pdf

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: “Child Recruitment” by Parties to Conflict in Syria, a Lasting Phenomenon, 5. Mai 2020
https://stj-sy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/%E2%80%9CChild-Recruitment%E2%80%9D-by-Parties-to-Conflict-in-Syria-a-Lasting-Phenomenon.pdf

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: SNA: “Controlling Child Recruitment is Difficult”, 25. Mai 2021
https://stj-sy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/SNA-It-is-Difficult-to-Control-Child-Recruitment.pdf

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: Northeastern Syria: 50 Child Soldiers Demobilized, 19 Others Still Commissioned, 2. Juni 2021
https://stj-sy.org/en/northeastern-syria-50-child-soldiers-demobilized/

·      Syria Direct: SDF continues to recruit child soldiers, despite pledges to stop the practice, 15. September 2020
https://syriadirect.org/sdf-continues-to-recruit-child-soldiers-despite-pledges-to-stop-the-practice/

·      The New Arab: Every major faction in Syria used child soldiers in 2020: UN report, 23. Juni 2021
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/every-major-faction-syria-used-child-soldiers-2020

·      UN Security Council: Children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/398], 23. April 2021
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2021/398&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC

·      UNGA – UN General Assembly, Security Council: Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General [A/75/873–S/2021/437], 6. Mai 2021
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2021/437&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC


Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

Al-Monitor ist eine auf Berichterstattung zum Nahen Osten spezialisierte Medienplattform.

·      Al-Monitor: US adds Turkey to list of countries using child soldiers, 1. Juli 2021
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/us-adds-turkey-list-countries-using-child-soldiers

„The US [United States] State Department has added Turkey to a list of countries implicated in the unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers, the first time the label has been applied to a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally. […]

Turkey has fought Kurdish forces in Syria with the backing of the Syrian National Army, an umbrella group of both moderate and hard-line rebel factions. Some of the proxy fighters have been accused of serious rights violations, including killings, torture and kidnappings, in parts of northeast Syria seized during the Turkish border operations.

A senior State Department official told reporters Thursday that Ankara has provided ‘tangible support’ to the Syrian National Army’s Sultan Murad faction, including transit through Turkish territory during the reporting period of April 2020 through March 2021.

‘This is the first time a NATO member has been listed in the child soldier prevention act list,’ the official said. ‘As a respected regional leader and member of NATO, Turkey has the opportunity to address this issue, the recruitment and use of child soldiers in Syria and Libya.’

Al-Monitor has previously reported on how Turkey-backed factions, including the Sultan Murad division, recruited Syrian children to fight on behalf of the Government of National Accord in Libya.“ (Al-Monitor, 1. Juli 2021)

·      Al-Monitor: Syrian Kurdish authorities issue work cards for children, 6. Juli 2021
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/syrian-kurdish-authorities-issue-work-cards-children#ixzz7HHqPWeUh

„The Child Protection Office affiliated with the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in Manbij has started issuing work cards for children ages 10 to 18, in a move it claims aims to avoid forced conscription by the Syrian Democratic Forces. […]

An employee at the Child Protection Office in Manbij told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, ‘The aim of the decision to issue work cards is to protect children from the SDF, which launched a compulsory military service campaign earlier this year and arrested a large number of young people, including minors ages 14 to 16. By doing so, they ignored all the United Nations agreements on child protection.’“ (Al-Monitor, 6. Juli 2021)

ASO News Network wurde 2016 gegründet und spezialisiert sich auf Nachrichten aus dem kurdischen Teil Syriens.

·      ASO News Network: Trafficking in human beings by recruiting children… Violations of the Syrian National Army in military actions without any accountability, 9. Juli 2021
https://aso-network.com/en/archives/26724

„As described by a military source in the ‘Syrian National Army’ (whose name was not revealed), about 30% of the total number of members of these factions, which range between 50 and 70,000, are minor children, which is an approximate number, according to the source familiar with the mechanism of monitoring and follow-up of the camps and checkpoints of the ‘Syrian National Army’.

The military source spoke about the spread of children at the checkpoints and said that children are accepted to join the national army factions without the slightest hesitation, and upon acceptance, they are subjected to military and legal courses for a period of two months, then they are sent to one of the headquarters, to start working on the lines of contact, and he also confirmed that they are sent to the battlefronts, as this is a main base for the ‘Syrian National Army’ and jihadist groups in Syria.

Recruitment as a systematic process…

Observers of the ‘Syrian National Army’ backed by the Turkish occupation, classify the child recruitment mechanism as systematic, and see that it takes advantage of the harsh conditions experienced by civilians, especially those living in camps, displaced families from other Syrian governorates and families settled in the occupied areas such as Afrin and Serekaniye \ Ras al-Ain, which opens the way for parents to push their children to join the ‘Syrian National Army‘ […]

A military official in the ‘Syrian National Army’ (on condition of anonymity), told ASO News Network that most of the military forces recruit children, which they consider a source of strength for them, given that they grow up to obey leaders, and although everyone resorts to child soldiers But most of them are the ‘Al-Sham Legion,’ followed by the ‘Al-Hamzat Division’ and ‘Sultan Suleiman Shah Division. […]

The ‘Syrian National Army’ includes among its ranks a large number of children.

Journalist Khaled Al-Hamdan from the eastern countryside of Hama and residing in the city of Azaz in the northern countryside of Aleppo, confirms to ASO News Network, that the recruitment of children into the ranks of the National Army is clear, and it is not a secret to anyone. ‘This can be seen through the large numbers of children scattered at the checkpoints within areas of The Euphrates Shield, the Olive Branch and the Occupied Peace Spring, which are under the control of the Turkish-affiliated factions.” (ASO News Network, 9. Juli 2021)

Danish Immigration Service (DIS) ist die dänische Einwanderungsbehörde.

