Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Autonome Administration von Nord- und Ostsyrien (AANES): Informationen zu Clans und Stämmen (Präsenz, Strukturen, Mitgliedschaften, bewaffnete Konflikte/Konkurrenzkämpfe in Raqqa und Deir ez-Zor, Militärische Kontrolle der Stämme und Möglichkeit machthabende Kräfte herauszufordern, mögliche Verwaltung über die Bevölkerung) [a‑12264]

16. November 2023

Diese Anfragebeantwortung wurde für die Veröffentlichung auf ecoi.net abgeändert.

Kurzbeschreibungen zu den in dieser Anfragebeantwortung verwendeten Quellen sowie Ausschnitte mit Informationen aus diesen Quellen finden Sie im Anhang.

Inhaltsverzeichnis
Clan- bzw. Stammespräsenz und -strukturen in der AANES (Raqqa und Deir ez-Zor)  2

Mitgliedschaft 4

Bewaffnete Konflikte/Konkurrenzkampf zwischen Clans und Stämmen in der AANES (Raqqa und Deir ez-Zor) 4

Militärische Kontrolle der Stämme und die Möglichkeit machthabende Kräfte herauszufordern. 6

Stammesstrukturen, die Verwaltung und militärische Kontrolle über die Bevölkerung ermöglichen. 8

Quellen 10

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen. 12

 

Clan- bzw. Stammespräsenz und -strukturen in der AANES (Raqqa und Deir ez-Zor)

Chatham House schreibt im Jänner 2018, dass laut Schätzungen aus der Zeit vor 2011 zwischen 60 und 70 Prozent der syrischen Bevölkerung einem Clan oder Stamm angehören würden (Chatham House, 11. Jänner 2018). Syria Direct beschreibt Clans als eine tragende Säule der Gesellschaft („fundamental pillar of society“) in den meisten Provinzen Syriens (Syria Direct, 9. Dezember 2022). Laut Chatham House seien Stämme Nordostsyrien sehr präsent. Der größte Stamm der Region sei der Stamm der Jubur, gefolgt von den Stämmen der Tayy, Bakara, Anazzah und Shammar. Die bekanntesten arabischen Stämmeskräfte, die sich den Kurden angeschlossen hätten, seien die Al-Sanadid-Streitkräfte, angeführt von einem Scheich des Shammar-Stammes. Im Gebiet des Euphrats (Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa und Südosten der Provinz Aleppo) seien die berühmtesten Stämme Akidat, Qays und Bakara und die wichtigsten Clans seien die Clans der Dulaim, Shaitat, Albu Saraya, Albu Chabur, Al-Boleel, Al-Namis, Al-Butush und Al-Asasna. Chatham House beschreibt auch die Existenz von kurdischen, turkmenischen, alawitischen, drusischen und christlichen Stämmen in Syrien (Chatham House, 11. Jänner 2018). Laut Enab Baladi seien die meisten der von den SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) kontrollierten Gebiete (d.h. die AANES, Anmerkung ACCORD) von arabischen und kurdischen Stämmen und Clans bewohnt, wobei arabische Clans und Stämme die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung im Osten und Nordosten Syriens ausmachen würden (Enab Baladi, 24. Jänner 2021).

Die Quellen über Nordostsyrien, die im Zuge der Onlinerecherche gefunden wurden, beziehen sich vorrangig auf die arabischen Stämme der Region.

Die Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) beschreibt in einem Bericht über die Provinz Raqqa vom Dezember 2019 die arabischen Stämme, neben der Existenz syrischer Kurd·innen und Turkmen·innen, als wesentlichen Bestandteil der Bevölkerung in der Provinz. Der Bericht listet die Namen von 36 in der Provinz Raqqa ansässigen Stämmen auf, zusammen mit deren Wohnorten und einigen grundlegenden Informationen über den jeweiligen Stamm (ACU, Dezember 2019, S. 18-20). Die gesamte Liste finden Sie im Anhang.

Das Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR) veröffentlicht auf Seite 12 seines Berichts über Stämme im Nordosten Syriens vom Mai 2019 eine Landkarte der Stammesgebiete (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 12).

Das Middle East Institute (MEI) erklärt in einem Bericht über Stämme in Raqqa vom Mai 2021, dass Stämme in Syrien, wie im Rest der arabischen Welt, in kleinere Parallelgruppen unterteilt seien, die als Asha’ir („Clans“) und Afkhad („Abstammungslinien“) bekannt seien. Stämme könnten auch Zweige von größeren konföderalen Systemen sein, sogenannten Stammeskonföderationen, die „politisch unter einer zentralen Autorität vereint seien“, wie zum Beispiel die Anizah- und Shammar-Konföderationen. Jeder Stamm habe einen traditionellen Anführer (auf Arabisch „Scheich“ genannt), der einer bestimmten Scheichfamilie innerhalb des Stammes angehöre. Es könne zu Meinungsverschiedenheiten darüber kommen, wer innerhalb einer Scheichfamilie die Führung innehabe (MEI, 24. März 2021).

Laut COAR müssten Stammesführer Mitglieder des Stammes sein. Im Idealfall würden die Anführer aus den prominenteren Familien des Stammes kommen, die traditionell und historisch Führungspositionen innehatten. Da der Stamm grundsätzlich auf der Idee einer gemeinsamen Verwandtschaft basiere, sei die Möglichkeit sich auf die Erbgeschichte zu berufen, um Führungsansprüche zu rechtfertigen, ein wichtiger Bestandteil der Legitimität eines Stammesführers. Es gebe vier wesentliche Komponenten, die die Stammesführung im heutigen Nordostsyrien definieren würden: Familie, Finanzierung, Freundschaften und Kämpfer (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 8). Bei den Stammesführern handle es sich in der Praxis um populäre oder einflussreiche Personen, die in der Lage seien innerhalb eines verwandtschaftlichen Solidaritätsnetzwerks erhebliche Unterstützung zu mobilisieren (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 3).

Mitgliedschaft

Laut COAR seien Stämme von einem gemeinsamen Verwandtschaftsnetzwerk geprägt, das auf einer gemeinsamen väterlichen Abstammung basiere. Grundsätzlich sei die Stammeszugehörigkeit ein unveränderliches Merkmal, was bedeutet, dass man den Stamm nicht wechseln könne (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 6).

MEI erklärt weiters, dass die meisten Mitglieder eines Stammes aus Gruppen stammen würden, die tatsächlich oder potenziell fiktiv verwandtschaftlich verbunden seien. Neben der klassischen Definition von Stämmen, die sich auf Gruppen von Menschen mit gemeinsamer Abstammung beziehe, habe MEI in seiner Studie auch kleine Gruppen von Menschen inkludiert, die aus bestimmten Orten in Syrien stammen würden, diese verlassen hätten, sich jedoch über diese Orte identifizieren würden. Ein Beispiel seien die Al-Sakhani, die Mitte des letzten Jahrhunderts aus der syrischen Stadt Al-Sukhnah weggezogen seien (MEI, 24. März 2021).

Bewaffnete Konflikte/Konkurrenzkampf zwischen Clans und Stämmen in der AANES (Raqqa und Deir ez-Zor)

Enab Baladi veröffentlicht im Jänner 2021 einen Artikel über Stammeskonflikte in Ostsyrien. Streitigkeiten, Blutfehden und andere Konflikte würden zu Kämpfen zwischen Clans, insbesondere arabischen Clans in Ostsyrien, führen. Im Mai 2020 sei es zu Kämpfen in Deir ez-Zor zwischen den Clans Albufrio und Al-Bakir gekommen. Die Kämpfe hätten zu Toten und Verletzten auf beiden Seiten geführt. Die Ursache sei unklar. Möglicherweise habe es sich um einen Racheakt gehandelt. Anfang Dezember 2020 sei es östlich von Deir ez-Zor zu einem Konflikt zwischen Mitgliedern des Shaitat-Stammes gekommen. Auch in diesem Fall seien die Ursachen des Konflikts unklar, da die Stammesmitglieder nicht bereit seien öffentlich darüber zu sprechen. Die Kämpfe hätten 72 Stunden angedauert und die SDF hätten eine Ausgangssperre verhängt, Razzien durchgeführt und Checkpoints errichtet. Laut Enab Baladi würden sich die SDF von den meisten Stammeskonflikten distanzieren (Enab Baladi, 24. Jänner 2021).

Al-Monitor berichtet im Mai 2022, dass die Stammeskonflikte im Nordosten Syriens seit Anfang 2022 zunehmen würden. Laut Daten, die von SyriaTV, einem oppositionsfreundlichen syrischen Fernsehsender mit Sitz in Istanbul, gesammelt und am 28. April veröffentlicht worden seien, seien im ersten Quartal 2022 zwölf Menschen in Folge von bewaffneten Stammeskonflikten und Racheakten in der Provinz Hasakah getötet worden, sechs in Deir ez-Zor und zwei in Raqqa. Das Eye of Euphrates Network, das über die Entwicklungen in der östlichen Region Syriens berichte, habe am 30. April den Tod von vier Menschen und sieben Verletzte in der Provinz Deir ez-Zor, als Folge eines Disputs zwischen zwei Familien in der Stadt Abu Hamam, dokumentiert. Laut Ibrahim Al-Hussein, einem Journalisten, der dem Al-Shaitat-Clan aus Abu Hamam angehöre, sei die hohe Zahl der Tötungen entweder auf einfache Streitigkeiten zurückzuführen, die durch den Einsatz von Waffen ausarten würden, oder auf Racheakte innerhalb der Clangemeinschaft. Laut Al-Hussein sei der blutige Streit Ende April 2022 ein Racheakt für die Ermordung der Söhne einer der beiden verfeindeten Familien durch unbekannte bewaffnete Männer im Jahr 2020 gewesen. Stammeskonflikte könnten über mehrere Tage andauern und würden zu einer völligen Ausgangssperre in dem Gebiet führen, in dem die Gewalt auftrete. Außenstehende würden nicht schlichtend eingreifen. Von diesen Zusammenstößen seien auch Mitglieder der Stämme betroffen, die mit dem ursprünglichen Konflikt nichts zu tun hätten. Anas Shawakh, Politikwissenschaftler und Experte für Angelegenheiten des östlichen Euphrat am Jusoor Center for Studies, sei der Ansicht, dass das Clan-System zu ständigen Konflikten führe (Al-Monitor, 11. Mai 2022).

