Sultan Haitham bin Tariq became the country’s monarch after his cousin—Sultan Qaboos bin Said, who had reigned since 1970—died in January 2020. Sultan Haitham delegated some of the responsibilities that Sultan Qaboos had retained for himself to his cabinet ministers, including by appointing a foreign minister. However, Haitham continues to serve as the country’s prime minister. In 2021, a new law created the position of crown prince; the sultan’s eldest son, Dhi Yazan bin Haitham, received the title.

A 1996 law created a bicameral body consisting of an appointed Council of State (Majlis al-Dawla) and an elected Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura). Citizens elect members of the Consultative Council for four-year terms, but the chamber has no legislative powers and can only recommend changes to new laws.

Consultative Council elections were held in October 2023 using an electronic voting system developed by the Interior Ministry, which allowed individuals to vote through their smartphones. There were 883 nonpartisan candidates, including 33 women, who competed for the council’s 86 seats. While two women were elected in 2019, none were elected in 2023. The Sultan appointed 18 women to the 86-member Council of State, up from 15 appointed in 2019.

The municipal council elections set to take place in 2020 were postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the existing councils remaining in place. Elections were ultimately held in 2022.

The electoral framework allows all citizens over the age of 21 to vote unless they are in the military or security forces, but only allows voters to elect the Consultative Council and municipal councils, which serve largely as advisory bodies. Elections are administered by the Interior Ministry rather than by an independent commission.

Political parties are not permitted, and the authorities do not tolerate other forms of organized political opposition. A 2014 law allows the government to revoke the citizenship of Omanis who join organizations deemed harmful to national interests.

The sultan maintains a monopoly on political power. The structure of the constitutional system excludes the possibility of a change in government through elections.

The nonpartisan nature of Oman’s limited elections, the overwhelming dominance of the sultan in Omani society, and the authorities’ suppression of dissent leave voters and candidates with little autonomy in their political choices.

Noncitizens, who make up about 46 percent of the population, have no political rights or electoral opportunities. Citizenship is generally transmitted by Omani fathers. Foreign residents must live legally in the country for 20 years to qualify for citizenship, or 15 and 10 years for foreign husbands and wives of Omani citizens, respectively, if they have a son. These and other conditions make naturalizations relatively rare.

Omani women can legally vote and run for office, but they have few practical opportunities to organize independently and advance their interests in the political system. No women were elected to the Consultative Council in 2023, down from two in the 2019 elections and one in the 2015 elections. There are 18 women serving in the appointed Council of State.

Government policy is set by the sultan and an inner circle of advisers and senior ministers. The Council of State and the Consultative Council are advisory bodies with no lawmaking powers.

Oman’s legal code does not provide an effective framework for the prevention, exposure, and impartial prosecution of corruption. However, government officials are required to declare their assets and sources of wealth, and in recent years several high-profile corruption cases involving government officials and executives from Oman’s oil industry have resulted in convictions and prison sentences.

The law does not provide freedom of information guarantees. Openness and transparency are limited in practice by the concentration of power and authority in a small inner circle around the sultan. The State Audit Institution (SAI) monitors ministerial spending, conflicts of interest, and state-owned companies, but its findings are not released to the public, and it does not cover the sultan’s court or the military.

The media environment is constrained by legal limits on freedom of expression, including a ban on criticism of the sultan. There are private media outlets in addition to those run by the state, but they typically accept government subsidies, practice self-censorship, and face punishment if they cross political redlines. Media outlets were reportedly told to avoid covering demonstrations that were held in several cities in 2021.

The government has broad authority to close outlets, block websites, revoke licenses, and prosecute journalists for content violations, and it has used this authority on multiple occasions. The government’s efforts to suppress critical news and commentary regularly include arrests and prosecutions of prominent individuals who are active on social media.

Islam is the state religion. Non-Muslims have the right to worship, but they are banned from proselytizing. Religious organizations must register with the government. The Ministry of Awqaf (religious charitable bequests) and Religious Affairs (MARA) distributes standardized texts that outline the content of mosque sermons, and imams are expected to stay within the parameters of these texts.

Blasphemy is a criminal offense, and the law is actively enforced. In June 2022, a court imposed prison sentences of three and five years, respectively, on Maryam al-Nuaimi and Ali al-Ghafri for participating in online conversations about freedom of thought, religion, and atheism. Al-Nuaimi received a royal pardon and was released in April 2023. However, a retrial of al-Nuaimi and al-Ghafri, along with two other individuals, reportedly began in August 2023.

The government restricts academic freedom by preventing the publication of material on politically sensitive topics and placing controls on contacts between Omani universities and foreign institutions.