·      DIS – Danish Immigration Service: Syria Military Service, Mai 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2031493/Report_Syria_Military_Service_may_2020.pdf

„Prevalence of recruitment of men under 18 and over 42

69. The SAA [Syrian Arab Army] does not recruit persons under the age of 18, but the pro-government militias do in large numbers, e.g. Syrian Hezbollah, the Local Defense Forces (LDF) etc. According to the source, under-age boys firstly join out of economic necessity as there are no jobs and the economy is destroyed. Secondly, they join pro-government militias for security reasons; people are afraid of being perceived as disloyal by the GoS [Government of Syria] and thus join pro-government militias to prove their loyalty to the GoS.“ (DIS, Mai 2020, S. 54)

„Prevalence of recruitment of men under 18 and over 42

161. The SAA [Syrian Arab Army] is not recruiting men under 18. The source has never heard of such cases. There are procedures that the SAA has been following since before the war.

162. Pro-government militias, the FSA [Free Syrian Army] and the PYD [Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat] recruit men under 18. Only the PYD actually force Kurds under the age of 18 to join them. However, the PYD does not systematically recruit minors.

163. Young people under 18 join pro-government militias voluntarily, because they know that they otherwise will be conscripted to the SAA [Syrian Arab Army]. But the deteriorating economic situation is also pressing many of those young men to join the militias as they are in need of a source of income. The source knows a person from Homs who joined a pro-government militia because he was about to turn 18, and he thus chose the militia over the SAA in the expectation of a higher salary. He also expected that he would likely serve in his home area rather than being sent to the front.“ (DIS, Mai 2020, S. 65/66)

„Prevalence of recruitment of men under 18 and over 42

350. The source has not registered recruitment of anyone under the age of 18 within the official ranks of the SAA [Syrian Arab Army].

351. Within the pro-government militias such as the National Defence Forces (NDF), however, recruitment under 18 is widespread. Minors are recruited to these militias with the consent of the GoS [Government of Syria]. They abuse the circumstances of minors who are affected by poverty and sectarianism and are unable to go to school. The militias also recruit by motivating the children to revenge the death of their relatives.

352. The source has received information from several sources on the case of Mohammad Fares Abdin al-Fares from Aqarab al-Safiya (a town in Salamiya City in the eastern suburbs of Hama governorate), who was forcibly recruited at the age of 16 by his relative who was commander in a pro-government militia. The relative of Mohammad threatened him that he would arrest him if he did not join the militia.“ (DIS, Mai 2020, S. 89)

Middle East Monitor (MEMO) ist eine nichtprofitorientierte Organisation zur Analyse und Übersetzung von Medienprodukten sowie zur Medienbeobachtung in Bezug auf Berichterstattung zum Nahen Osten.

·      MEMO – Middle East Monitor: Kurdish militia shoots anti-child conscription protesters, 4. Juni 2021
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210604-kurdish-militia-shoots-anti-child-conscription-protesters/

„A ruling Kurdish militia in north-east Syria fired on protestors demonstrating against the forced recruitment of their children earlier this week, killing eight and wounding 27 others.

On Monday and Tuesday, protestors in the city of Manbij were protesting against the Kurdish Peoples' Protection Unit (YPG) and its forced recruitment of minors in areas under its control, when militia members fired live ammunition into the crowd. […]

Led by Kurds – and according to Turkey, linked to the terror group the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) – the YPG and the affiliated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are reported to regularly raid predominantly Arab-populated towns and villages in order to kidnap minors and force them into conscription. Those reports were confirmed by the United Nations in 2019, as well as by the United States' Pentagon last year.“ (MEMO, 4. Juni 2021)

North Press Agency ist eine syrische Nachrichtenagentur.

·      NPA – North Press Agency: HTS recruits child soldiers in Syria’s Idlib, 5. September 2020
https://npasyria.com/en/46341/

„Kamal al-Aswad, age 16, misses his studies after he gave up his ambition to become a doctor a few months ago to join the ranks of a faction within HTS [Haiʾat Tahrir asch-Scham] in Idlib. Al-Aswad, who is the eldest son of a displaced family from the city of Saraqeb, tried to search for a job opportunity after his father died from a military injury a year ago, but his search was in vain. Al-Aswad told North Press that he works in a group of 20 people, four of whom are under the age of eighteen, and their mission is to guard the military checkpoints at night. […]

The repeated invitations from HTS, along with poor living conditions, prompt a large proportion of Idlib’s schoolchildren to participate in the fighting in exchange for some money. In previous years, the organization launched several campaigns to attract youth and recruit children, most notably the ‘Go light and heavy’ campaign at the beginning of this year.

14-year-old Waheed al-Yassin joined the fighting after Syrian government forces took control of his village in Idlib countryside about a year ago. Al-Yassin told North-Press that ‘The preachers of the organization visited a mosque in the Atma camps and called us for jihad and defending the land of Muslims, which prompted me and four of my friends to join them.’ Al-Yassin, accompanied by other children, went through a religious intellectual session that lasted for about a month, followed by a combat session that included military tactics, after which they were deployed to the Ribat points in the western countryside of Aleppo […]

Umm Yasser (a pseudonym), a displaced woman in Idlib, told North Press that her eldest son (15 years old) joined the fighting factions with the aim of obtaining money, although she is ‘not satisfied with his joining at this age.’“ (NPA, 5. September 2020)

·      NPA – North Press Agency: Syrian opposition groups recruit child soldiers in Idlib, 10. März 2021
https://npasyria.com/en/55749/

„Child soldiers in the ranks of extremist Turkish-backed armed opposition groups in northwest Syria’s Idlib say that they have undergone military and sharia (Islamic law) courses before participating in military operations, while people say that the extremist da’ees (who call for embracing Islam) offer material and moral temptations to attract children in order to recruit them. Despite the unavailability of accurate statistics on child soldiers among the opposition, an informed source from the armed opposition groups told North Press, ‘a huge number of children are recruited among Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other armed groups.’