Syria Direct erklärt im Dezember 2022, dass der jahrelange Konflikt in Syrien und Machtverschiebungen zur Zunahme von Stammeskonflikten geführt hätten. Zwischen Anfang 2022 und Ende Oktober 2022 habe Syria Direct 46 Vorfälle von Clanstreitigkeiten und Versöhnungen dokumentiert. Bei 29 dieser Vorfälle, die sich im Norden und Osten Syriens ereigneten, seien die einzelnen Konfliktparteien dokumentiert worden. Als Beispiel nennt Syria Direct die Versöhnung von zwei Familien desselben Clans in der Provinz Deir ez-Zor im November 2022 nach einer 25 Jahre dauernden Vendetta. Der Artikel zitiert weiters Scheich Hassan Al-Khamri des Stammes Al-Walda aus der Gegend der Stadt Tabqa, im nördlichen Raqqa. Der Scheich habe gegenüber Syria Direct von einem Streit berichtet, der mit einem Mord geendet habe, nachdem eine Person als vogelfrei (ihdar al-dam) erklärt worden sei, weil sie die Regierung unterstützt habe. Der Scheich habe außerdem geholfen tödliche Streitigkeiten beizulegen, wie beispielsweise nach einem Mord als Folge einer Meinungsverschiedenheit über Land und Eigentum, sowie nach einem weiteren Mord, nachdem die Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) in das Gebiet eingedrungen war und es unter dem Vorwand vom Glauben abgefallen zu sein zu Morden gekommen sei. Laut dem Scheich hätten Clanstreitigkeiten nach der Vertreibung des IS „erheblich zugenommen“. Laut Scheich Al-Rahhal (ebenfalls dem Stamm der Al-Walda zugehörig, jedoch von einem anderen Clan) hätten Vorfälle mit Clancharakter in Raqqa seit 2011 um bis zu 75 Prozent zugenommen. Al-Khamri habe gegenüber Syria Direct erklärt, dass es eine Zunahme an Rachemorden, Waffengewalt und eine große Anzahl individueller Auseinandersetzungen, die sich zu Clankonflikten ausweiten würden, gebe (Syria Direct, 9. Dezember 2022).

Al-Monitor erklärt in seinem Artikel über Stammesgewalt im Nordosten Syriens vom Mai 2022, dass die SDF bei Zusammenstößen zwischen den Stämmen im Allgemeinen neutral bleibe und nicht eingreife. In den Gebieten, in denen arabische Stämme weit verbreitet seien, würden die SDF die Stämme als Konkurrenten betrachten, so Anas Al-Shawakh. Die anhaltenden Spannungen zwischen den Clans würden begünstigen, dass die SDF ihre Kontrolle in der Region festigen könne. Muhammad al-Sukari, ein in Gaziantep ansässiger Forscher für syrische Angelegenheiten, führe die Stammeskonflikte auf die Korruption innerhalb der syrischen Behörden zurück und sagte, dass diese die Stammeskonflikte ausnutzen würden, um ihre Kontrolle über die syrische Gesellschaft zu stärken (Al-Monitor, 11. Mai 2022).

Informationen über Konflikte zwischen Stämmen in der Provinz Al-Hasakah in den Jahren 2021 und 2022 finden Sie in folgender Anfragebeantwortung von ACCORD:

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Informationen zum Stamm Al-Mashahada (in welcher Region ansässig, politische Haltung des Stammes (Regierung, IS), Diskriminierung von Angehörigen); generelle Informationen zu Stammeskonflikten in der Provinz Al-Hasakah [a-12042-1], 13. Jänner 2023
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2086155.html

Militärische Kontrolle der Stämme und die Möglichkeit machthabende Kräfte herauszufordern

Enab Baladi erklärt in seinem Artikel über soziale und politische Auswirkungen von Stammeskonflikten auf Ostsyrien, dass Stämme trotz ihrer weitreichenden Präsenz in ganz Syrien keiner einheitlichen und militärischen Organisation oder Führung unterliegen würden. Während der Jahre des Konflikts in Syrien seien sich die arabischen Clans und Stämme in mehreren politischen Fragen uneins gewesen (Enab Baladi, 24. Jänner 2021).

COAR erklärt in einem Bericht über Stämme im Nordosten Syriens vom Mai 2019, dass Stämme, insbesondere sunnitisch-arabische Stämme, eine zunehmend prominente und einflussreiche politische Kraft im Nordosten Syriens seien. Arabische Stammesangehörige würden in den meisten größeren Gemeinden im von der AANES kontrollierten Nordosten Syriens die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung stellen und in vielen kurdischen Gemeinden eine wichtige Minderheit („potent minority“) darstellen. Laut COAR würden die arabischen Stämme zwar eine wichtige gesellschaftspolitische Einheit darstellen, sie seien jedoch nicht monolithisch. Die am Syrienkonflikt beteiligten Staaten würden als politisches Instrument die Stämme umwerben. Aufgrund diffuser Strukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse sei es in den meisten Fällen jedoch schwierig die „Zugehörigkeit“ eines einzelnen Stammes zu einem bestimmten politischen oder staatlichen Akteur festzustellen. Die unterschiedlichen Staaten würden Beziehungen mit einzelnen Stammesführern knüpfen, um sich lokalen Einfluss zu sichern (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 3). Stämme würden nicht nur dazu genutzt werden lokale Unterstützung zu sichern, sondern auch dazu politischen Gegnern zu schaden. Beispielsweise könnten Stammesführer, die lokalen Einfluss genießen würden, ihre Stammesmitglieder dazu aufrufen Protestbewegungen zu starten, lokale bewaffnete Gruppen zu bilden oder neue politische Parteien und Blöcke zu gründen. Durch die Pflege von Beziehungen zu Stammesführern würden regionale Kräfte, die im Syrienkonflikt beteiligt sind, lokale Wählerschaft und Vermittler aufbauen, die bereit seien ihre jeweilige strategische Politik zu unterstützen (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 5). Laut Enab Baladi sei das Besondere an Clankämpfen, dass die Entscheidung, die auf der politischen Loyalität der Clans basiere, gemeinschaftlich und nicht individuell falle. Im heutigen Ostsyrien würden die herrschenden Kräfte die Clans in Kämpfe verwickeln, was zu Kluften in der sozialen Struktur der Clans und Stämme führe (Enab Baladi, 24. Jänner 2021).

Laut Al-Monitor sei die Loyalität der Clans und Stämme im Nordosten Syriens gespalten. Sie seien entweder den SDF-Kräften, der Regierung oder der syrischen Opposition gegenüber loyal. Laut dem oben genannten Politikwissenschaftler Shawakh würden die SDF es loyalen Clans ermöglichen eine wichtige Rolle in der Region zu spielen und sie sowohl sozial wie auch finanziell unterstützen (Al-Monitor, 11. Mai 2022). Chatham House erklärt in einem Beitrag vom Jänner 2018, dass die Loyalität der Clans seit Beginn des Krieges in Syrien zwischen den unterschiedlichen Seiten gewechselt habe. Auch variiere die Loyalität zwischen den einzelnen Clanmitgliedern und es sei zu Kämpfen zwischen Mitgliedern desselben Clans, die unterschiedliche politische Seiten unterstützt hätten, gekommen (Chatham House, 11. Jänner 2018).

Etana Syria berichtet im August 2023 über gewalttätige Konfrontationen zwischen den SDF und Stammeskräften in Deir ez-Zor. Der Auslöser für die Kämpfe sei die Festnahme des Kommandeurs des Militärrats von Deir ez-Zor, Abu Khawla, und mehrerer seiner hochrangigen Mitarbeiter durch die SDF gewesen. Fraktionen des Militärrats hätten sich zusammen mit verschiedenen Stammesangehörigen gerächt, indem sie Straßen gesperrt, Checkpoints unter ihre Kontrolle gebracht und SDF-Militärstandorte im Osten von Deir ez-Zor belagert hätten (Etana Syria, August 2023). Das Middle East Institute (MEI) erklärte in einem Artikel vom September 2023, dass es sich bei genanntem Abu Khawla (oder Ahmed Al-Khubayl) um den Emir des Bakir-Stammes handle. Es hätten sich immer mehr Städte und Clans an den Angriffen gegen die SDF beteiligt. Am 30. August habe sich der Scheich der Akidat-Stammeskonföderation, die die Provinz Deir ez-Zor dominiere, zu Wort gemeldet. Der Scheich, der ein langjähriger Verbündeter der SDF gewesen sei, habe alle Stämme und Clans in Deir ez-Zor dazu aufgerufen sich gegen die SDF zu vereinen. Laut MEI sei dies das erste Mal seit 2011, dass es einen derartigen Aufruf zur Einheit der Stämme gebe. MEI analysiert, dass nach diesem Aufruf das Schicksal von Deir ez-Zor von den Entscheidungen der Stämme Shaytat und Baggara abhänge. Der Stamm Shaytat sei neben dem Stamm Bakir einer der zwei mächtigsten Bestandteile der Akidat-Konföderation. Der Shaytat-Stamm scheine sich hinter die Stammeskräfte zu stellen. In den zwei Tagen nach dem Aufruf seien die SDF aus allen Akidat- und Shaytat-Gemeinden zwischen dem Fluss Khabour bis hin zur irakischen Grenze vertrieben worden. Der Baggara-Stamm, der nicht Teil der Akidat-Konföderation sei, sei gespalten. Während einige Mitglieder Ende August begonnen hätten SDF-Positionen anzugreifen, hätten sich manche Stammesführer ausdrücklich für die SDF ausgesprochen. Die meisten seien neutral geblieben. Der oberste Stammesführer der Baggara habe einen Waffenstillstand und Verhandlungen gefordert (MEI, 1. September 2023). Jusoor for Studies berichtet im Oktober 2023, dass die SDF am 8. September 2023 ihre Militäroperation in Deir ez-Zor für beendet erklärt hätten. Die Angriffe der Stammeskämpfer gegen die SDF würden jedoch weitergehen. Es gebe Phasen der Eskalation und Deeskalation. Laut Jusoor for Studies sei es zu zwei größeren Gewaltausbrüchen gekommen. Am 25. September hätten Stammeskämpfer mehrere SDF-Checkpoints und Stellungen in unterschiedlichen Gebieten im Norden und Osten von Deir ez-Zor angegriffen. Am 11. und 12. Oktober seien SDF-Ziele, von Fahrzeugen bis zu Checkpoints und Barrieren, im Norden und Osten der Provinz zeitgleich angegriffen worden. Laut Jusoor for Studies weise die Synchronisierung der Angriffe auf eine weiterentwickelte Organisationsfähigkeit der Kämpfer hin, die überwiegend in dezentralen Einheiten operieren würden. Die Bewaffnung der Kämpfer bleibe jedoch einfach und beschränke sich hauptsächlich auf Maschinengewehre und RPG-Raketen (eine sowjetische/russische Serie von reaktiven Panzerbüchsen, Anmerkung ACCORD). Der Kern der Aktivitäten konzentriere sich auf Gebiete, in denen der Akidat-Stamm lebe. Dhiban, wo die Führung des Akidat-Stammes ansässig sei, diene als Knotenpunkt der Stammeskämpfer. Aufgrund der Aktivitäten der Stammeskämpfer hätten die SDF nur einen schwachen Einfluss in den Außenbezirken von Deir ez-Zor. Laut Jusoor for Studies sei die Kontinuität der Kämpfe durch die Stämme von menschlicher, finanzieller und militärischer Unterstützung abhängig. Ohne die Unterstützung einer regionalen oder internationalen Einheit würden diese Ressourcen des Stammes zur Neige gehen (Jusoor für Studium, 26. Oktober 2023). Al-Mayadeen schreibt Ende Oktober 2023, dass laut lokalen Medien Stammeskämpfer am 29. Oktober an einer groß angelegten Offensive im Umland von Deir ez-Zor teilgenommen hätten, um die Kontrolle über die von den Kurden kontrollierten Gebieten in der Region zu erlangen. Es sei ihnen gelungen den Großteil der Stadt Abu Hardoub einzunehmen und in die Stadt Dhiban einzudringen und dort mehrere Stadtteile einzunehmen. Stammesmitglieder hätten Anfang September die Kontrolle über das gesamte östliche Umland von Deir ez-Zor übernommen, bevor die SDF die Kontrolle zurückerlangt hätten (Al-Mayadeen, 29. Oktober 2023).

