Former president Idriss Déby Itno seized power during a rebellion in 1990 and officially won all subsequent elections. Those elections were not credible or free, taking place amid government crackdowns on political dissent. Following Idriss Déby Itno’s death in 2021, the Transitional Military Council (CMT) headed by his son, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, took control of the country in a coup d’état.

In 2022, seeking to gain support from armed opposition groups, the CMT organized negotiations hosted by the Qatari government, which lasted from March to August. The talks were followed by the organization of the DNIS with civilian representatives, which concluded in October with a new transition timeline that envisioned elections taking place by November 2024. The CMT formally disbanded after the DNIS, and Déby remained in position as the president of a new transitional government. He appointed a former political opposition leader, Saleh Kebzabo, as transitional prime minister.

Prior to the April 2021 military coup, the unicameral National Assembly consisted of 188 members elected to four-year terms. Legislative elections were last held in 2011, and have been repeatedly postponed.

At the time of the 2021 coup, legislators were performing their functions despite the expiration of their electoral mandates. The CMT dissolved the National Assembly and appointed a 93-member National Transitional Council (CNT) as an interim legislature. While some opposition members were included in the body, members of a prominent opposition coalition that denounced the coup were excluded. In October of that year, the former president of the National Assembly, Haroun Kabadi, was appointed as president of the CNT. In November 2022, Déby named 104 additional deputies to the CNT.

In October 2022, the DNIS established a new two-year transition timetable that included plans for a new electoral code and a referendum on a new constitution.

The National Commission Charged with the Organization of the Constitutional Referendum (CONOREC), the lone electoral management body in place during the transition period, was launched by decree in February 2023. Despite objections from the opposition, its members were appointed by transitional president Déby. Members of the opposition and civil society also denounced CONOREC’s lack of transparency.

In late June, 96 percent of CNT members voted to adopt the proposed draft of a new constitution. CONOREC scheduled a referendum on the draft for December, launched the voter registration process in July, and released a final electoral roll in November. The opposition boycotted the referendum, and according to official tallies, the new constitution passed with 86 percent of the vote and voter turnout of 64 percent. The adopted constitution would allow junta members and members of the transitional government to compete in elections, which were scheduled for November 2024. A new electoral body to administer the 2024 balloting had yet to be established at year’s end.

There are more than 130 registered political parties in Chad, though most have historically been aligned with the ruling party of the former president, the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS).

In 2022, authorities violently cracked down on opposition protests, arrested leaders of prominent opposition groups, and intimidated political activists, prompting some to flee the country. Following protests in October of that year, the government issued a curfew for major urban areas and a three-month ban on political activities.

At the end of October 2023, transitional authorities struck a deal with Succès Masra, the president of the Transformers opposition party, that provided a general amnesty for those involved in the October 2022 protests and allowed Masra to return to the country in November.

Chad has never experienced a peaceful transfer of power through elections, and elections have been repeatedly delayed, denying opposition groups an opportunity to compete with incumbent forces. After the October 2022 protests, security forces continued to target the opposition with detentions and harassment, and opposition members claimed that hundreds of their supporters had been detained or disappeared. Transitional authorities have also co-opted some opposition leaders into the transitional government and legislature and undermined their attempts at political reform.

Extensive kinship networks tied to the former president resulted in a concentration of political and economic power. The former government was not accountable to voters in practice, and citizens had few effective means of influencing politics. The military’s support for the installation of transitional president Déby in 2021 perpetuated a historic pattern of military interventions in political affairs. The extension of the transition period by two years in 2022 further postponed any shift toward electoral politics and voter participation.

The transitional leadership has continued a long-standing practice of appointing members of the Beri ethnic group to prominent positions within the government, causing resentment among the country’s other ethnic groups. The Beri make up less than 5 percent of Chad’s population. Many ethnic groups from the southern part of the country have been largely excluded from political power; while some have held government posts, they had little ability to advocate for their communities or act independently under the Déby regime.

Women have historically held few senior positions in government, and they face societal discrimination. LGBT+ people are severely marginalized and have little ability to engage in political processes or advocate for their interests.

None of the executive or legislative officials installed since the 2021 coup were elected. Even before 2021, the president was not freely elected, and the mandate of the National Assembly had expired in 2015.

Corruption, bribery, and nepotism are endemic in Chad. Journalists, labor leaders, and religious figures have faced harsh reprisals for speaking out about corruption, including arrest, prosecution, and expulsion from the country. Corruption charges against high-level officials that do go forward are widely viewed as selective prosecutions meant to discredit those who have fallen out with or pose a threat to the government or its allies.

Chad has no law establishing the right to access official information. Since seizing power in 2021, Déby has largely ruled by decree, offering no meaningful opportunity for civil society to comment on government policies or obtain basic information about government operations.

The transitional charter provided for freedom of the press, but press freedom has been restricted in practice. Newspaper editors are legally required to have completed at least three years of higher education, and outlets employing editors who do not meet this condition face suspension.

Although criticism of the government is permitted within certain boundaries, reporters and editors commonly self-censor to avoid reprisals. Journalists can face arrest, detention, and imprisonment on charges including defamation. In August 2023, authorities suspended the news website Alwihda Info for eight days after it allegedly shared remarks that were insulting to transitional president Déby. On the same day, Alwihda Info’s editor, Djimet Wiché, claimed that he was pursued in a car chase by suspected military intelligence agents.

The state imposes a number of religious restrictions, primarily against certain Muslim sects. Those deemed to promote violence are banned, despite limited evidence of violent activity. Imams are subject to governance by the semipublic High Council for Islamic Affairs, which is led by a group of imams belonging to the Tijanyya Sufi order. Wearing burqas is banned by ministerial decree, and the government detains individuals who wear them in public.