On Sunday, ten-year-old Mustafa Kara, a recruiter for Turkish-backed armed opposition groups, was killed in a traffic accident. […]

16-year-old Yasser Abdulrahim, an IDP from the western countryside of Aleppo, is now working in an HTS weapons manufacturing plant in Jisr al-Shughour, southwest of Idlib. ‘The reason why I left school and joined the armed groups was to get a monthly salary amounting to $100,’ Abdulrahim told North Press. […]

15-year-old Mustafa al-Omar, a child recruiter in the Sham Legion, said that he was ‘seeking to help his family,’ and his father, who refused to allow him to join the militant group, could not bring him back home. Al-Omar goes to the vicinity of the town of Afs, east of Idlib, for a week each month to fulfill his tasks as a recruiter.

17-year-old Salim al-Hameed (a pseudonym), from the countryside of Idlib, said that he and three of his friends joined HTS three years ago and immediately received a month-and-a-half long military and sharia course. Al-Hameed participated in a battle against the Syrian government forces in al-Ays, south of Aleppo. He added that he lost one of his 16-year-old friends, while others were wounded.“ (NPA, 10. März 2021)

Das Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) ist eine unabhängige Organisation von Rechercheuren und Aktivist·innen zur Dokumentation von Menschenrechtsverletzungen aller am Krieg in Syrien beteiligten Parteien.

·      SNHR – Syrian Network for Human Rights: On World Children’s Day: Tenth Annual Report on Violations against Children in Syria, 20. November 2021
https://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/On_World_Childrens_Day_Tenth_Annual_Report_on_Violations_against_Children_in_Syria_en.pdf

„Syrian regime forces regularly conscript children, a practice which they began from the earliest days of the popular movement for democracy: since then, these child conscription operations have assumed a more organized and methodical character with the formation of the National Defense Forces, with the regime conscripting children to compensate for the heavy losses in their ranks. Among the regime and regime affiliated forces best known for this practice are the ‘National Defense Force’ and the battalions and brigades of foreign and local militias. Syrian regime forces and militias where the children receive short training courses on carrying weapons before being sent to fight alongside adult soldiers and militiamen, and sometimes being conscripted directly without training. […]

After the Syrian regime took control of large areas that had previously been liberated for years, we observed an increase in the frequency of child recruitment in areas that have been subject to local settlements and reconciliations, mainly in the governorates of Damascus, Daraa and Aleppo.“ (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 31)

„The recruitment of children by the regime forces has resulted in the death of at least 62 children on the battlefields from March 2011 until November 20, 2021.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights estimates that at least 1,374 children are currently serving in the Syrian regime’s forces. We have also documented at least 78 children being recruited into Iranian militias or militias supported by Iran. These children were mainly recruited by the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Al-Quds Brigadem with 23 of them killed while participating in hostilities, especially in the Syrian Badia, and mainly during the clashes with ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].

The child, Mahmoud al Tawil, aged 14, from Aleppo city, was enlisted in the ranks of the Iraqi al Nujaba militia in the suburbs of Aleppo at the beginning of 2020, and is still a conscript with the militia to this day.“ (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 32)

„Since the announcement of the establishment of the Al-Nusra Front in January 2012, it has worked to recruit children in its rank. […]

Muhammad Nour Hussein Abdul Qader, from al Bashiriya village in the suburbs of Idlib governorate, born in 2005, was conscripted into Hay’at Tahrir al Sham’s ranks in August 2021.“ (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 37)

„The Syrian Democratic Forces have used children in forced recruitment on a large scale, as they sought to recruit children, whether voluntarily or forcibly, in all areas of their control, either by attracting children and encouraging them to join its forces and granting them privileges, or through abductions that targeted children while they were in schools, streets and neighborhoods, and established training camps for child soldiers in areas far from their original areas, preventing them from communicating with their families and isolating them from the outside world until the end of their training period and after affecting their beliefs and loyalty towards the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK).

The Revolutionary Youth (Joanne Schurchkar), the Women’s Protection Units and the People’s Protection Units are considered among the most prominent parties responsible for the recruitment of children and their inclusion in the training camps and combat units of the Syrian Democratic Forces.“ (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 42)

„Muhammad Ibrahim al Sadeq, a child from Herbisan village, which is administratively a part of Ein al Arab ‘Kobani’ city in the eastern suburbs of Aleppo governorate, born in 2005, was conscripted by Syrian Democratic Forces on Tuesday, May 25, 2021, and enlisted in one of the SDF training camps in Hasaka governorate.

Wael Adnan Ibrahim, a child from al Qameshli city in the suburbs of Hasaka governorate, born in 2007, was kidnaped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on July 24, 2021, and taken to one of the SDF recruitment centers in al Qameshli city.“ (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 43)

„Ahmed Abdul Baqi Rammou, a child from al Qameshli city in the northeastern suburbs of Hasaka governorate, born in 2005, was conscripted by Syrian Democratic Forces and enlisted in one of the SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] training camps in Hasaka governorate on Thursday, August 12, 2021.