Stammesstrukturen, die Verwaltung und militärische Kontrolle über die Bevölkerung ermöglichen

COAR erklärt im Mai 2019, dass ein Stamm in Syrien keine zusammenhängende soziopolitische Einheit darstelle. Heutzutage sei die gesellschaftspolitische Bedeutung der Stammesidentität sehr unterschiedlich, unterscheide sich je nach Individuum und Gemeinschaft und sei in vielen Fällen von sozioökonomischen und geografischen Hintergründen geprägt. Für viele sei die Stammeszugehörigkeit nur eine mehrerer sozialer Identitäten, wie ihre Religion, Nationalität oder Ethnizität (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 6). Laut Chatham House hätten die weittragenden Veränderungen, die die syrische Gesellschaft in den letzten sieben Jahren erlebt habe, den Einfluss der Clans und der Clankultur auf das private und öffentliche Leben verringert (Chatham House, 11. Jänner 2018). Trotz allem seien die Stämme, laut COAR, im gesamten Nordosten Syriens weiterhin ein wichtiger Bestandteil der sozialen Identität. Die Stammeszugehörigkeit präge die Zusammensetzung vieler Gemeinschaften und Stammesführer würden oft wichtige Funktionen in Bezug auf Streitschlichtung, wirtschaftliches Wohlergehen, Schirmherrschaft, sowie der Gewährleistung grundlegender Sicherheit einnehmen. Obwohl der Stamm in den meisten Fällen keine „einheitliche“ gesellschaftspolitische Einheit mehr sei, bleibe er dennoch eine starke soziale Identität, die politisiert werden könne und werde, wenn formelle Regierungsstrukturen in den Hintergrund treten. Im Kontext des Syrienkonflikts sei die gemeinsame Stammesidentität häufig ein entscheidender Faktor für die Mitgliedschaft in bewaffneten Gruppen, der Bildung politischer Blöcke und die Grundlage für die Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung. Folglich würden Stammesführer oft als mächtige politische Vermittler gesehen (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 7).

Das Middle East Institute (MEI) veröffentlicht im März 2021 einen Artikel über die Situation der Stämme in der Provinz Raqqa. Das erste Jahr nach Beginn des Krieges in Syrien hätten Stammesscheichs junge Menschen daran gehindert sich in Raqqa zu versammeln. Diese hätten schlussendlich die Regeln der Stammesscheichs gebrochen und im März 2012 eine Protestaktion organisiert. Es habe große Spaltungen zwischen jungen Stammesmitgliedern und Stammesscheichs gegeben, sowie zwischen Mitgliedern, die die Regierung unterstützten, und jenen, die sie ablehnten. Einige junge Stammesmitglieder hätten sich bewaffnet gegen die Regierungskräfte gestellt. Gleichzeitig habe die Regierung seine loyalen Scheichs dazu aufgefordert Milizen aufzubauen und junge Stammesmitglieder zu mobilisieren. Nachdem die Regierung die Kontrolle über Raqqa verloren hatte, hätten sich Stämme sowohl den islamistischen Gruppen wie auch der Freien Syrischen Armee angeschlossen. Laut MEI habe auch der Islamische Staat (IS) erkannt, dass sich die Stammesstruktur verändert habe und die jüngere Generation die traditionelle Stammesführung nicht akzeptiere. Der IS habe daher mit jungen Stammesführern zusammengearbeitet, die beispielsweise wiederum junge Menschen aus den Stämmen in Raqqa für den IS rekrutiert hätten. Nach dreijähriger Herrschaft des IS hätten sich viele junge Stammesmitglieder gegen den IS gewandt und stattdessen die SDF unterstützt. Die SDF hätten sich laut MEI mit vielen lokalen Stämmen in Raqqa verbündet, um den IS aus der Provinz zu vertreiben. Die SDF hätten das Raqqa Civilian Council unter der gemeinsamen Leitung mit dem lokalen Stammesführer Scheich Mahmoud Shawakh Al-Bursan, gegründet, dem zwanzig Vertreter lokaler Stämme angehören würden. Gleichzeitig hätten externe politische Autoritäten verschiedene Personen, die in ihrem Kontrollbereich leben, als legitime Vertreter eines bestimmten Stammes gefördert. Dies habe zur Bildung mehrerer konkurrierender Führungsgruppen innerhalb eines einzigen Stammes geführt. Sowohl die Türkei als auch die syrische Regierung würden versuchen Stammesbeziehungen zu nutzen, um die SDF-Kontrolle in Raqqa zu destabilisieren. Die Stammesführer würden die Parteien unterstützen, die ihnen selbst und ihren Stammesangehörigen Vorteile garantieren könnten. MEI fasst zusammen, dass Stämme keine homogenen, statischen Akteure seien. Nicht alle Stammesmitglieder würden zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt ihrem Anführer oder ihren Stammestraditionen folgen und traditionelle Stammesführer seien nicht unbedingt repräsentativ für ihren gesamten Stamm. Die Schwächung der staatlichen Autorität stärke die Stammeszusammenhörigkeit. Stämme hätten nicht die Möglichkeit sich außerhalb ihres unmittelbaren Gebiets militärisch zu koordinieren (MEI, 24. März 2021).

Al-Monitor beschreibt in seinem Artikel vom Mai 2022, dass zunehmende Konflikte und das Fehlen einer legitimen lokalen Behörde dazu führen würden, dass Menschen sich zur Lösung ihre Streitigkeiten an Clans wenden würden, um Schutz zu suchen und ihre Rechte gewahrt zu sehen. Stammesscheichtümer würden unter Spaltungen und einem geringen Einfluss auf ihre Mitglieder, die in unterschiedlichen Teilen Syriens verteilt seien, leiden. Mudar Hammad Al-Assaad, Sprecher des Rates der syrischen Stämme und Clans, würde trotz allem auf Stammesälteste, Würdenträger und Clanmitglieder im Nordosten Syriens setzen, um die Situation zu beruhigen, Konflikte zu lösen und den zivilen Frieden zu fördern. Laut Al-Assaad stehe sein Rat in ständigem Kontakt mit den Ältesten in Gebieten, wo es zu Stammeskonflikten komme. Al-Assaad habe gegenüber Al-Monitor erklärt, dass es innerhalb der Bevölkerung einen Mangel an Vertrauen in die offiziellen Gerichte und Justiz gebe. Dies veranlasse Einzelpersonen ihre Rechte auf jede erdenkliche Weise wiederherzustellen. Gleichzeitig sei aber auch die Rolle der Clans zurückgegangen und es gebe eine Spaltung der Ältesten, nachdem Regierungstruppen und SDF-Truppen Älteste ernannt hätten, die ihren Interessen entsprechen würden und durch die Bereitstellung von Waffen und finanziellen Ressourcen Spaltungen innerhalb der Stammesgemeinschaft herbeiführen würden. Der bereits genannte Forscher Al-Sukari erklärt, dass mindestens drei Stammesräte den unterschiedlichen Kräften im Nordosten Syriens angeschlossen seien und dass jeder Clan in diesen Räten vertreten sei, wobei jede Partei behaupte die legitime Vertretung des Clans zu sein (Al-Monitor, 11. Mai 2022).

Syria Direct zitiert im Dezember 2022 Scheich Hawas Al-Jassim (Abu Kassar), der die Stadt Baghouz in Deir ez-Zor und ihre Umgebung vertrete und als Sekretär der Bukamal Jazira-Clan-Versammlung fungiere. Laut Al-Jassim mangle es den Clans östlich und westlich des Euphrats seit 2011 an Führung. Vor dem Krieg habe es Clan-Autoritäten gegeben und auf jeden Konflikt sei mit etablierten Clanmethoden reagiert worden. Diese Autoritäten würden heutzutage nicht mehr existieren. Es herrsche Chaos in der Clanführung, was zur Zunahme von Clankonflikten beitrage. Die Jugend respektiere die Clan-Autorität nicht. Gleichzeitig habe Scheich Hassan Al-Khamri, vom Clan der Al-Nasser in Tabqa, erklärt, dass Syrien während des Krieges eine deutliche Rückkehr zum Stammesdenken und eine Zunahme des Gefühls der Clanzugehörigkeit erlebt habe. Syria Direct erklärt, dass es die Rolle der Stämme sei Konflikte zu lösen und eine Versöhnung der Parteien auszuverhandeln. (Eine ausführliche Darstellung des Versöhnungsprozesses finden Sie im Anhang.) Suleiman Al-Qurfan, ehemaliger Leiter der Syrischen Vereinigung Freier Anwält·innen, habe erklärt, dass die syrischen Gerichte rechtlich gesehen nicht an die Versöhnungsurkunden der Clans gebunden seien. Es sei bei den Gerichten jedoch üblich, die Urkunde in ihre Entscheidung einzubeziehen, wenn diese nichts enthalte, was gegen die öffentliche Ordnung verstoße. Die AANES habe Versöhnungskomitees und -räte sowie einen Ältestenrat, der sich aus Scheichs und angesehene Persönlichkeiten aus der Region zusammensetze, gebildet. Es gebe weiters ein Allgemeines Versöhnungskomitee, dessen Aufgabe darin bestehe, Clanprobleme zu lösen, wenn die lokalen Versöhnungsprozesse der Clans keine Lösung erbringen. Laut Scheich Al-Jassim aus Deir ez-Zor gebe es in der Provinz keine formelle richterliche Autorität. Die Clans würden in Deir ez-Zor diese Aufgaben übernehmen. Laut Sakhr Faisal Al-Ali, einem Forscher zu Clans in Syrien, bedeute dies jedoch nicht, dass die SDF nicht bis zu einem gewissen Grad Kontrolle über die Clan-Komponente ausübe (Syria Direct, 9. Dezember 2022).

