LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The constitution states there shall be “absolute freedom of conscience” and declares the state will respect all religious groups and denominations, as well as the personal status and religious interests of persons of every religious group. The constitution guarantees free exercise of religious rites, provided they do not disturb the public order, and declares the equality of rights and duties for all citizens without discrimination or preference.

By law, an individual is free to convert to a different religion if a local senior official of the religious group the person wishes to join approves the change. The religious group issues a document confirming the convert’s new religion, allowing the convert to register her or his new religion with the Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) Personal Status Directorate. The new religion is included thereafter on government-issued civil registration documents.

Citizens have the right to remove the customary notation of their religion from government-issued civil registration documents or change how it is listed. Changing these documents does not require approval of religious officials and does not change or remove the individual’s registration with the Personal Status Directorate.

The penal code stipulates a maximum prison term of one year for anyone convicted of “blaspheming God publicly.” It does not provide a definition of what this entails. A publications law regulates print media and includes provisions that impose potential fines or prison terms for sectarian provocation and prohibit the press from publishing either blasphemous content regarding the country’s officially recognized religions or content that may provoke sectarian feuds.

The law governing audiovisual media bans live broadcasts of certain religious events and prohibits the broadcast of programs that seek to harm public morals, ignite sectarian strife, or insult religious beliefs. Websites are censored through court orders filed with the Internal Security Forces’ (ISF) Cybercrimes Bureau for further investigation, after which the bureau issues a final order to the Ministry of Telecommunications. Elements of the law permit censorship of religious material considered a threat to national security or offensive to the dignity of the head of state or foreign leaders. The law includes guidelines regarding materials deemed unsuitable for publication in a book, newspaper, or magazine. Any violation of the guidelines may result in the author’s imprisonment or a fine. Officials from any of the recognized religious groups may request that the Directorate of General Security (DGS) ban a publication. The government may prosecute offending journalists and publications in the publications court. Authorities occasionally also refer such cases to criminal courts, a process not established in law.

The penal code criminalizes defamation and contempt for religion and stipulates a maximum prison term of three years for either of these offenses.

By law, religious groups may apply to the government for official recognition. To do so, a religious group must submit a statement of its doctrine and moral principles to the cabinet, which evaluates whether the group’s principles are in accordance with the government’s perception of popular values and the constitution. Alternatively, an unrecognized religious group may apply for recognition by seeking affiliation with another recognized religious group. In doing so, the unrecognized group does not gain recognition as a separate group but becomes an affiliate of the group through which it applies. This process has the same requirements as applying for recognition directly with the government.

There are 18 officially recognized religious groups: five Muslim groups (Shia, Sunni, Druze, Alawite, and Ismaili), 12 Christian groups (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Assyrian, Chaldean, Copt, evangelical Protestant, and Roman Catholic), and Jews. Religious groups not recognized by the government include Baha’is, Buddhists, Hindus, several Protestant groups, and the Church of Jesus Christ. Individuals from all of Lebanon’s 18 recognized religious communities are involved in Lebanon’s political life and government.

Official recognition of a religious group allows baptisms and marriages it performs to receive government recognition and also conveys other benefits such as tax-exempt status and the right to apply the group’s codes to personal status matters. By law, the government permits recognized religious groups to administer their own rules on family and personal status issues, including marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. State-appointed, government-subsidized sectarian courts administer family and personal status law for Shia, Sunni, Druze, and recognized Christian groups, according to the respective religious group’s beliefs. While the religious courts and religious laws are legally bound to comply with the provisions of the constitution, the Court of Cassation (the highest civil court in the judicial system) has very limited oversight of religious court proceedings and decisions.

There are no formalized procedures for civil marriage or divorce. The government recognizes heterosexual civil marriage ceremonies performed outside the country irrespective of the religious affiliation of each partner in the marriage. While some Christian and Muslim religious authorities will perform interreligious marriages, clerics, priests, or religious courts often require the nonbelonging partner to pledge to raise his or her children in the religion of the partner and/or to relinquish certain rights, such as inheritance or custody claims, in the case of divorce.

Unrecognized religious groups may own property, assemble for worship, and perform religious rites freely. They may not perform legally recognized marriages or divorces, and they have no standing to determine inheritance issues. Due to agreements in the country’s confessional system that designate percentages of senior government positions (and in some cases, specific positions) for the recognized religious communities, members of unrecognized groups have no opportunity to occupy certain government positions, including cabinet, parliamentary, secretary-general, and director general positions.