Ahed Absul Ghani Amin, a female child born in 2005, from Tai neighbourhood of Qameshli city in the northeastern suburbs of Hasaka governorate, was conscripted by Syrian Democratic Forces and enlisted in one of the SDF’s training camps in Qameshli on Monday, August 2, 2021.

Fatimah Idris Na’san, a female child born in 2006, from Qoujman village, which is administratively part of Afrin city in the norther suburbs of Aleppo governorate who currently lives in al Shabaa area in north of Aleppo governorate, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces on Friday, August 13, 2021, in al Shahbaa area, and taken to one of the SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] recruitment center.“ (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 44)

„Dana Emad Suleimna, a female child from al Qameshli city in the northeastern suburbs of Hasaka governorate, born in 2006, was kidnapped for forces conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Thursday, August 26, 2021, in al Qameshli city, and taken to one of the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] recruitment centers.

Rama Ali Othman, a female child from Aqeiba town, which is administratively a part of Afrin city in the norther suburbs of Aleppo governorate, born in 2007, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Thursday, June 10, 2021, with the aim of forced recruitment, and taken to one of the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] recruitment centers.“ (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 45)

„The armed opposition factions/National Army forces recruited children within their ranks,“ (SNHR, 20. November 2021, S. 47)

·      SNHR - Syrian Network for Human Rights: At Least 156 Children Still Conscripted by Syrian Democratic Forces, 16. Dezember 2021
https://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/At_Least_156_Children_Still_Conscripted_by_Syrian_Democratic_Forces_en.pdf

„IV. At Least 19 Children Have Been Conscripted Since November 2021 in the Worst Child Kidnapping Campaign Since the beginning of 2021:

Since the beginning of November 2021 up until December 15, 2021, we recorded the kidnapping for conscription of at least 19 children, distributed between nine male and 10 female children; 11 of these kidnappings took place in Hasaka governorate and eight in Aleppo governorate. We have recorded the demobilization of only three of these conscripted children, while 16 are still conscripted.“ (SNHR, 16. Dezember 2021, S. 6)

„Female child, Abir Castor Abdul Aziz, born in 2006, from Blessiyeh village, which is administratively a part of al Malekiya city in the north-eastern suburbs of Hasaka governorate, was kidnaped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Tuesday, November 2, 2021, in al Qameshli city in the suburbs of Hasaka governorate, and taken to one of the SDF’s conscription centers.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights spoke with Ms. Hanan, a relative of Abir’s family, via FB [Facebook] Messenger. She told us: ‘Abir came out of her house at around 12:00 on Tuesday in order to go to a strengthening course at the Hanza Institute in al Qameshli city. On the same day, around 6 p.m., Abir called her mother and told her that she had been forcibly abducted in front of the Hanza Institute by the personnel of Joanne Schurchkar […]

Sidra Khalil Ibrahim, a 14-year-old female child from Abboudan village, which is administratively a part of Afrin city in the northern suburbs of Aleppo governorate, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Saturday, November 6, 2021, from al Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhood in Aleppo city, and taken to one of the SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] conscription centers.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights spoke with Mr. Abdul Rahim Osso, a witness and friend of Sidra’s family, who told us: ‘Sidra was abducted at around 8:00 a.m. while on her way to a shop in al Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhood, by personnel of Joanne Schurchkar.“ (SNHR, 16. Dezember 2021, S. 7)

„Child Muhammad Abdou Bozou, from Kafr Dalla village, which is administratively a part of Afrin city in the northern suburbs of Aleppo governorate, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Monday, November 15, 2021, from al Shahbaa area, north of Aleppo governorate, and taken to one of the SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] conscription cneters.

Child Abdul Rahman Ahmad Berro, from Routanli village, which is administratively a part of Afrin city in the northern suburbs of Aleppo governorate, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Tuesday, November 16, 2021, from al Ashrafiya neighbourhood of Aleppo city, and taken to one of the SDF’s conscription centers.

Female child, Maryam Farid, born in 2009 from Afrin city in the northern suburbs of Aleppo governorate, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Tuesday, November 16, 2021, from Ein al Arab city in the suburbs of Aleppo governorate, and taken to one of the SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] conscription centers.

Female children Hadeya Abdul Rahman Antar, Avin Jalal Khalil, and Ayana Ibrahim Idris, all born in 2006 from Amoud city in the northern suburbs of Hasaka governorate, were kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Sunday, November 21, 2021, from Amouda city, and taken to one of the SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] conscription centers. On November 26, Ayana Ibrahim Idris was returned to her family.“ (SNHR, 16. Dezember 2021, S. 8)

„Child Ahmad Sheikh Zidan Mustafa, born in 2007 from Zougher village, which is administratively a part of Ein Arab city in the suburbs of Aleppo governorate, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Monady, November 22, 2021, and taken to one of the SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] conscription centers.

Child Isam Muhammad Eisa, born in 2008, from Qatama village, which is administratively a part of Afrin city in the northern suburbs of Aleppo governorate, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Tuesday, November 23, 2021, near the Martyr Qahraman School in al Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhood in Aleppo city, and taken to one of the SDF’s conscription. On November 30, he was returned to his family.