 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am [Veröffentlichungsdatum])

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Informationen zum Stamm Al-Mashahada (in welcher Region ansässig, politische Haltung des Stammes (Regierung, IS), Diskriminierung von Angehörigen); generelle Informationen zu Stammeskonflikten in der Provinz Al-Hasakah [a-12042-1], 13. Jänner 2023
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2086155.html

·      ACU - Assistance Coordination Unit: Ar-Raqqa Governorate Panoramic Report, Dezember 2019
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IMU_En-Raqqa-Panoramic____.pdf

·      Al-Mayadeen: Syrian tribes launch offensive against US-backed SDF in Deir Ezzor, 29. Oktober 2023
https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/syrian-tribes-launch-offensive-against-us-backed-sdf-in-deir

·      Al-Monitor: Tribal violence haunts northeastern Syria, 11. Mai 2022
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/05/tribal-violence-haunts-northeastern-syria

·      Chatham House, Kalam: Division Defines Syria’s Tribes and Clans, 11. Jänner 2018
https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/division-defines-syrias-tribes-and-clans/

·      COAR – Center for Operational Analysis and Research: Tribal Tribulations: Tribal Mapping and State Actor Influence in Northeastern Syria, 6. Mai 2019
https://coar-global.org/2019/05/06/tribal-tribulations-tribal-mapping-and-state-actor-influence-in-northeastern-syria/#:~:text=That%20said%2C%20tribes%20throughout%20northeastern,patronage%2C%20and%20the%20provision%20of

·      Enab Baladi: Social and political impact of tribal conflict on eastern Syria, 24. Jänner 2021
https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2021/01/social-and-political-impact-of-tribal-conflict-on-eastern-syria/

·      Etana Syria: Syria Military Brief: North-East Syria – August 2023, August 2023
https://etanasyria.org/syria-military-brief-north-east-syria-august-2023/

·      Jusoor for Studies: Future Dynamics of Arab Tribal Clashes with the SDF in Deir ez-Zor, 26. Oktober 2023
https://jusoor.co/en/details/future-dynamics-of-arab-tribal-clashes-with-the-sdf-in-deir-ez-zor

·      MEI – Middle East Institute: The Kin Who Count: Mapping Raqqa’s Tribal Topology, 24. März 2021
https://www.mei.edu/publications/kin-who-count-mapping-raqqas-tribal-topology

·      MEI – Middle East Institute: Deir ez-Zor’s tribes reach a breaking point, 1. September 2023
https://www.mei.edu/publications/deir-ez-zors-tribes-reach-breaking-point

·      Syria Direct: Clan conflicts in Syria: Seeds of revenge grow under the ashes amid attempts to renew customary law, 9. Dezember 2022
https://syriadirect.org/clan-conflicts-in-syria-seeds-of-revenge-grow-under-the-ashes-amid-attempts-to-renew-customary-law/

 

 

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

Die Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) ist eine syrische NGO, die mit lokalen Hilfsgruppen sowie internationalen Gebern zusammenarbeitet, um Hilfsleistungen zu koordinieren.

·      ACU - Assistance Coordination Unit: Ar-Raqqa Governorate Panoramic Report, Dezember 2019
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IMU_En-Raqqa-Panoramic____.pdf

„SECTION IV: TRIBES OF AR-RAQQA GOVERNORATE

The Arab tribes are the essential component of Ar-Raqqa governorate’s population, together with the existence of Syrian Kurds and Turkmen in several villages in the governorate.

1. Al-'Afadleh Tribe: it is one of the largest tribes in Ar-Raqqa governorate and descends from Hasan AshSha'ban who had two sons; Thaher and Shibl. Al-'Afadleh tribe is the descendant of Thaher, who had seven sons forming the seven subfractions of Al-'Afadleh tribe (Al-Hous, Al-Breij, Al-Musa, Al-Medlej, Al-Ghanem, Al-Awwad and Al-Issa) and their chieftaincies are Al-Hweidi family. Al-'Afadleh distribute in Ar-Raqqa city and its surrounding towns and nearby countryside, such as Al-Mashlab, Raeqqet Samra, Tawi Rumman, AlHamrat, Al-Karama, Al-Jdeidat, Al-Hous, At-Trifawi, Moezleh, Tal Elsamen, Ba's, As-Salhabiyat, Hawi Elhawa and Al-Kasrat towns.

2. Al-Wildeh Tribe: they are the sons of Hazea Ibn Shaaban and considered as one of the biggest tribes in the Euphrates Valley. It is composed of several subfractions (Al-Ali, An-Nasser, Ali Al-Fares, Al-Ja'abat, Al-Ghanem, Albu Masarrah, At-Turn, Al-Hweiwat and Al-Amer). The tribe’s chieftaincy in the western bank of the Euphrates River (or what is known as Ash-Shamiyeh) is concentrated in Muhammad Al-Faraj family and in the eastern bank of the Euphrates River (or what is known as Aj-Jazirah) in Albu Rasan family. The tribe is distributed in Ar-Raqqa city and the governorate’s countryside. Further, they largely spread in Ath-Thawrah (Tabaqa), Mansura and Jurneyyeh cities and in Shams Eldin, Abu Jadi and Jeiber towns.

3. Sabka Tribe: they descend from As-Subae' Ibn Shaaban and are distributed in the southern bank of the Euphrates River (or what is known as Ash-Shamiyeh) in Kisret Mohammed Agha, Akeirshi, Rahbi, Al-Shridah, Sabka, Ghanem Ali, Little Maghalla, Big Maghalla, Jaber, Khamisiyeh, Sweida (Maadan) towns and in Tabni city which is affiliated with Deir-ez-Zor governorate. Their chieftaincy belongs to Ar-Rakan family.

4. Al-Mashhour Tribe: they descend from Al-Bakkarah tribe (a large tribe in Deir-ez-Zor governorate) and are distributed in Tell Abiad villages, basically in Shreaan, Hawi, Bir Mohmmed Elkhader, Al-Hwija, Al Monbateh, Katuniyeh and Badi towns. Their chieftaincy belongs to At-Tahri family.

5. Al-Jis Tribe: they descend from Amer Bani Sa'sa'a and are composed of Al-Jamileh, As-Sayyaleh, Ath-Th'albeh, Al-M'aljeh, Al-Bashamjeh, Al-Munif, Al-Jar'an, Albu Jaradeh, Al-'Aleimat, Al-'Abadeh and As-Saramdeh. They are distributed in Tell Abiad district and its countryside and in Ar-Raqqa city too.

6. An-Naim Tribe: they are distributed in Tell Abiad district.

7. Albu Assaf Tribe: they are distributed in Tell Abiad district and in Ar-Raqqa city. Their chieftaincy belongs to the family of Sheikh Khalaf Al-Hassan and Al-Khalaf Al-Issa and his sons. One of the tribe’s subfractions is called Ash-Shafrat and distributed in Jurneyyeh and Ein Issa sub-districts.

8. Al-Majadmeh Tribe: they descend from Al-Jabbour tribe (a tribe from the Arabian Peninsula) and are distributed throughout scattered villages in the northern part of Ar-Raqqa governorate, such as Khneizat, Lakta and Al-Hammoud towns. Their chieftaincy belongs to Al-Kasha family.

9. Al-Fad'an Tribe: they are a part of Al-Wildeh tribe and distributed in Ein Issa sub-district, starting from the bank of the Balikh River towards the west. Their chieftaincies are Al-Mheid and Ibn Hreimes families, whereas Majed Balikh subfraction are distributed in Al-Kantari town and Suluk city and their chieftaincies are AlK'ashish and Ibn Ghabeen families.

10. Al-Hleisat Tribe: they descend from Al-Jabbour tribe (a tribe from the Arabian Peninsula) and are divided into Al-Ma'amrah and Al-Jadadseh. They are located in Ar-Raqqa city and on the banks of Balikh River and their chieftaincy belongs to Ahmad Al-Hammoud family.

11. Albu Thaher Tribe: (Al-Jamaseh) they are distributed in Jurneyyeh sub-district and Al-Hamrat town.

12. Al-Marandiyeh Tribe: they are distributed in multiple villages (such as Al-Mashlab), in Ar-Raqqa city and in Samra, 'Anadiyeh and Abdallah Al-Khalil towns.

13. Albu Ramadan Tribe: they are distributed in Sabka sub-district.

14. Albu Rajab, Albu 'Atij and Albu Bana Tribes: the bulk of them is concentrated in Aleppo governorate and some are located in Ar-Raqqa governorate in Kanu and Mansura villages. Their chieftain in Ar-Raqqa is Shiekh Ahamd Kanu.

15. Al-Ojeil Tribe: they descend form Al-Jabbour tribe and live in the western part of Ar-Raqqa governorate, such as Ath-Thawrah city (Tabaqa), Sahl, Al Hamam and Al Barouda towns and some villages affiliated with AthThawrah city.

16. Albu-Jaber Tribe: they are located in Kdeiran, Sweidiyeh and Hunaida towns and their chieftaincy belongs to Ad-Daif family.

17. Al-Wahab Tribe: they descend from Shummar tribe (an Arab tribe originallyfrom the Arabian Peninsula) and are concentrated in Ath-Thawrah sub-district (Tabaqa).

18. Ash-Shibl Tribe: they are distributed in multiple villages in the northern side and the northwestern corner of Ar-Raqqa governorate, such as Khneiz, Abbara, Fteih and Abu Kabra villages.

19. Albu-Khamis Tribe: they descend from Dalim tribe. Some of their subfractions are Al-Ali Al-Jasem, Al-Jeish, Ash-Shihab, Al-Fikrah, Al-Barashmeh, Ar-Rashed and Albu Jaber. They are distributed in villages located on the banks of the Euphrates River, and most importantly Jeidine and Zamlah towns and Mansura city. Their dignitaries are Al-Hamshar and Ar-Rashed.

20. Al-Fardon, Albu Salem, Albu Sheikh, Al-Omeirat and Al-'Ajajin Tribes

21. Shibl As-Salameh Tribe: they descend from Dalim tribe and are concentrated in Ar-Raqqa city. Their chieftaincy belongs to Ismael Al-Abed family.

22. Al-Bayatrah Tribe: the are concentrated in Ar-Raqqa city and its suburbs. Al-Haj, Ad-Dalli, Al-Matar, Al-Yusuf, An-Najem, Al-Farhan, Al-Hamada, Al-Fawwaz, Al-Masare'a and Ad-Darwish are some of their families.

23. Al-Ojeili Tribe: they descend from Albu Badran tribe (one of Deir-ez-Zor tribes) and are concentrated in ArRaqqa city.

24. Al-Bleibel Tribe: they descend from Albu Badran tribe (a tribe from Deir-ez-Zor) and are distributed in ArRaqqa city.