The government requires Protestant churches to register with the Supreme Council of the Evangelical Community in Syria and Lebanon, a self-governing advisory group that oversees religious matters for Protestant congregations and represents those churches to the government.

According to the constitution, recognized religious communities may operate their own schools. However, religious schools must follow the same general rules as public schools, which stipulate that they must not incite sectarian discord or threaten national security. The government permits but does not require religious education in public schools. Both Christian and Muslim local religious representatives sometimes host educational sessions in public schools.

The constitution states “sectarian groups” shall be represented in a “just and equitable balance” in the cabinet and high-level civil service positions, which includes the ministry ranks of secretary-general and director general. It also states these posts shall be distributed proportionately among the major religious groups. This distribution of positions among religious groups is based on the unwritten 1943 National Pact, which used religious affiliation data from the 1932 census (the last conducted in the country). According to the pact, the president shall be a Maronite Christian, the speaker of parliament shall be a Shia Muslim, and the prime minister shall be a Sunni Muslim. This proportional distribution also applies to high-level positions in the civil service, the judiciary, military, and security institutions, and public agencies at both the national and local levels of government. Parliament is elected on equal representation between Christians and Muslims, and cabinet positions must be allocated on the same basis. Druze and Alawites are included in this allocation within Muslim communities. With the exception of Ismaili Islam and Judaism, authorities allocated every government-recognized religious group at least one seat in parliament regardless of the number of its adherents.

The constitution also states there is no legitimacy for any authorities that contradict the “pact of communal existence,” thereby giving force of law to the unwritten 1943 National Pact, although that arrangement is neither officially spelled out in the constitution nor is it a formally binding legal agreement.

The Taif Agreement, which ended the country’s 15-year civil war in 1989, also mandates elections based on the principle of proportional representation between Muslims and Christians in the Lebanese Parliament but reaffirms the Christian and Muslim allocation at 50 percent each. The agreement reduced the constitutional powers of the Maronite Christian presidency and increased those of the Sunni Muslim prime minister while also subjecting the designation of the prime minister to binding consultations with parliament and the designations of all ministers to a parliamentary vote of confidence. The Taif Agreement also endorses the constitutional provision appointing most senior government officials according to religious affiliation, including senior positions within the military and other security forces. Customarily, a Maronite Christian commands the armed forces, while the directors general of the ISF and the DGS are Sunni and Shia Muslims, respectively. Several other top positions in the security services are customarily designated for particular confessions as well. While specific positions are designated by custom rather than law, deviating from custom is rare and the confessions concerned must mutually agree to any change or accommodation. The Taif Agreement’s stipulations on equality of representation among members of different confessions do not apply to citizens who do not list a religious affiliation on their national registration, and thus they cannot hold seats designated for specific confessions.

By law, the synod of each Christian group elects its patriarch, the Sunni and Shia electoral bodies elect their respective senior clerics, and the Druze community elects its Sheikh al-Aql, its most senior religious leader. The cabinet must endorse the nomination of Sunni and Shia muftis, as well as the Sheikh al-Aql, and pay their salaries. The government also appoints and pays the salaries of Muslim and Druze clerical judges. By law, the government does not endorse Christian patriarchs and does not pay the salaries of Christian clergy and officials of Christian groups.

The government issues foreign religious workers a one-month visa; to stay longer, a worker must complete a residency application during the month. Religious workers also must sign a “commitment of responsibility” form before receiving a visa, which subjects the worker to legal prosecution and immediate deportation for any activity involving religious or other criticism directed against the state or any other country, except Israel. If the government finds an individual engaging in religious activity while on a tourist visa, the government may determine a violation of the visa category has occurred and deport the individual.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

GOVERNMENT PRACTICES

Abuses Involving Violence, Detention, or Mass Resettlement

According to NGOs, on August 29 the ISF arrested comedian Nour Hajjar in connection with a complaint that a leading member of the Dar al-Fatwa, Lebanon’s highest Muslim Sunni religious authority, had submitted against him. The Dar al-Fatwa claimed that a comedy sketch that Hajjar performed on stage in 2018 was “an insult to Islam, Muslims, and endangers civil peace in the country.” Upon the orders of Public Prosecutor Ghassan Oueidat, officers took Hajjar, without informing his lawyer, to the division’s headquarters at the Justice Ministry in Beirut, where they interrogated him for several hours. Following the interrogation, authorities released Hajjar later that evening, after dozens of protesters gathered outside the ministry calling for his release. According to Amnesty International and legal experts, Article 10 of the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedures, the statute of limitation for prosecuting such acts is three years and had therefore expired at the time of Hajjar’s arrest.