Khattab Abeid Hasa, a 15-year-old child from al Hilaliya neighbourhood of al Qameshli city in the northern suburbs of Hasaka governorate, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syran Democratic Forces personnel on Friday, November 24, 2021, from al Hilaliya neighbourhood, and taken to one of the SDF’s conscription centers. […]

Female child, Dulafa Abdou Hasan, born in 2009 from Shiran village, which is administratively a part of Ein Arab city in the suburbs of Aleppo governorate, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forces personnel on Friday, November 26, 2021, and taken to one of the SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] conscription centers.“ (SNHR, 16. Dezember 2021, S. 10)

„Muhammad Fa’eq Hanan, a 15-year-old child from al Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhood in Aleppo city, was kidnapped for forced conscription by Syrian Democratic Forced personnel on Friday, November 26, 2021, from al Sheih Maqsoud neighbourhood, and taken to one of the SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] conscription centers.“ (SNHR, 16. Dezember 2021, S. 11)

Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) besteht aus einem Team von Forschern, Anwälten und Freiwilligen, die sich der Aufdeckung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen in ganz Syrien widmen.

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: “Child Recruitment” by Parties to Conflict in Syria, a Lasting Phenomenon, 5. Mai 2020
https://stj-sy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/%E2%80%9CChild-Recruitment%E2%80%9D-by-Parties-to-Conflict-in-Syria-a-Lasting-Phenomenon.pdf

„The factions of the Syrian National Army/SNA, which Turkey backs, while affiliated to the Syrian Interim Government / The National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, have also recruited children within their ranks in Ras al-Ayn / Sari Kani area, after the offensive Peace Spring was launched against the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] in December 2019 by Turkish forces with the support of the SNA. In the after math of the offensive, Ankara and its allies controlled wide border area in northeastern Syria, about 120 km, extending between the cities of Ras Al-Ayn / Sari Kani, north of al-Hasakah, and Tel Abyad, north of Raqqa. Child recruitment emerged in Ras Al-Ayn / Sari Kani area before the SNA’s factions held reigns to power there, specifically in November 2019, which is less than a month before these factions managed to take it over. Recruitments, nonetheless, mounted in time, according to a Ras al-Ayn / Sari Kani-based media activist.“ (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 11)

„Several sources reported that the Sultan Murad Brigade, the Hamza Brigade / al-Hamzat and the Ahrar Sharqiya/Rebels of the Eastern Area are responsible for most cases of child recruitment in Ras Al-Ayn / Sari Kani. Furthermore, the recruitment cases, which are carried out by the factions of the SNA [Syrian National Army], in Ras al-Ayn/ Sari Kani are way beyond the cases registered in the city.

In this regard, STJ’s [Syrians for Truth and Justice] field researcher recorded that the Tukey-backed armed groups of SNA, including Ahrar Sharqiya/Rebels of the Eastern Area and the Sultan Murad Brigade, have recruited three children at least within their ranks. The children were yet captives when this report was prepared, namely on March 31, 2020. The recruitments took place mostly in the town of Tal Halaf, 5 km southwest of Ras Al-Ayn / Sari Kani, according to the testimonies of the recruited children’s parents, who refused to reveal their names concerned for their safety.

Firas M., 15, from the town of Tal Halaf, was one of the children enlisted by the Sultan Murad Brigade in the city of Ras al-Ayn / Sari Kani in January 2020, ignoring the pleas of his parents, who demanded that their son be released being he a minor. […]

Abbass M., 16, from Tal Halaf town, is a second child who had been recruited by the Ahrar al-Sharqiya/Rebels of the Eastern Area in late 2019 to the day this report was prepared, on March 31, 2020.“ (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 12)

„Additionally, STJ [Syrians for Truth and Justice], in a report prepared in March 2020 (to be published in May), documented that the Turkey-backed factions of the SNA [Syrian National Army] had recruited children from northern rural Aleppo, who were displaced / or choose to settle there, coming from other provinces. These children will be transferred to the fronts in Libya, in exchange for monthly sums of money. In February 2020, a fighter mobilized to Tripoli – Libya, confirmed this information, adding:

‘Within my division, I saw five children at least. It was clear that they are under the age of 18, both their physical appearances and inability to use arms proved it. It is also important to mention, that they were assigned different tasks.’“ (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 14)

„In areas outside the Syrian government’s control, in Idlib province particularly, the phenomenon of child recruitment has been mounting with the spread of Islamist factions and the increase of their popularity in 2012 and 2013. The most prominent of these factions is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham/HTS, which was established in early 2017 and took over most of Idlib province later on.

With the start of the military campaign that the Syrian regular forces and allies launched against Idlib province in May 2019, HTS, along with its affiliated or close armed groups, has embarked on a number of campaigns in northwestern Syria, covering Idlib, rural Aleppo and rural Hama. The campaigns seek to urge people to fight, including children.“ (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 15)

„Omar M., 16, born in the village of Jabal al-Zawiya, was displaced with his family to the camps of Deir Hassan in Northern Syria after his town was bombarded. In the camp, he was recruited into the ranks of HTS in late 2019 during the ‘Infiro Khifafan wa-Thikalan/Go forth, whether Light or Heavy. Omar was still a recruit when this report was being prepared, on March 31, 2020. […]

Samer M, 16, from rural Jisr al-Shughour is another child recruited by HTS [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham] in late 2019. He attended a 40-day-training camp in the city of Harem and participated in the confrontations between HTS and the Syrian regular forces. Once HTS got defeated, Samer opted for dissent and joined urrās ad-Dīn /Guardians of Religion Organizations, based in the Turkmen Mountains. Samer was yet a recruit when this report was being prepared, on March 31, 2020. […]

In areas held by the Syrian regular forces and loyalist militias, child recruitment started in 2018, after the latter took full control of the city of Damascus and its countryside. Militias including the National Defense, the al-Nujaba movement and the Lebanese Hezbollah enlisted children within their ranks.“ (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 17)

„In 2019, child recruitment witnessed an upsurge in these areas, as these militias took advantage of the poor financial conditions of many families, especially the displaced ones, where local activists estimated the number of children who were recruited into their ranks with dozens, as they targeted the most vulnerable groups of children, offering them money and power.