25. Al-Hassoun Tribe: they are distributed in Ar-Raqqa city and their chieftaincy belongs to Khalil Al-Jali family.

26. Ash-Shuaib Tribe: they are distributed in Ar-Raqqa city.

27. Al-'Akrad Tribe: they are distributed in Ar-Raqqa city and their chieftaincy belongs to Al-Khalaf Al-Qasem family.

28. Al-Muhammad Al-Hasan Tribe: they are distributed in Ar-Raqqa city.

29. Al-Hleibin Tribe: they are from Albu Salameh tribes and distributed in Ar-Raqqa city.

30. Al-Bakri Tribe: they descend from At-Taytribe (an Arab tribe originally from the Arabian Peninsula). They are distributed in Ar-Raqqa city and their chieftaincy belongs to Al-Kakaji family.

31. Ar-Ramadan Agha Tribe: they are distributed in Ar-Raqqa city. Al-Sattaf, Al-Alo, Al-Kayyas and Al-Hilal are some of their families. Their chieftaincy belongs to Al-Sattaf family.

32. Al-Qweider Tribe: they are distributed in Ar-Raqqa city. Ahmad Al-Jumaa, Al-Mouh and Al-Alloush are some of their families.

33. As-Safarneh Tribe: they are concentrated in Ar-Raqqa city and its nearby countrysideand were named after As-Safira sub-district in Aleppo eastern countryside. They vary in their origins and are arrivals to Ar-Raqqa from Aleppo eastern countryside.

34. Al-Tawadfeh Tribe: they are concentrated in Ar-Raqqa city and were named after Tadaf sub-district in Aleppo eastern countryside. They vary in their origins and came to Ar-Raqqa governorate from Aleppo eastern countryside.

35. Albu Saraya Tribe: they are arrivals from Deir-ez-Zor governorate and concentrated in Ar-Raqqa city.

36. As-Sakhani Tribe: they are concentrated in Ar-Raqqa and Tell Abiad cities and were named after Sokhneh sub-district in Homseastern countryside. They are arrivals to Ar-Raqqa governorate and vary in their origins, such as Al-Jabbour, Al-Jis, An-Naim, Bani 'Afi, Bani Rahma and Bani Khalaf. Their chieftaincy belongs to AlKhatib family.“ (ACU, Dezember 2019, S. 18-20)

Al Mayadeen ist ein panarabischer Nachrichtensender, der 2012 aus dem Libanon das erste Mal ausgestrahlt wurde.

·      Al-Mayadeen: Syrian tribes launch offensive against US-backed SDF in Deir Ezzor, 29. Oktober 2023
https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/syrian-tribes-launch-offensive-against-us-backed-sdf-in-deir

„Tribal fighters in Syria's east are participating in a new large-scale offensive in the Deir Ezzor countryside in light of their effort to take control over the Kurdish-controlled areas in the region, local media reported on Sunday.

The tribal fighters launched a large-scale offensive on SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces]-controlled areas in numerous towns in the eastern and western Deir Ezzor countryside.

Local sources told Al Mayadeen that the tribal fighters attacked SDF sites on Sunday dawn, managing to take over the majority of the town of Abu Hardoub and also enter the town of Dhebian and take over several neighborhoods in it as they continued to make progress in the locality. […]

Tribal members took control of the entire eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor at the beginning of September before the SDF regained control after mobilizing a large number of forces in the area.“ (Al-Mayadeen, 29. Oktober 2023)

Al-Monitor ist eine auf Berichterstattung zum Nahen Osten spezialisierte Medienplattform.

·      Al-Monitor: Tribal violence haunts northeastern Syria, 11. Mai 2022
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/05/tribal-violence-haunts-northeastern-syria

„Tribal clashes in northeastern Syria have been on the rise since the beginning of 2022 as a result of disputes and acts of revenge witnessed in the cities and towns where Arab tribes are widespread in the governorates of Hasakah, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor.

According to data collected and published April 28 by SyriaTV, a pro-opposition Syrian television network based in Istanbul, Hasakah province ranked first in the number of deaths resulting from armed tribal clashes and acts of revenge, with 12 people killed in total since the start of 2022.

Casualties were reported in the cities of Qamishli, Amuda, Markada and Hasakah.

Deir ez-Zor province ranked second, with six people killed in separate incidents during the same period.

As for Raqqa province, two cases of murder have been recorded since early 2022, the first under the pretext of revenge, and the second as a result of an armed clash that erupted between two families in a popular market.

The Eye of Euphrates Network, which covers developments in the eastern region of Syria, reported April 30 that four people were killed and seven wounded in less than 24 hours during fighting in Deir ez-Zor province. The fighting, as per the newspaper, erupted between two families in the town of Abu Hamam in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor on the grounds of an old dispute dating back to 2020.

Ibrahim al-Hussein, a journalist belonging to al-Shaitat clan who hails from Abu Hamam, told Al-Monitor that the high number of killings is either grounded in simple disputes that evolve due to the use of weapons, or on acts of revenge in the clan community.

Hussein said the recent bloody dispute in Abu Hamam came in revenge to the killing by unidentified gunmen of the sons of one of the two warring families back in 2020. […]

Tribal clashes sometimes last for a few days and lead to a complete curfew in the area where violence is taking place, without the intervention of any third party to solve it. Such clashes, he added, also affect members of one of the two fighting clans who have nothing to do with the problem. […]

Clans and tribes in northeastern Syria are divided in their loyalties to several parties controlling areas and villages in northeastern Syria. […]

In light of these divisions, the clans are either loyal to SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] forces, to the regime or to the Syrian opposition.

As clashes among the divided tribes escalate, the controlling forces, namely the SDF that controls the largest part of northeastern Syria, have remained neutral without intervening to end the tribal violence.

Anas al-Shawakh, political researcher specializing in the affairs of the eastern Euphrates area at the Jusoor Center for Studies, told Al-Monitor that clans were previously considered a competing and alternative ruling system for the Syrian authorities. The Syrian authorities would sit idly by whenever tribal clashes erupted in order to achieve gains once the clash came to an end, he said.

He noted that the situation is no different today for the de facto authorities, especially in the areas under the control of the SDF, which consider the tribes a competing candidate in the areas where Arab tribes are widespread. The constant tension between the clans creates a suitable ground for the SDF to establish their control in the region.

Shawakh said that the SDF forces are also working on attracting loyal clans by allowing them to play a major role and supporting them both socially and financially. They even released a large number of Islamic State members through clan mediation, without any trials, to boost the role of the sheikhdom before the clan members.

He added that with the increasing disputes resulting from the lack of a legitimate local authority capable of protecting its citizens, people have been referring to clans to solve their disputes, which they believe provides them with some kind of protection and safeguards their rights. However, Shawakh believes that the clan system results in continuous conflict situations.

Despite the divisions plaguing tribal sheikhdoms, the multiplicity of their loyalties and their low influence on their members who are spread in different parts of Syria, Mudar Hammad al-Assaad, spokesman for the Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Al-Monitor that he is counting on tribal elders, dignitaries and clan members in northeastern Syria to calm the situation, resolve conflicts and promote civil peace in areas under the control of the Syrian regime and the SDF forces, especially with the recent increase in tribal clashes.

He asserted that his council is in constant contact with the elders in those areas.

Assaad said that the lack of confidence in the official courts and judiciary amid nepotism exacerbated clan problems, leading individuals to restore their rights in any way possible.

This, according to Assaad, is also due to the decline in the clan’s role and the division plaguing its elders after the government forces and SDF forces appointed elders who fit their interests, exploited the violence and created divisions within the tribal community, all the while providing tribes with weapons, support and financial resources, which negatively affects Syrian clans and tribes.

Muhammad al-Sukari, researcher on Syrian affairs based in Gaziantep, attributed the tribal clashes to the corruption of the authorities in Syria and said that these exploit the tribal strife to strengthen their control over Syrian society.

He told Al-Monitor that the permanent fighting among tribal members is the product of the system that was prevailing before the revolution and that was reinforced after the revolution due to chaos. Sukari believes that there is great division within the Syrian clans due to the state of political polarization between the opposition, the Syrian regime and the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

He said that there are at least three tribal councils affiliated with these forces and that each clan is represented in these councils, with each party claiming to be the legitimate representative of the clan.“ (Al-Monitor, 11. Mai 2022)

Kalam ist die Webseite des Middle East and North Africa Program (MENAP) von Chatham House, einer britischen Denkfabrik, die sich mit internationalen politischen Themen befasst.

·      Chatham House, Kalam: Division Defines Syria’s Tribes and Clans, 11. Jänner 2018
https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/division-defines-syrias-tribes-and-clans/

„Though between 60 and 70 per cent of the Syrian population belongs to a clan or tribe, according to pre-2011 estimates, the enormous transformations that Syrian society has undergone in the past seven years have diminished the influence which clans and clan culture have on private and public life.

As the conflict intensified, however, all parties saw an opportunity in reviving these identities, hoping to secure support from areas with the largest clan presence.

Upper Mesopotamia (northeastern Syria) contains a significant tribal presence. The largest tribe in the area is Jubur, followed by Tayy, Bakara, Anazzah, Shammar and others. Since the beginning of the revolution, these tribes have been divided between regime loyalists and opponents, including the self-administration declared by the Kurds. The most prominent Arab tribes in the area that joined the Kurds are the al-Sanadid Forces, led by a sheikh of the Shammar tribe. […]

As Upper Mesopotamia changed hands between the regime, the opposition and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], it is only natural that clan members in the area made displays of loyalty to the side that controls their land. The loyalty of clan members has thus repeatedly changed from one side to another, and battles have even been fought between members of the same clan, which would have been previously unimaginable.

This fluidity in loyalties is another characteristic considered by many researches to be a part of clan culture. Many examples can be found in support of this perspective in the area of the Euphrates (‘Deir Ez-Zor, Raqqa and the southeastern Aleppo countryside), where the most famous tribes are Akidat, Qays and Bakara, and the most important clans are Dulaim, Shaitat, Albu Saraya, Albu Chabur, al-Boleel, al-Namis, al-Butush and al-Asasna.

At the beginning of the revolution, most of the members of clans in the Euphrates region rose up against the regime, except for the province of Raqqa, where huge protests broke out in ‘Deir Ez-Zor and the eastern Aleppo countryside, before many young men in the area joined the Free Syrian Army. Yet, as expected, most clan elders in the area sided with the regime due to the privileges that they had previously received from it.

Subsequently, when ISIS gained control of the area, many fighters, elders and clans who had not left joined the organization. This was before some of them joined the Kurdish self-administration – such as the Deir Ez-Zor Military Council, and Jabhat Thuwar al-Raqqa before it – whereas others returned to the ranks of the regime, the most prominent figures being the sheikh of the Bakara clan and the ex-opposition fighter Nawaf al-Bashir.

