Country Report on Terrorism 2022 - Chapter 2 - Iran

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its support for terrorist activity in 2022, including support for Hizballah, U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups in the West Bank and Gaza, and various terrorist and militant groups in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and throughout the Middle East.  Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to provide support to terrorist organizations, provide cover for associated covert operations, and create instability in the region.  Iran has acknowledged the involvement of the IRGC-QF in the Iraq and Syria conflicts, and the IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist activity abroad.  In 2019 the Secretary of State designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including IRGC-QF, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.  Iran also used regional militant and proxy groups to provide deniability, in an attempt to shield it from accountability for its destabilizing policies.

In Iraq, Iran supported various Iran-aligned militia groups in 2022, including the U.S.-designated terrorist groups Kata’ib Hizballah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, with sophisticated weapons — including increasingly accurate and lethal unmanned aerial systems (UAS) — support, funding, and training.  These groups conducted multiple rocket and UAS attacks on U.S. and coalition facilities across Iraq, as well as attacks in Syria from Iraq in 2022.  These included multiple attacks on U.S. and coalition forces at Ain al-Assad Airbase in January and May.  Additionally, Iran-aligned militia groups conducted an explosive UAS attack on Erbil in June, which injured three civilians, and two drone attacks on Turkish bases in Iraq in July.  Pro-Iranian militias also fired rockets at the Turkish consulate in Mosul in July.

Iran also bolstered terrorist groups operating in Syria, including Hizballah, which has provided significant support to the Assad regime.  Iran views the Assad regime as a crucial ally.  It considers Iraq and Syria vital routes through which it can supply weapons to Hizballah, Iran’s primary terrorist proxy group.  Iranian forces have directly backed militia operations in Syria with artillery, rockets, drones, and armored vehicles.  Through financial or residency enticements, Iran has facilitated and coerced primarily Shia fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan to participate in the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown in Syria.  These Iran-aligned forces conducted multiple attacks on U.S. forces in Syria.

Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701.  Israeli security officials and politicians expressed concerns that Iran was supplying Hizballah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, as well as assisting the group in creating infrastructure that would permit it to produce its own rockets and missiles, thereby threatening Israel from Lebanon and Syria.  Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran.  Hizballah fighters have been used extensively in Syria to support the Assad regime.

In 2022, Iran continued providing weapons systems and other support to Hamas and other U.S.-designated Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.  These groups were behind numerous deadly attacks originating in Gaza and the West Bank.

In Bahrain, Iran has continued to provide weapons, support, and training to local Shia militant groups, including the al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar, both U.S.-designated terrorist groups.

In Yemen, Iran has provided a wide range of weapons, training, advanced equipment such as UAS, and other support to Houthi militants, who engaged in attacks against regional targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.  On at least five occasions in 2022, the U.S. Navy and partner forces interdicted vessels suspected of traveling from Iran to Yemen, with cargoes that included more than 300 tons of missile fuel component and fertilizer that could be used by Houthi militants to make missiles and explosives, as well as ammunition, small arms, and equipment.

In 2022, Iranian forces continued a pattern of attacks on commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman, including a November 16 drone attack on the Pacific Zircon, a Liberian-flagged, Israeli-affiliated tanker carrying oil.

Iran pursued or supported terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in 2022, including thwarted plots to attack Israeli tourists in Türkiye in May and to murder an Israeli citizen in Georgia in November.  These plots were being implemented by current and former members of the IRGC-QF.

Senior al-Qa’ida members continued to reside in Iran, where the authorities still refuse to identify publicly members they know to be living in the country.  Iran has allowed AQ facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria, among other locales.

As in past years, the Iranian government continued supporting terrorist plots or associated activities targeting dissidents and other perceived enemies of the regime.  A British intelligence agency publicly reported uncovering at least 10 potential threats emanating from Iran’s government to kidnap or kill individuals in the United Kingdom in 2022.  In recent years, Albania, Belgium, and the Netherlands have all either arrested or expelled Iranian government officials implicated in various terrorist plots in their respective territories.  Denmark similarly recalled its ambassador from Tehran after learning of an Iran-backed plot to kill an Iranian dissident in its country.  The Albanian government became a victim of cyberattacks emanating from Iran in July and September, likely in response to Albania providing shelter to the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq — an Iranian dissident group that advocates overthrowing the government in Iran.  In 2022 the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it had disrupted an IRGC-QF-led plot to assassinate former National Security Advisor John Bolton and arrested a suspected Iranian operative accused of planning the assassination.

Associated documents