Abuses Involving the Ability of Individuals to Engage in Religious Activities Alone or In Community with Others

According to local NGOs, some members of unregistered religious groups, such as Baha’is and members of unrecognized Protestant faiths, continued to list themselves as belonging to recognized religious groups in government records to ensure their marriage and other personal status documents remained legally valid. Many Baha’is said they chose to list themselves as Shia Muslims in order to effectively manage civil matters that Shia institutions officially administered, while members of the Church of Jesus Christ said they registered as evangelical Protestants.

The government again failed to approve a request from the Jewish community to change its official name to the Jewish Community Council from the Israelite Communal Council (the group’s officially recognized name). Jewish community representatives reported that the MOI continued to delay the verification of the results of the Jewish Community Council’s election of members, which occurs every six years, most recently in 2020. Regulations governing such councils require the MOI to verify council election results. The council, which represents the interests of the country’s Jewish citizens, repeatedly submitted requests to change its government-appointed name to reduce social stigma, but to no avail. The council blamed its official name in part for the difficulties it experienced with renewals every six years. In late 2021, the Minister of Interior said the MOI would investigate allegations that several council members forged the signatures of nonresident Lebanese Jews to illegally acquire property. As of year’s end, the MOI had not referred the case to the judiciary.

The Jewish community faced difficulties importing material for religious rites; as customs agents were reportedly wary of allowing imports of any origin containing Hebrew script due to a national ban on trade of Israeli goods, the Jewish Community Council decided to stop importing any religious material. During the year, the Jewish Community Council faced difficulty in renewing the mandate of its members, a legal requirement for groups that wish to continue to be recognized by the government. This was due to government officials’ unwillingness to put their signatures on any document with the group’s name on it, since doing so could be misinterpreted as tacit support for Israel.

The government remained in a caretaker status because parliament was unable to elect a president after former president Michel Aoun’s six-year term expired in October 2022. The caretaker cabinet consisted of 24 ministers: five Maronite, five Shia, five Sunni, three Greek Orthodox, two Druze, two Greek Catholic, one representing Christian minorities, and one Armenian Orthodox.

Members of all confessions may serve in the military, intelligence, and security services. While most confessions had members serving in these capacities, some religious groups did not, usually because of their small number of adherents in the country. Members of the largest recognized confessions dominated the ranks of senior positions.

During the year, religious leaders spoke out on various political issues. On January 3, Grand Mufti of the Sunni community Abdel Latif Derian called for “finalizing the presidential election as soon as possible,” warning that “the country and citizens can no longer bear this vacuum that is destroying all of the state’s pillars.” He further warned that a “presidential vacuum is a rejected and dangerous thing, and it threatens Muslims and Christians in their country, [which is] built on the basis of the culture of citizenship and coexistence.” On February 12, Maronite Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rai said that politicians were abusing their “power and influence” in delaying the election of a new president. Al-Rai convened a prayer meeting of all Christian leaders on April 5 in an attempt to rally action to elect a president. 53 parliamentarians attended, but 10 others opted either not to attend, or to attend virtually.

Christian and Muslim leaders continued to fear that allowing civil marriages would threaten their ability to administer their own confessional affairs. According to the online news site Al-Monitor, “Secular and feminist movements have highlighted the importance of civil marriage as the door to a personal status law.”

Persons seeking a nonreligious marriage ceremony typically travelled to countries that allow civil marriages, such as Cyprus.

Abuses Involving Discrimination or Unequal Treatment

On March 23, caretaker Prime Minister Mikati, after meeting with Speaker Berri, made a last-minute decision to delay the start of daylight savings time/summer hours from March 26 to April 21. The government announcement gave no reason for the change, but local media reported that Berri asked for the change to allow Muslims to break earlier from their Ramadan fasts. Christian politicians and institutions objected to the move. On March 27, Mikati reversed the daylight savings time postponement in response to criticism that he had unilaterally approved the delay without first consulting with the cabinet. Later that day, Mikati announced that the cabinet had voted to begin daylight savings on the evening of March 29-30.

In a September 7 cabinet meeting, caretaker Prime Minister Mikati said that over a thousand Syrian refugees each week were fleeing to Lebanon. Mikati said the refugee flows “could create harsh imbalances.” Mikati said what is worrying about the influx in refugees is that most of them are young men and women and “that threatens our entity’s independence and could create harsh imbalances that could affect Lebanon’s demographic balance.” According to the AP, “the demographic in question may be religious affiliation, as the vast majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims.”