For their part, the pro-opposition clan groupings expelled from Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa, such as the Revolutionary Commando Army and Thuwar al-Sharqiyya, continued their activity in the neighbouring areas, such as the Syrian desert and the Euphrates area in northeastern Aleppo. Others maintained their loyalty to Jabhat al-Nusra and Harakat Ahrar al-Sham.

For seven years, the revolution caused a storm to tear through Arab clan society, the vast majority of which are followers of Sunni Islam. At the same time, it represented an opportunity for clans of other ethnicities and religions, such as Kurdish, Turkmen, Alawite, Druze and Christian clans, to bring back their presence into the public sphere.

Due to common threats or new sources of support, these clans came alive again, with the Kurds receiving support from the Democratic Union Party, or PYD [Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat], and Turkmen being supported by Turkey.“ (Chatham House, 11. Jänner 2018)

Das Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR) ist eine politische Beratungsorganisation, die die Planung und die Umsetzung von humanitären und Entwicklungsprojekten in konfliktbetroffenen Regionen unterstützt.

·      COAR – Center for Operational Analysis and Research: Tribal Tribulations: Tribal Mapping and State Actor Influence in Northeastern Syria, 6. Mai 2019
https://coar-global.org/2019/05/06/tribal-tribulations-tribal-mapping-and-state-actor-influence-in-northeastern-syria/#:~:text=That%20said%2C%20tribes%20throughout%20northeastern,patronage%2C%20and%20the%20provision%20of

„Tribes, specifically Sunni Arab tribes, are an increasingly prominent and influential political force in northeastern Syria. The relative power of tribes is in many ways a function of demographics; despite popular misconceptions, Arab tribesmen remain the majority of the population in most major communities in Kurdish Self Administration-controlled northeastern Syria, and an important plurality or potent minority in many nominally Kurdish communities. States party to the Syrian conflict, primarily the Governments of Syria, Turkey, and Iran, are aware of this dynamic and have been courting tribes for years, in many ways as part of a formal foreign policy instrument; this outreach has only increased in scope and scale following the military defeat of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. Yet tribes are also often misunderstood, particularly in the west: while Arab tribes are indeed important socio-political entities, they are not monolithic; thus, it is difficult in most cases to determine a single tribe’s ‘affiliation’ with a specific political or state actor due to diffuse structures and decision-making. At present, states conducting tribal outreach do so through forging relationships with individual tribal leaders as a means of securing local influence. While the term ‘tribal leader’ is open to debate, in practice states have identified popular or influential individuals capable of mobilizing significant support within a kinship-based solidarity network.“ (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 3)

„It is important to note that the purpose of building relationships with Syrian tribal leaders and tribes extends beyond the objective of securing local support; Arab tribes are also instrumentalized as a means of undermining political foes. For example, tribal leaders with local support can call upon fellow tribesmen to foment domestic protest movements, form local armed groups, or create new political parties and blocs. By cultivating relationships with tribal leaders, regional states party to the Syrian conflict are essentially building local constituencies and intermediaries willing to support their respective strategic policies.“ (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 5)

„However, most practitioners do agree on two key characteristics of the tribe in the Middle East: the tribe is an socio-political identity and solidarity network; and a tribe is informed by shared kinship networks based on common paternal descent. Mohammad Jamal Baroud, a prominent Arab social scientist, refers to the tribe using the concept of muhit hayawi ijtima’i, which is best translated as a person’s ‘essential social environment.’ Fundamentally, tribal affiliation is an immutable characteristic; i.e. a member of the Jabour tribe cannot convert and become a member of another tribe, and that status will also inform behavior patterns within the broader socio-political environment.

While the tribe is perhaps a person’s ‘essential social environment’, it is worth noting that the tribe, at least in Syria, is not a cohesive socio-political unit. Prior to the implementation of the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms, the tribe was (in many cases) more politically unified and led by a single, often hereditary, Sheikh. In modern Syria, the socio-political significance of tribal identity varies wildly, differs by individual and community, and in many cases is informed by socio-economic and geographic backgrounds. Anecdotally, individuals who have migrated to urban centers, work as urban professionals, or who no longer reside within kinship or tribally-based communities are less influenced by their tribal identity. However, this does not mean that a northeastern Syrian tribesman who is now an engineer in Damascus does not feel strongly about his tribal identity; conversely, it would be wrong to assume that a farmer in Raqqa’s decision-making is solely informed by tribal relationships. For many, tribal affiliation is just one of a plurality of social identities, to include for example ‘Muslim,’ ‘Syrian,’ ‘Arab,’ or ‘Raqqawi.’“ (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 6)

„That said, tribes throughout northeastern Syria remain an important component of social identity; tribal affiliation informs the composition of many communities, and tribal leadership figures often perform important governance functions such as dispute mediation, economic welfare and patronage, and the provision of basic safety and security. Indeed, while in most cases the tribe has ceased to be a ‘unified’ socio-political entity, it nonetheless remains a strong social identity that can and is politicized when formal governance structures recede. In the context of the Syrian conflict, shared ‘tribal’ identity is often a critical component of armed group membership, the formation of political blocs, and the basis of popular mobilization. Consequently, ‘tribal’ leaders are often viewed as powerful political brokers, though as noted the ‘tribe’ as a socio-political construct is far less relevant and more fragmented today than in the past.“ (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 7)

„Ultimately, there are four essential components that define tribal leadership in present-day northeastern Syria: family, funding, friendships, and fighters. […]

Tribal leaders must, obviously, be members of the tribe. Ideally, leaders hail from the more prominent families within that tribe that have traditionally and historically held leadership positions. As the tribe is fundamentally based on the idea of a shared kinship, the ability to call upon hereditary history to justify leadership claims is an important component of a tribal leader’s legitimacy.“ (COAR, 6. Mai 2019, S. 8)

Enab Baladi ist eine regierungskritische syrische Medienorganisation.

·      Enab Baladi: Social and political impact of tribal conflict on eastern Syria, 24. Jänner 2021
https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2021/01/social-and-political-impact-of-tribal-conflict-on-eastern-syria/

„Arab clans and tribes comprise the majority of the population in eastern and northeastern Syria. They are distributed along the Euphrates River banks, in the Syrian Jazira, and other cities and regions in Syria. Despite their wide presence throughout Syria, they do not fall under unified military organization or leadership. During previous years of conflict, Arab clans and tribes disagreed on several political issues.

Disputes, blood feuds, and other conflicts are considered factors leading to inter-clan fighting in the Arab clans’ areas, especially in eastern Syria. 

A conflict arose east of Deir Ezzor among the members of the Shaitat tribe in early December 2020. The causes of the conflict remained unclear because the tribe members refused to talk about the conflict, arguing that it is a private affair among tribe members.

The fighting continued for 72 hours. In response, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the military arm of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES), imposed a curfew, carried out a campaign of raids and searches, and instituted checkpoints inside the town. […]

The SDF distances itself from most inter-clan conflicts because these clans hold positions of power, and they could be a robust future competitor for the SDF over the region.

Political researcher and expert on eastern Euphrates affairs Anas Shawakh believes that these ongoing quarrels and fighting undermine any possible joint action between these clans and minimize the chances of becoming a rival force in the future. 

The SDF is also afraid that it might take sides in favor of one clan against another, which may have detrimental effects. This is because most of the SDF-controlled areas are inhabited by Arab and Kurdish tribes and clans, Anas Shawakh stressed. 

The Syrian regime relies on these ongoing skirmishes between clans to fuel a security rift and to distort the image of stability that the SDF is trying to paint in the region. […]

On 23 May 2020, fighting took place in Deir Ezzor between the Albufrio and al-Bakir clans. The fighting, which broke out due to a disagreement, resulted in the death and injury of some members of the two clans. Conflicting news spread about the causes of fighting.

Enab Baladi’s correspondent pointed out that the al-Afif Family, who are members of the al-Bakir clan, attacked members of the Albufrio clan after being accused of killing one of their sons.

The correspondent indicated that there was an old vendetta between the al-Afif Family and Albufrio clans in the village of Mashkh. He also confirmed at the time that the SDF did not intervene in the fighting. […]

Clans’ structure influenced by fighting

The peculiar trait of clan fighting is that decision-making is communal, not individual.

Decision-making is based on the clans’ political loyalty. This creates real social risks, including disintegrating and cracking existing social structures, which pre-date the modern state, according to researcher Talal Mustafa.

Today, the forces in control are pushing the clans into more fights, leading to chasms in the overall social order and future cracks in the structures of the clans and tribes themselves.“ (Enab Baladi, 24. Jänner 2021)

Etana Syria ist eine die Opposition unterstützende syrische Zivilorganisation.

·      Etana Syria: Syria Military Brief: North-East Syria – August 2023, August 2023
https://etanasyria.org/syria-military-brief-north-east-syria-august-2023/

„Violent confrontations between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and tribal forces began last week, after the SDF arrested Deir Ezzor Military Council commander Abu Khawla and several of his top associates at a meeting organized by SDF leaders in Hasakeh on 28th August.

Joined by various tribal elements, factions of the Deir Ezzor Military Council retaliated by closing roads, capturing checkpoints, and besieging SDF military sites in eastern Deir Ezzor.“ (Etana Syria, August 2023)

Jusoor for Studies ist eine unabhängige Forschungseinrichtung mit Sitz in der Türkei, die sich unter anderem mit Syrien befasst.

·      Jusoor for Studies: Future Dynamics of Arab Tribal Clashes with the SDF in Deir ez-Zor, 26. Oktober 2023
https://jusoor.co/en/details/future-dynamics-of-arab-tribal-clashes-with-the-sdf-in-deir-ez-zor

„On September 8, 2023, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) declared the completion of their main military operations in Deir ez-Zor. Following this, they transitioned to targeted security operations. This announcement indicates a strategic redeployment of their forces in areas they control in the Deir ez-Zor countryside. This move comes after a brief deployment of Arab tribal fighters in these territories at the start of the same month. 