Khalid M., 16, from Damascus countryside, is one of the children recruited by the National Defense Forces of the Syrian government in mid-2019, after his family was displaced to a town west of the capital, Damascus. Khalid is perhaps his family’s breadwinner, for his father died in the detention centers of the Syrian regular forces, which makes the main reason for his joining their ranks. […]

Luay D., 16, from Eastern Ghouta, is another child who had been recruited into the ranks of the Iranian militias loyal to the Syrian government, established in Damascus city. Enlisted in late 2019, Luay was still a recruit when this report was prepared, on March 26, 2020.“ (STJ, 5. Mai 2020, S. 18)

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: SNA: “Controlling Child Recruitment is Difficult”, 25. Mai 2021
https://stj-sy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/SNA-It-is-Difficult-to-Control-Child-Recruitment.pdf

„Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) verified that factions operating under the opposition’s Syrian National Army (SNA) have been recruiting children among their ranks.. Field researchers with STJ obtained information and testimonies confirming that at least 20 minors are currently commissioned within the ranks of the SNA. When our researchers interviewed faction commanders, they claimed it is difficult to control child recruitment despite difficult steps taken to end the practice. […]

On 19 May 2020, the Ministry of Defense—General Staff of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG)— made a statement banning the recruitment or voluntary conscription of children under 18 years old within the SNA. Additionally, the statement provided for the immediate discharge of the children already enlisted.“ (STJ, 25. Mai 2021, S. 3)

„Field researchers with STJ reached out to command-level military sources to obtain details about the implementation of the ban on child recruitment. The two sources, from two separate SNA-affiliated factions, said that minors continue to be enlisted into the ranks of the SNA despite the direct orders to end the practice and discharge commissioned children. The sources added that several faction commanders did not adhere to orders and insisted on enlisting children, relying on means and mechanisms which allow them to circumvent the general system by which the SNA operates.

While the two sources noted that child recruitment decreased significantly after the ban and noted that several restrictions have been instituted to obstruct new recruitments since May 2020, they added it is to monitor and control the actions of smaller military groups spread throughout towns and villages.“ (STJ, 25. Mai 2021, S. 4/5)

„Field researchers with STJ obtained detailed information on three cases of child recruitment. These children were enlisted at an early age and remain under 18 years old. Moreover, all three children continue to perform the military tasks assigned within the Sultan Murad Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade (also known as al-Amshat). The field researchers compiled the information from fighters within the two groups.

A fighter of the Sultan Murad Division confirmed that there were 21 children under the age of 18 at the Abdul Qader Saleh Military Training Camp— located in Sajo border village, near Azaz city in the northern countryside of Aleppo— in March and May 2020. After the training, these minors were deployed to various areas, including Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ayn/Serê Kaniyê.“ (STJ, 25. Mai 2021, S. 6)

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: Northeastern Syria: 50 Child Soldiers Demobilized, 19 Others Still Commissioned, 2. Juni 2021
https://stj-sy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Northeastern-Syria-50-Child-Soldiers-Demobilized-19-Others-Commissioned.pdf

„Despite the two binding agreements, Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) documented that the Revolutionary Youth’s Union (RYU) recruited at least 19 male and female minors, from early May 2020 till the end of the year. Additionally, STJ recorded the demobilization of four female and three male recruits after parents filed complaints to the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces].

Over the first quarter of 2021, STJ verified that the RYU recruited an additional seven male and female minors, who were still commissioned at the time of writing on 16 April 2021.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 4)

„The majority of interviewed families told STJ that the RYU [Revolutionary Youth’s Union] (known as Ciwanên Şoreşger in Kurdish) is the key perpetrator of child enlistments in northeastern Syria.

Additionally, a field researcher with STJ [Syrians for Truth and Justice] recounted that the RYU has been recruiting children for years in northeastern Syria. The researcher added that the group quit many of their activities, such as holding social and intellectual events, in late 2020 and ramped up enlistment activities instead. Increased recruitment followed calls by the Force Commander of the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces], General Mazloum Abdi, for all the Kurdish actors in the region to unite.

The RYU uses a practiced child recruitment method. RYU teenage members approach target children in the school or the street, establish friendships with them, and then invite them to participate in intellectual and educational lectures and courses organized by the RYU in their affiliated academic centers, where they are ultimately lured into joining military groups.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 5)

„In early January, the RYU [Revolutionary Youth’s Union] recruited female minor N. Shukri, 14, into the ranks of the YPJ [Women’s Protection Unit] in the city of Kobanî. […]

In February 2021, a field researcher with STJ [Syrians for Truth and Justice] documented the recruitment of at least six children. At the beginning of the month, male minor A. Rami, 16, was recruited in Karda village, west of Kobanî.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 6)

„Once again in Kobanî city, the RYU [Revolutionary Youth’s Union] recruited female minor S. Mahou, 16, a resident of the Jubnah village, west of the city, on 12 February 2021. […]

A few days after S. Mahou was recruited, the RYU [Revolutionary Youth’s Union] enlisted female minor A. Bahri, 13, in al-Hasakah city on 16 February 2021.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 9)

„On the same day, 16 February 2021, male minor F. al-Hamdo, 15, left his home in Qamishli /Qamishlo and never returned.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 10)

„In a previous report, STJ [Syrians for Truth and Justice] documented the recruitment of three female minors in 2019 and early 2020. The SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] enlisted Sultana Bakr, 16, from the town of Shaykh al-Hadid in the countryside of Afrin on 7 January 2020, Yasmeen Rashid, 14, from the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood in Aleppo in late 2019, and Aisha Mohammad, 15, in February 2019. For the purposes of this report, STJ tracked these three cases and discovered that all three female minors were still serving within SDF ranks.