Other Developments Affecting Religious Freedom

On August 18, the General Directorate for Religious Advocacy, a subordinate organization of the Higher Islamic Shia Council, declared 15 of its own clerics unqualified to deliver religious guidance within the Shia Muslim community. The general directorate issued the directive based on what it cited as deviations in the 15 clerics’ beliefs and behaviors, attributing the discrepancies to their “insufficient religious knowledge.” Sheikh Yasser Aoudeh, one of the supposedly disqualified clerics who is also a staunch critic of both Hizballah and the Amal Movement, told the AP that he did not recognize the authority of the Higher Islamic Shia Council and rejected “corruption by politicians who are protected by religious authorities.” Aoudeh said both Hizballah and the Amal Movement “strictly prohibit any criticism.” The Higher Islamic Shia Council subsequently issued a statement on August 20 stating that the General Directorate for Religious Advocacy’s directive did not reflect the Council’s point of view and that Acting President of the Higher Islamic Shia Council Sheikh Ali al-Khatib had not been informed in advance.

On August 9, Minister of Culture Mohammed Mortada formally requested that the MOI ban the film Barbie from cinemas, arguing that it contradicted the values of “faith and morality” by diminishing the importance of the family unit. The DGS reviewed the film and authorized its public release in Lebanese theaters on September 1.

ACTIONS BY FOREIGN FORCES AND NONSTATE ACTORS

Hizballah, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group, continued to exercise influence over some areas, particularly the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Beka’a Valley, and southern areas of the country, all of which are predominantly Shia. In those areas, Hizballah provided several basic services, such as gas, diesel, health care, education, food aid, infrastructure repair, and internal security. There continued to be reports of Hizballah controlling access to the neighborhoods and localities under its influence, including in Beirut’s southern suburbs and areas of the Beka’a Valley and South Lebanon. Hizballah has used this influence, including religious influence, to silence and intimidate critics.

In areas under Hizballah’s influence, independent NGOs faced harassment and intimidation, including social, political, and financial pressures. In October, Hizballah members harassed Murr TV (MTV) reporter Joyce Akiki as she attempted to report from an area near Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, saying that she and MTV “represented Zionists.” Armed members of nonstate armed groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian militias, impeded access to certain neighborhoods, camps, and other areas where they operated outside the reach and authority of the government. Starting in October, Hizballah, Palestinian militants, and the Israeli Defense Forces engaged in sporadic, and often tense, exchanges of fire along the Blue Line (the line of demarcation separating Lebanon from Israel and the Golan Heights).

From July 29 through December, sporadic heavy fighting between rival armed groups in the Ain el-Helweh Palestinian refugee camp killed at least 30 persons. According to the press, Fatah, the main faction under the PLO umbrella, which is associated with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, clashed with the Islamist groups Jund al-Sham and Shebab al-Muslim after a senior Fatah commander was killed.

According to press and NGO accounts, on August 9, a Hizballah truck loaded with weapons overturned in front of a church in the predominantly Christian village of Kahaleh on its way from the Beka’a Valley to Beirut. When Hizballah members tried to prevent local residents from investigating the accident, a gun battle ensued resulting in two deaths, one a Christian villager and the other a Hizballah member. The LAF subsequently took control of the scene. On August 18, a military court summoned four villagers and four Hizballah members to give testimony about the incident. According to press reports, Christian parties in the country rejected the summoning of the villagers by the LAF investigation. Analysis posted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy stated that the incident was the latest example of friction between Hizballah and members of other religious groups in the country and stated: “Accumulating frustration with such behavior has led to increased hostility against Hizballah on the street and in social media spaces, and for many Lebanese, the Kahaleh incident seems to have cracked the wall of fear surrounding Hizballah. More Christian civilians and community leaders are now calling for an armed response and self-defense measures.”

In late July, according to the Jerusalem Post, Hizballah mobilized its fighters as a “show of strength” for the commemoration of the holy day of Ashura. Pro-Hizballah media covered Hizballah’s activities, which one satellite channel said were intended to protect participants in Shia observances. The Post said that the goal of Hizballah was “to blend [Shia] religious events with the group’s militia and terrorist activities, to portray Hizballah as both ‘safeguarding’ these religious events and hijacking them for its own purposes.”

Investigations continued into the 2021 killing of Lokman Slim, a prominent political activist and vocal critic of Hizballah. No findings had been made public by year’s end.

Although the law empowered the cabinet to license all political parties, Hizballah’s “political wing” operated without a license.