However, attacks carried out by the tribal fighters against the SDF in Deir ez-Zor continued. There were periods of escalation and de-escalation due to several internal and external factors. The region witnessed at least two major surges in violence. The first was on September 25th, during which tribal fighters launched attacks on multiple SDF checkpoints and positions across various areas in the northern and eastern countrysides of Deir ez-Zor. The second surge began on October 11th, following an audio message from the sheikh of the Al-Akidat tribe, Ibrahim Al-Hufl. This lasted for approximately two days, during which nearly 10 targets, ranging from vehicles to military checkpoints and barriers affiliated with the SDF, were simultaneously targeted in various areas of the eastern and northern countrysides of Deir ez-Zor. […]

It has been observed that the majority of targeting operations were carried out simultaneously, even though they spanned several villages and towns. This synchronization suggests an evolved organizational capability among the fighters, who seem to predominantly operate in decentralized units. The strategy appears to be aimed at dispersing the security and military efforts of the SDF. However, despite this advancement in tactics, the fighters' armaments remain relatively basic, primarily limited to machine guns and RPG rockets. The core of their operations is predominantly focused in the areas where the Akidat tribe resides, especially in the eastern countryside locations like Al-Shuhail and the vicinity of the village of Dhiban. Notably, Dhiban serves as a significant hub for tribal fighters, as it is home to the leadership of the Akidat tribe. There are also occasional operations in the villages and towns of the northern countryside. […]

Essentially, the SDF's grip on Deir ez-Zor's outskirts remains tenuous due to tribal militants' activities and their inability to cement their chosen security-centric approach to quell the dissent. Simultaneously, the endurance and continuity of the tribal fighters in their skirmishes against the SDF are tied to key elements, especially procuring the needed human, financial, and military support. This appears to be the SDF's gamble as such resources, being self-contained and finite, risk running out without aid or backing from a regional or international entity. “ (Jusoor for Studies, 26. Oktober 2023)

Das Middle East Institute (MEI) ist ein in Washington ansässiger Think-Tank.

·      MEI – Middle East Institute: The Kin Who Count: Mapping Raqqa’s Tribal Topology, 24. März 2021
https://www.mei.edu/publications/kin-who-count-mapping-raqqas-tribal-topology

„The tribe in Syria, as in the rest of the Arab world, is divided into smaller parallel sections, known as asha’ir (‘clans’) and afkhad (‘lineages’). Tribes can also be branches of a larger confederal system called tribal confederations that are ‘politically unified under a central authority,’ like the popular Anizah and Shamar Confederations. […]

Each tribe has a traditional leader, known as a chieftain, or sheikh in Arabic, who comes from a particular sheikhly family within his tribe. Instead of specifically mentioning the name of the sheikh, this study uses the name of each tribe’s sheikhly family since there can be disagreement as to who holds the leadership within that family. Most members belonging to a tribe originate from groups with which they have actual or potentially fictive kinship ties. Whether real or fictive, these kinship ties create sentiments of unity, solidarity, and collective action among members of the tribes, particularly in times of need.​ […]

Apart from the classical definition of tribes, which refers to groups of people who have common descent, this study also covers small groups of people who came from particular places in Syria at different points in time, such as al-Sakhani, who moved from the Syrian town of al-Sukhnah in the middle of the last century.​ […]

Tribal sheikhs prevented young people from gathering in the city of Raqqa’s central square for a whole year, but the tribesmen eventually broke the rules they laid down and organized a big protest there, attempting to pull down a statue of former President Hafez al-Assad in March 2012 (BBC, 2013). The uprising highlighted the large gap between the sheikhs and the younger members of the tribes who took to the streets. Long years of clientelism between the regime and the sheikhs helped the regime to survive but divided the tribes, because the sheikhs recruited part of each tribe to suppress the others who had revolted. This led to major divisions within tribes between those who supported the regime and those who opposed it (Dukhan, 2019).

Many tribal youths who took part in the protests resorted to armed self-defense and took revenge for their relatives who were tortured or killed by the Syrian regime’s security forces. Some tribal youths also received outside support — for example, the Saudis backed the establishment of the King Abdulaziz Brigade from the al-Fadda’n tribesmen in Raqqa. At the same time, the regime asked its loyal sheikhs to set up militias and mobilize their younger members to fight alongside them. For example, the Fighters of the Tribes militia was established by Turki al-Buhamad, a tribal youth from Raqqa, and it played a vital role in the Assad regime's efforts to retake central and eastern Syria (Nedaa, 2018).

The governorate of Raqqa started going outside of the regime’s control in the summer of 2012, beginning with Tell Abiad and eventually leading to the takeover of the city of Raqqa by Islamist groups like Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra in March 2013. Alongside these Islamist groups, there were many other Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigades that were established on tribal lines as well. One of these was the Uwais al-Qarni Brigade, active in the city of al-Tabqah, which drew the majority of its members from the al-Naser tribal group belonging to the al-Waldah clan. Other such groups include the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigade, whose members came mainly from the al-Sakhani tribal group referred to previously, and the al-Mustansir Billah Brigade, whose members were largely from the al-Affadlah clan.  […]

In addition to co-opting the governorate’s traditional leaders, ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] understood that the tribal structure had changed over time and that there was a younger generation that refused to accept the traditional chiefdoms. Therefore, ISIS co-opted young tribal leaders by offering to share oil and smuggling revenues with them and promising them positions of authority in the state. For example, ISIS appointed Ali al-Sahou, a young man of 23, as the head of its security office in Raqqa. He worked on recruiting young people from the tribes in Raqqa to join ISIS (al-Sayed, 2015). […]

After more than three years of living under ISIS rule, local tribes in Raqqa were exhausted by the oppression, arbitrary arrests, censorship, and deaths caused by airstrikes intended to target ISIS militants. These extreme conditions pushed many of the tribal youths to give up on ISIS and support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in their military campaign against ISIS’s de facto capital of Raqqa. The SDF had to ally with many local tribes in Raqqa, including the Buo-Assaf and the al-Waldah, in order to liberate the governorate. In this way, the SDF managed to defeat ISIS and retake the majority of the lands it once controlled.​

Current situation

Control of the governorate of Raqqa is currently divided between the ‘Syrian National Army’ opposition group supported by Turkey, which has a presence that extends about 20 km in from the border; the SDF, which controls the majority of the governorate; and the Syrian regime, which has a small pocket of territory in the south. The vast majority of the resources and population fall under the control of the SDF. The group established a Raqqa Civilian Council co-led by local tribal leader Sheikh Mahmoud Shawakh al-Bursan that includes 20 representatives from local tribes, but critics who live outside Raqqa say it is merely a fig leaf for Kurdish rule (Dukhan, 2018).​

External political authorities promote different individuals living within their area of control as the legitimate representative of a given tribe. This has led to the creation of multiple competing leadership groups within a single tribe, thereby promoting conflicting agendas. Both Turkey and the Syrian regime attempt to use tribal bonds to destabilize SDF rule in Raqqa, which causes further divisions within tribes and clans.​

On the ground and inside Raqqa itself, tribal leaders will lend support to those who guarantee benefits to themselves and their tribesmen. As long as the U.S. maintains its support for the SDF, tribes in Raqqa, despite sporadic tensions, will continue to stand by the SDF. If the latter were ousted by the Syrian regime, or the U.S. were to withdraw, their backing of the SDF would almost certainly wane.

What are the implications for policy makers?

1.      Tribes are not homogenous, static actors. Structural changes within tribal communities mean that not all members of the tribe follow their leader or their tribal traditions at any given time. Tribal identity is just one of many that tribesmen hold, meaning there is less cohesion among members of the tribes.​

2.      The weakening of state authority enhances tribal affiliations as many tribesmen see the tribe as their safety valve in the absence of state control. This means that concepts of tribal solidarity and support become more salient in times of conflict.

3.      Tribes do not have the ability to coordinate militarily outside their immediate area. The case of the Army of the Tribes, which is composed mainly of members of the al-Waldah and Buo-Assaf clans, shows that clans and lineages have a stronger sense of territorial solidarity than tribes do.

4.      Traditional tribal leaders are not necessarily representative of their entire tribe. The examples of Ali al-Sahou and Turki al-Buhamad show that there is a ‘generational’ dimension at play. Often such people still utilize their tribal background and ties to influence unemployed and disenfranchised members of different tribes to rally for a particular group. This means that the SDF or the U.S. should also reach out to groups other than the traditional tribal leaders when attempting to counter extremism and establish stability in Raqqa.“ (MEI, 24. März 2021)

·      MEI – Middle East Institute: Deir ez-Zor’s tribes reach a breaking point, 1. September 2023
https://www.mei.edu/publications/deir-ez-zors-tribes-reach-breaking-point

„Years of simmering tensions between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and local populations in northeast Syria have exploded this week into still-expanding battles across much of Deir ez-Zor. The current violence was triggered by the SDF’s Aug. 27 arrest of Ahmed al-Khubayl (‘Abu Khawla’), the emir of the Bakir tribe and commander of the SDF’s Deir ez-Zor Military Council. Five days later the chaos shows no sign of subsiding — in fact it appears to be spreading as more towns and clans take up arms against the SDF. […]

Late on Aug. 30, the sheikh of the large Akidat tribal confederation, which dominates SDF-held Deir ez-Zor, broke his silence. Sheikh Ibrahim al-Hifl, a long-time ally of the SDF and victim of past ISIS assassination attempts, released an audio statement in which he called on all tribes and clans in Deir ez-Zor to unite under one banner against the SDF. Such calls for inter-tribal unity have not been heard since the initial uprising against Damascus in 2011. Hifl’s call represents a key turning point in this conflict, likely ending the possibility that the violence could die out on its own. […]

Now the fate of Deir ez-Zor likely rests on the decisions of the Shaytat and Baggara tribes. The Shaytat, alongside the Bakir, is one of two powerful components of the Akidat confederation, together with a variety of smaller clans. The Shaytat appears to have increasingly thrown its weight behind the tribal forces since Hifl’s statement. In the two days since, the SDF has been expelled from every Akidat and Shaytat community stretching from the Khabour River to the Iraq border. The Baggara tribe, which is not part of the Akidat confederation and whose members have long been split among every side of the war, remains divided. While some members began attacking SDF positions early on Aug. 31, other leaders have made explicit statements in support of the SDF, with most remaining neutral. Late on Aug. 31, the head of the Baggara, Sheikh Hashim al-Bashir, released a statement calling for a ceasefire and the creation of a shura council to conduct negotiations.“ (MEI, 1. September 2023)

Syria Direct ist, laut eigenen Angaben, eine 2013 gegründete nicht profitorientierte journalistische Organisation, die Nachrichten und Interviews aus Syrien publiziert.

·      Syria Direct: Clan conflicts in Syria: Seeds of revenge grow under the ashes amid attempts to renew customary law, 9. Dezember 2022
https://syriadirect.org/clan-conflicts-in-syria-seeds-of-revenge-grow-under-the-ashes-amid-attempts-to-renew-customary-law/

„Years of war and shifts in the balance of power in Syria have left a deep mark on Syria’s clans, contributing to more frequent conflicts, complicating traditional authorities’ reconciliation efforts and laying the groundwork for future acts of revenge. […]

In the eastern Deir e-Zor town of Ghranij, a 25-year vendetta was put to rest last month. Through efforts by a number of clan sheikhs and notables in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled area, on November 10 the al-Khalifa al-Nayef and al-Aghdab al-Hamada families of the al-Shaytat clan finally agreed to a reconciliation agreement. […]

These two incidents—one of clan reconciliation, the other of conflict—are examples of the clan dynamics at work in Syria, as well as the role of traditional authorities in a shattered state. They are among 46 incidents of clan disputes and reconciliations Syria Direct tracked from the start of 2022 to the end of October. The individual parties at conflict were documented in 29 of those incidents, which took place in northern and eastern Syria. 