Furthermore, STJ documented the recruitment of at least 19 male and female minors in northeastern Syria between early May and December 2020. Seven of these child soldiers were subsequently demobilized. On 23 May 2020, female minor S. Hasso, 16, was enlisted by the RYU [Revolutionary Youth’s Union] into the ranks of the YPJ [Women’s Protection Unit] in Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood in Aleppo.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 15)

„In a second case in Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, STJ documented that the YPG [People’s Defense Unit] recruited male minor S. Zinki, 15, on 25 May 2020. […]

On 29 May 2020, the YPJ [Women’s Protection Unit] approved the recruitment of female minor J. Suleiman, 16, into their ranks in Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 16)

„In Qamishli/Qamishlo city, in al-Hasakah province, STJ documented the recruitment of female minor H. Ghaibi, 15, by RYU [Revolutionary Youth’s Union]-affiliated teenagers on 25 June 2020. […]

Over July 2020, STJ detected a spike in RYU-pretreated recruitments. Early that month, the group enlisted 9th grader male D. Jum’a, 15, from Kobanî city.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 18)

„In Minas village, West of Kobanî, the RYU [Revolutionary Youth’s Union] recruited female minor J. Ayoub, 14, on 6 July 2020.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 20)

„On 11 July 2020, the RYU [Revolutionary Youth’s Union] recruited two female minors— A. Hussein, 14, and Gh. Isso, 15— in Saftak village, in Kobanî countryside.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 21)

„On 28 July 2020, the RYU [Revolutionary Youth’s Union] recruited male minor Y. Muhyiddin, 16, in the city of Qamishli /Qamishlo.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 22)

„In mid-August 2020, the YPJ [Women’s Protection Unit] recruited female minor Sh. al-Darwish, 15, in Hamrat Jamsa, east of Raqqa city.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 23)

„On 8 October 2020, STJ recorded that the YPJ [Women’s Protection Unit] recruited a female minor, R. Aliko, 16, in Qamishli/Qamishlo city.“ (STJ, 2. Juni 2021, S. 24)

Syria Direct ist eine 2013 gegründete Nachrichtenorganisation mit Sitz in Amman, Jordanien, die über den Krieg in Syrien und syrische Politik berichtet und Journalisten ausbildet.

·      Syria Direct: SDF continues to recruit child soldiers, despite pledges to stop the practice, 15. September 2020
https://syriadirect.org/sdf-continues-to-recruit-child-soldiers-despite-pledges-to-stop-the-practice/

„Further, according to parents of abducted children in northeast Syria and human rights monitors who spoke with Syria Direct, children are continuing to be kidnapped and recruited by YPG/YPJ- [People’s Defense Units/Women’s Protection Unit] affiliated groups in the area. Syria Direct was made aware of at least 17 such cases of recruitment in 2020. […]

However, multiple sources, including parents of abducted children, pointed to one group as being the culprit of many of the kidnappings and recruitments: Shabiba al-Thawra (Youth of the Revolution in English). 

Shabiba al-Thawra, or Ciwanên Şoresger in Kurdish, is a youth empowerment movement located in northeast Syria that is known for its ties to the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leadership based in the Qandil mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan. The group has centers across northeast Syria and offers educational lectures on Kurdish history and nationalism to youth in the area.  […]

Interviews with parents of kidnapped children and sources with knowledge of Shabiba al-Thawra revealed a methodical and orderly kidnapping process. There are no armed men descending upon families and forcibly snatching children, but rather the meticulous grooming and recruitment of children seen as having the potential to benefit the Kurdish independence movement, both in Syria and abroad. 

Shabiba al-Thawra maintains a presence in schools and educational facilities across the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AA), the Kurdish-led political authority running most of northeast Syria. It is there, sources alleged, that the group selects the children it will target. 

After selecting children, members of the group approach the children in schools or at sports events and invite them to take classes on the history of Kurdistan and issues important to Kurdish nationalism. These classes can last anywhere from a month to a year before children are sent to a training camp in Ramalien, a town on the outskirts of Qamishli. 

From the training camp, the children are divided into those who want to fight for the PKK and those who want to stay in northeast Syria and fight for the independence of Rojava with the YPG. […]

Like Shafan’s parents, many families never see their kidnapped children again. However, in the case of Ronida Dari—an 11-year-old girl kidnapped in July from the town of Amuda in Hasakah province—her parents were able to secure her return in August. They were largely able to get her back due to their close relationship with the commanding general of the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces], Mazloum Abdi, as well as with other PKK leaders.“ (Syria Direct, 15. September 2020)

The New Arab (Al Araby Al Jadeed) ist ein 2014 in London gegründetes Medienunternehmen.

·      The New Arab: Every major faction in Syria used child soldiers in 2020: UN report, 23. Juni 2021
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/every-major-faction-syria-used-child-soldiers-2020

„Rights groups have described active recruitment of children for Syrian regime forces and associated Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah militias in Damascus and its countryside. Regime forces and affiliated groups recruited children from impoverished areas and conscripted them sometimes without the permission or knowledge of their parents.“ (The New Arab, 23. Juni 2021)

UN Security Council ist der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen.