The government does not explicitly restrict academic freedom, but funds meant for the education system, as well as government-funded stipends, are regularly in arrears, increasing scholars’ vulnerability to political pressure or self-censorship. Academic freedom is also affected by broader legal and practical restrictions on antigovernment speech. Peaceful student protests are routinely met with violent repression. Police commonly arrest or use tear gas against members of student movements that seek to improve academic conditions. Student leaders have been harassed and arbitrarily detained by security forces.

There is some space for personal expression and free private discussion, but residents tend to self-censor due to fears of reprisal from the state. Outspoken activists face harassment, intimidation, arrest, and torture by security forces.

The right of free assembly is not upheld by the transitional government, and some peaceful protests have been met with lethal violence. Security forces have used gunfire, tear gas, and beatings to suppress protests on multiple occasions during the transition period, with some estimates claiming that hundreds of demonstrators have been killed since 2021.

In May 2023, dozens of activists who took part in the October 2022 protests received prison sentences of between 18 months and 5 years, but they were pardoned days later by the transitional president. Hundreds of others were pardoned over the course of the year, and the general amnesty was announced in October.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must receive government approval to operate legally, and few applications are approved. Some NGOs do operate in the country, but they have tended to focus on less politically sensitive issues like humanitarian relief or human trafficking.

In November 2022, the authorities banned Wakit Tama—a coalition of NGOs and opposition parties—and forbade any other such civic-political alliances. The coalition announced that it was resuming its activities in May 2023, and noted that it would shift its focus to educating the public.

Though the transitional charter ostensibly protected the rights to strike and unionize, other laws limit public-sector workers’ right to strike. Despite the restrictions, some public unions, including Chad’s two judicial unions, organized strikes in 2023. Union leaders commonly face arrest for their activism and their role in organizing demonstrations that put pressure the regime.

The political leadership heavily influences the courts. Judges went on strike in June 2023 to demand better working conditions and protest the draft constitution, which they said would reduce the judiciary’s independence.

Security forces routinely ignore legal guidelines regarding search, seizure, and detention. Detained persons are often denied access to lawyers, especially those held in connection with antigovernment protests or activities. Many people suspected of committing crimes are jailed for lengthy periods without being charged, and instances of arbitrary detention and forced disappearances by security forces have been reported.

Security forces have been accused of killing and torturing civilians with impunity. In addition, tensions among ethnic groups have been known to escalate into violent conflict, particularly over land use, and did so on multiple occasions in 2023.

The Boko Haram militant group, including a faction known as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (IS-WA), operates near Lake Chad and was active throughout the year.

Armed opposition groups, most notably the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) and the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR), threaten the government from bases in southern Libya. In August 2023, FACT announced that it was terminating a two-year cease-fire with the government after accusing it of bombarding FACT bases, raising fears that full-scale conflict would resume.

While there are some legal protections against discrimination based on race, sex, and other categories, none are effectively enforced. Ethnic disparities in the justice system have been reported, with officials refraining from enforcing court orders against people who share their ethnic identity. Arbitrary arrests and detentions based on ethnic identity have also been reported.

Women face pervasive discrimination, and girls have limited access to education. Due to cultural stigmatization, LGBT+ individuals are forced to conceal their sexual orientation or gender identity. The penal code criminalizes same-sex sexual activity.

While discrimination against people with disabilities is legally prohibited, NGOs report that these provisions are not upheld in practice.

The UNHCR reported that at the end of 2023 there were approximately 1.1 million refugees in Chad. This number included some 930,000 Sudanese refugees, roughly 500,000 of whom had arrived since the outbreak of conflict in Sudan in April. Refugees generally lack access to government services and rely on international organizations for humanitarian assistance, though the military has supplied armed escorts for humanitarian groups helping the refugees.

Although legal guarantees for freedom of movement exist, militant activity and government restrictions limit movement in practice. Militants have erected roadblocks in some areas of Chad, and government security forces periodically close borders with Libya, Sudan, and the Central African Republic due to militant activity in those countries. In April 2023 the border with Sudan was closed indefinitely, and border security measures were increased, following the outbreak of civil war in Khartoum.

According to the UNHCR, at the end of 2023 just under 216,000 Chadians were internally displaced because of general insecurity.

Public-resource constraints limit citizens’ ability to move to pursue employment or educational opportunities, including by hampering the processing of official documents.

Laws establishing land and property rights are nominally in force, but they are functionally irrelevant to most of the population due to the state’s minimal presence in rural areas; customary law governs land ownership and usage rights in practice. Laws protecting the right of women to inherit land are not enforced.

Establishing and operating a business in Chad is extremely difficult and obstructed by official corruption.

Violence against women is common. Female genital mutilation or cutting is illegal but widely practiced, and roughly a third of women aged 15 to 49 have undergone it. According to the UN Global Database on Violence against Women, which compiles data from various local and international sources, approximately 29 percent of women aged 15 to 49 had experienced physical or sexual intimate-partner violence in their lifetime as of 2022, and over 17 percent had experienced such violence in the last 12 months. A little more than 60 percent of married women aged 20 to 24 were married before age 18. The penal code bans child marriage, but the courts rarely punish those who violate the ban.

The government has adopted minimum wage and occupational safety laws, but they are not well enforced. Many workers are unaware of or lack access to formal channels through which they may seek redress for mistreatment; corruption also impedes workers from obtaining such redress. Unpaid wages are a problem in many sectors.

Chad is a source, transit, and destination country for child trafficking; victims are exploited for forced labor or commercial sex or are recruited into armed groups. NGOs have reported that a large percentage of human trafficking within Chad is related to the operation of illegal gold mines in the north.