Together, they paint a picture of how clan disputes arise and are resolved, through sheikhs, traditional elders and clerics, in accordance with religious rulings and prevailing clan customs and traditions. […]

Years of war and shifts in the map of military control in Syria have left a deep impact on the country’s economy, society and security. As a result, clan fighting and disputes have escalated, in a country where—in most provinces—clans are a fundamental pillar of society.  

Proof of that, in the eyes of Sheikh Hassan al-Khamri, from the al-Walda tribe’s al-Nasser clan, is the nature of clan issues and disagreements he has worked to resolve with other sheikhs and notables in the area of Tabqa city, where he lives in Syria’s northern Raqqa province. These included ‘a dispute that developed into a murder because of one person’s support for the regime, after his killing was authorized [ihdar al-dam], because he was a pro-regime thug [shabih] as the factions see it,’ al-Khamri said.

Al-Khamri and other notables have worked to resolve other deadly disputes, such as one murder ‘as a result of a disagreement over land and property, and another after Free Syrian Army factions left the area and the Islamic State came in, and killings took place under the pretext of unbelief and apostasy,’ he told Syria Direct. After IS [Islamic State] was later expelled, clan disputes ‘significantly increased,’ al-Khamri added. […]

Sheikh Hawas al-Jassim (Abu Kassar), who represents the Deir e-Zor town of Baghouz and its surroundings—where IS made its final territorial stand in 2019—and serves as the secretary of the Bukamal Jazira Clan Assembly, said there has been a ‘major defect in leadership of the clans, east and west of the Euphrates, since the events began’ in 2011. 

Before the revolution, there were ‘major clan authorities who held sway over influential figures, and any dispute was responded to and resolved by the established clan methods, whether through custom [al-urf], the Sharia or traditions—but [these authorities] no longer exist today,’ he said.

In Syria, ‘clan shrinkage,’ as al-Jassim put it, has contributed to an increase in clan conflicts. While once ‘sheikhs and notables used to control members of the clan, now there is chaos in clan leadership,’ he said, alongside ‘foreign hands from neighboring countries playing with the clan authorities, trying to control the sheikhs in order to undermine stability and prevent clan cohesion.’ 

As a result of this rupture, ‘clan revenge killings are being done in an arbitrary and barbaric way, in the absence of a truly deterrent authority,’ al-Jassim said. ‘This has given a green light to the youth, who do not listen to authority or the clan.’ […]

During the war in Syria, the country saw ‘a significant return to tribalism, and an increase in the sense of clan belonging,’ al-Khamri, from the al-Nasser clan in Tabqa, said. That is ‘a natural reaction given the rotation of controlling authorities and an individual’s search for a sense of security by joining a gathering or bloc that protects him.’

Underscoring this dynamic, al-Rahhal said, is that ‘incidents of a clan nature increased in Raqqa after the Syrian crisis by up to 75 percent’ compared to before the war, he estimated.

Al-Jassim, in Baghouz, agreed. ‘The rise became more pronounced after 2019, following the expulsion of IS from the area,’ he said. An increase in clan conflict put ‘great pressure on the clan sheikhs and those working for good in the area.’

The most recent conflicts ‘have revealed some acts that are inconsistent [even] with the previously established civil laws,’ according to al-Khamri, including ‘an increase in the revenge killings, taking up arms and the large number of individual disputes that devolved into clan fighting.’ He also pointed to ‘the emergence of inciting groups on social media and social phenomena alien to the community, such as drug use and its resulting problems and illegal criminal acts.’ […]

Syria’s clans are used to ‘taking measures of the truce [al-atwa], delegation [al-jaha] and reconciliation in most cases,’ al-Khamri said, ‘but their importance increases in major cases, such as those related to honor, killing, cutting the face and violating the sanctity of the home.’ In those cases, ‘urgent measures’ are needed to ‘limit conflicts and stop reactions,’ because ‘failure to follow customs could lead to further problems and complications.’ 

Reconciliation procedures begin with ‘preliminary contacts,’ after which a truce is approved and the members of the clan delegation to negotiate the reconciliation are chosen, the sheikh said, beginning to describe the process. ‘The delegation elder contacts the sheikh of the victim’s clan, or representatives of it,’ and the relatives of the victim are pressured ‘until they accept the principle of conducting a reconciliation.’

When the mediators feel there is intent to reconcile, ‘they tell the perpetrator’s clan, so it in turn makes the necessary arrangements,’ al-Khamri said. The reconciliation body, made up of notables and elders, is formed, and ‘contacts the other notables to determine the place and time of the assembly.’

Generally, when the case is adjudicated, ‘an arbitration committee is formed of members who are capable and competent to fulfill the rights of, and who have credibility and trust among, the two disputing parties,’ the sheikh said. In some cases, ‘the two sides agree to litigation through a religious arbitrator, who judges according to what God has revealed in the Holy Quran.’ And sometimes, the disputing sides accept a solution agreed upon by clan mediators.

At the end of the process, a deed of reconciliation is agreed upon between the perpetrator and victim, or the victim’s relatives, including an agreed-upon sum of blood money. The perpetrator is brought in, the two clans shake hands, guarantors are appointed for the reconciliation and the deed of reconciliation is reviewed and finalized with the signature of both parties before witnesses. ‘The deed of reconciliation is the written document regarding the procedures to end the case through the clan, and [documents] the forfeiture of all personal and civil rights before the courts,’ al-Khamri said. 

Today, decisions reached during clan reconciliation processes are ‘published online, in newspapers and by tribal governing councils,’ and amount to ‘a contract stipulating the end of the dispute and state of hostility and conflict between the two parties because of the crime,’ al-Khamri concluded. 

Clan reconciliation processes are based on ‘Islamic law, as the primary solution that the two opposing parties cannot go beyond, as well as some customs and traditions,’ Sheikh al-Jassim said. The agreement is made ‘in the presence of Sharia committees from the fabric of the clan, who have sufficient expertise and knowledge to resolve the disputes,’ he added. 

However, social changes in Syria today make it necessary to reconsider the current body of clan customary law and traditions governing reconciliation and associated processes, according to al-Khamri. For example, with the increased population of Syrian cities, customs such as jalwa, in which five generations of relatives of a perpetrator are exiled from a community in response to a serious crime, means ‘demanding the evacuation of more than 2,000 people sometimes,’ he said. 

Clan leaders, including al-Khamri himself, are making some attempts to reconsider long-held practices and clan customs to ‘update this covenant.’ The clans in Raqqa and Tabqa have held multiple meetings, out of which a sub-committee was formed, made up of ‘clan sheikhs themselves, jurists, clerics and some notables’ tasked with ‘proposing and drafting an amended clan charter, and presenting it to the sheikhs in joint coordination meetings in Raqqa and Tabqa,’ he explained. 

The next step is to hold meetings with influential local clans to present the amended body of rules and practices ‘and take opinions and proposals’ from elders. Finally, ‘we’ll hold a meeting of the clan sheikhs with the local media to announce the new covenant, distribute it to the area’s clans and announce it is being implemented and abided by,’ al-Khamri concluded. 

Customary laws followed by Syria’s clans ‘are not a constitution—they are like a law that everyone must recognize,’ journalist al-Kanj said. ‘Clan rulings have significantly contributed to ending conflicts, because they are consensus-based legal provisions, and the clan community agrees upon them.’ 

These provisions are detailed, prescribing a specific punishment and amount of blood money for each incident of murder. Under clan custom, the penalty for premeditated murder differs from murder in self defense or mutilation of a body, al-Kanj explained.

The Syrian regime has historically ‘recognized and invoked’ clan law, forming ‘clan committees to decide on some issues,’ al-Kanj said. Today, this approach is being repeated in parts of Syria outside control of the central state by de facto authorities, which ‘recognize clan laws and form committees of notables to rule among people,’ he said. 

Legally, ‘Syrian courts are not bound by clan deeds of reconciliation,’ Suleiman al-Qurfan, the former head of the Syrian Free Lawyers Association, told Syria Direct. ‘The Syrian constitution does not oblige the judiciary to invoke clan deeds, and it is left to the discretion of the trial court to adopt or disregard them.’ 

But it has been customary for Syrian courts to ‘include the deed in its rulings if there is nothing in it contrary to public order,’ al-Qurfan said. ‘That is, the courts adopt the reconciliation if they are convinced of it, and implement it in the form of a ruling.’ In that case, the court considers the deed as ‘forfeiting personal rights, and the litigants’ claims in the lawsuit are limited to what was stated in the ruling clauses of the deed.’ Still, the rights of the public ‘remain in place, and the court rules on them according to the facts of the case,’ he added. […]

In northeastern Syria, where al-Khamri lives, the Autonomous Administration (AANES) has formed ‘reconciliation committees and councils, and recently formed a council of elders made up of sheikhs and notables from the region to sit in on and resolve all issues and conflicts,’ he said. The AANES judiciary and Justice Council takes up and implements deeds of reconciliations issued by clan leaders.

In his view, ‘there is cooperation and harmony between the AANES—in all its political, administrative, judicial and even military components—and the sheikhs and notables of the area, who have full authority and absolute freedom to break up and resolve all kinds of conflicts.’ 

In addition to the reconciliation committees the AANES has helped form, which include a clan judge, known as a reconciliation judge or al-aarifa, alongside lawyers, sheikhs and notables, the de facto administration has formed a General Reconciliation Committee in Raqqa city, Sheikh al-Rahhal said. The body’s task is to ‘overcome difficulties and resolve clan problems after sheikhs and the reconciliation committees come to it when matters reach a dead end,’ he explained. 

Additional efforts to eliminate infighting and quarrels in the area include ‘educational meetings and seminars, and integrating clan members through [political] parties, education and intermingling,’ al-Rahhal added.

Sheikh al-Jassim, in SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces]-controlled Deir e-Zor, agreed with the other two sheikhs’ reading of the situation in AANES territories. ‘The AANES supervises and closely monitors any disagreement or clan fighting, and communicates directly with sheikhs and notables,’ he said. But it too ‘sometimes avoids interfering in clan fighting, except when asked,’ al-Jassim added, ‘so as not to cause tensions between it and one clan on account of another clan.’

And while clans hold sway in the Deir e-Zor countryside, formal judicial authority is absent. ‘There is no real judiciary or rigorous courts dealing with these issues and deterring disputes in the region,’ al-Jassim said.

But this does not mean the SDF does not exert ‘control over the clan component to some extent,’ researcher al-Ali said. Local authorities used ‘the Shammar Sheikh Hmeidi Daham al-Jarba, who they appointed governor of the Syrian Jazira region [corresponding to SDF-controlled Hasakah province] in a utilitarian partnership between them,’ he added.“ (Syria Direct, 9. Dezember 2022)