·      UN Security Council: Children and armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/398], 23. April 2021
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2021/398&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC

„7. The recruitment and use of children continued to be widespread and systematic, with 1,423 verified cases (1,306 boys, 117 girls), comprising 274 in the second half of 2018, 837 in 2019 and 312 in the first half of 2020. Some 1,388 of the children (98 per cent) served in a combat role. At the time of recruitment, 250 children (18 per cent) were under 15 years of age. The recruitment and use of children was verified in 11 out of 14 governorates, with 73 per cent of cases verified in the north-western part of the Syrian Arab Republic (Idlib, Aleppo and Hama) and 26 per cent in the north-eastern part (Raqqah, Hasakah and Dayr al-Zawr).

8. Verified cases were attributed to at least 25 parties, among which were armed groups, pro-government militia and Syrian armed forces, including Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (507); the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG, 318) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ, 99) under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces; Syrian armed opposition groups formerly known as FSA (328), Ahrar al-Sham (55) and Nur al-Din al-Zanki (11), all nominally operating under the umbrella of the opposition Syrian National Army since October 2019; other SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] components (37); the internal security forces (34); government forces (13); pro-government militia (10); ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] (6); the Afrin Liberation Forces (3); and unidentified armed groups (2). No new cases were verified for Army of Islam since the issuance of a command order in April 2018 prohibiting all recruitment of those under 18 years of age.

9. A significant increase was observed in the recruitment and use of children by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, with 36 per cent of all verified cases. Boys as young as 10 years of age were recruited from 11 different districts in Idlib, Aleppo and Hama, highlighting the common practice across areas held by the group. Child recruitment by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham accelerated significantly, from 61 cases in the second half of 2018 to 187 cases in the first half of 2020. In May 2019, for example, two boys who were 16 and 17 years of age joined Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and served as guards at the Karamah camp in Harim, Idlib, after six weeks of training. They also worked as police officers at the sharia court affiliated with the Syrian Salvation Government.

10. The recruitment and use of large numbers of children was attributed to SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] and its components, as well as the affiliated internal security forces under the authority of the self-administration in northern and eastern Syria, representing 35 per cent of all verified cases. In one example from September 2018, a 16-year-old girl disappeared from her school in Qamishli, Hasakah, and joined YPJ [Women’s Protection Units] at its base in Antariyah, from where she was deployed to a military training camp in Karbawi for three weeks. However, child recruitment by SDF and the internal security forces decreased significantly over the reporting period, in particular following the signature of a joint action plan with the United Nations in June 2019 to end and prevent child recruitment and use, after which it fell from 216 cases in the first half of 2019 to 41 cases in the first half of 2020. Therefore, 67 per cent of the verified incidents occurred prior to the signing of the action plan. Since its signing, 160 cases have occurred, including 23 children under 15 years of age and 149 children serving in a combat role. Most cases occurred in the Raqqah (42) and Manbij (40) districts.

11. At least 12 Syrian armed opposition groups formerly known as FSA [Free Syrian Army], as well as Ahrar al-Sham and Nur al-Din al-Zanki, were responsible for 28 per cent of all verified cases. Numbers remained consistently high, with 91 cases in the second half of 2018, 224 cases in 2019 and 79 cases in the first half of 2020. In one example from July 2018, an 8-year-old boy from Taqad village in Aleppo joined Faylaq al-Sham following the killing of his father. The boy stayed at the military base and carried a weapon. In another instance from February 2020, two boys, 15 and 16 years of age, were recruited by the Mu‘tasim Brigade of the armed opposition groups formerly known as FSA in Mare’ village in Aleppo and sent to fight in Libya by the Sultan Murad Division after two weeks of military training. The boys were promised a stipend of $3,000 and accommodation in Libya.

12. A total of 23 cases of child recruitment and use by government forces (13) and pro-government militia (10) were verified and attributed to government forces in Dar‘a (5), Hasakah (4) and Aleppo (4), and to pro-government militia in Damascus. In one incident from February 2019, two 16-year-old boys previously associated with the al-Hamzah Brigade armed opposition group were guarding a government forces checkpoint in Ankhal, Sanamayn in Dar‘a Governorate. The boys were recruited again during the ‘reconciliation agreements’ of July 2018 and received a stipend.

13. Verified cases served to confirm that factors in the recruitment of children included: financial incentives; revenge for the death of relatives; the affiliation of fathers, brothers and uncles; social status and community pressure; access to services and goods; the fear of arrest and detention by controlling or opposing belligerents; and the urge to protect their communities. Children also switched affiliation after an opposing party gained control of an area, signifying the absence of a strong ideological allegiance. Despite a complex security environment, 398 children who informally disengaged or were formally demobilized from parties to the conflict received support to return to civilian life.“ (UN Security Council, 23. April 2021, S. 3-5)

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ist die Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen.

·      UNGA – UN General Assembly, Security Council: Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General [A/75/873–S/2021/437], 6. Mai 2021
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2021/437&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC

„The United Nations verified the recruitment and use of 813 children (777 boys, 36 girls) by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (390); Syrian armed opposition groups formerly known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) (170); the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and Women’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ) (119) under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); pro-government militia (42); Ahrar al-Sham (31), Nur al-Din al-Zanki (3) and Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam) (3), all nominally operating under the umbrella of the opposition Syrian National Army (SNA) since October 2019; the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) (30); the Internal Security Forces (13); Hurras al-Din (6); ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant(] (4); and Syrian government forces (2). Cases were verified mainly in Idlib (477) and Aleppo (119). Of those, 99 per cent (805) were used in combat. In addition, the recruitment and use of 24 children (20 boys, 4 girls) by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (7), Syrian armed opposition groups formerly known as FSA [Free Syrian Army] (6), YPG/YPJ (8), ISIL, pro-government militia and the Kurdish Revolutionary Youth (1 each) were verified at a later date.“ (UNGA, 6. Mai 2021, S. 24)