The authorities reportedly monitor personal communications, and the growing number of arrests, interrogations, and jail terms related to criticism of the government on social media has encouraged self-censorship among ordinary citizens in recent years. The 2018 penal code increased the maximum penalties for slander of the sultan and blasphemy to 7 and 10 years in prison, respectively, from 3 years for both under the old code. In October 2022, the government issued a decree that added slander of the sultan’s wife or children to the penal code, with the same maximum penalty of seven years in prison.

A limited right to peaceful assembly is provided for in Oman’s basic law. However, all public gatherings require official permission, and the government has the authority to prevent organized public meetings without any appeals process. The 2018 penal code prescribes prison terms and fines for individuals who initiate or participate in a gathering of more than 10 people that threatens security or public order, or who fail to comply with an official order to disperse.

Demonstrations are rare in practice. However, demonstrations in support of Palestine that took place in Omani cities in October and November of 2023 did not appear to be broken up by security forces, and officials stridently and publicly criticized the Israeli government’s conduct of the war in Gaza. By comparison, in May 2021 protests against unemployment and the imposition of a value-added tax were held in several cities, and security forces responded with some arrests, brief detentions, and the use of tear gas. In 2011, authorities forcibly dispersed demonstrations and used lethal violence in at least one incident.

Oman’s basic law allows for the formation of nongovernmental organizations, but civic life remains limited in practice. The government has not permitted the establishment of independent human rights organizations and generally uses its registration and licensing process to block the formation of groups it sees as a threat to stability. The 2018 penal code includes vague clauses that allow prison terms for individuals who establish, operate, or finance an organization aimed at challenging the “political, economic, social, or security principles of the state.”

Individual activists focusing on issues including the economy, labor rights, the environment, and internet freedom risk arrest. In December 2022, activist Majid bin Abdullah al-Ruhaili was detained by the Internal Security Service and held for three weeks after he used his Twitter account to call for public accountability. Al-Ruhaili was released in January 2023.

Omani workers are legally able to organize unions, bargain collectively, and strike. However, there is only one authorized trade union federation, and neither government employees nor household workers are permitted to join unions. Strikes, which are banned in the oil and gas industry, are rare in practice, partly because disputes are often resolved through employer concessions or government mediation.

The judiciary is not independent and remains subordinate to the sultan, who is empowered to appoint and remove senior judges. The sultan also chairs the Supreme Judicial Council, which nominates judges and oversees the judicial system.

Arbitrary arrest is formally prohibited, but suspects arrested in vaguely defined security cases can be held for up to 30 days before being charged, and security forces do not always adhere to rules on arrest and pretrial detention. Ordinary detainees are generally provided with access to legal representation. Defendants in politically sensitive cases may face harsher treatment from the justice system.

The country is generally free from armed conflict, and violent street crime is relatively rare. However, prisons are not accessible in practice to independent monitors, and former detainees have reported experiencing beatings and other abuse while in custody. Activists and dissidents are sometimes forcibly disappeared or confined in degrading conditions, in addition to facing formal criminal penalties.

The 2021 basic law banned discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, ethnicity, and social class, but noncitizens are not protected from discrimination in practice. Women face disparate treatment under personal status laws and de facto bias in employment and other matters. Men are legally recognized as the heads of their households. Same-sex sexual relations are punishable with up to three years in prison, and LGBT+ people face societal discrimination.

Most Omani citizens enjoy freedom of movement, but travel bans are often imposed on political dissidents. Foreign workers cannot change jobs or leave the country without permission from their current employer, unless they demonstrate that they have completed the term of their contract; contracts with new employers must be approved by the authorities.

While the legal framework protects property rights, state-owned companies and the ruling family are dominant forces in the economy, limiting the role and autonomy of small and other private businesses. Women generally receive less property than men under inheritance laws.

Omani citizens require permission from the Interior Ministry to marry noncitizens from countries outside the Gulf Cooperation Council. Omani women who marry foreigners cannot transmit citizenship to their spouses or children. Omani law does not specifically address domestic violence and sexual harassment or criminalize spousal rape, and extramarital sex is criminalized. Women who report being raped have at times been prosecuted for engaging in extramarital sex when authorities did not believe they were assaulted. A woman must have a male guardian—usually a father—to contract her into marriage, and women are at disadvantage under laws governing matters such as divorce and child custody. The 2018 penal code included a new provision that made it illegal for men to wear women’s clothing.

Oman’s labor policies put migrant workers at a severe disadvantage and effectively encourage exploitation. Household workers, who are not covered by the labor law, are especially at risk of abuse by employers. The government has pursued an “Omanization” process to replace foreign workers with native Omanis. Among other tactics, temporary visa bans for foreign workers in various professions have been issued or extended since 2013. In 2021, the Ministry of Labor announced plans to bar expatriates from certain private-sector occupations, which would only be open to Omani citizens.

Despite a 2008 antitrafficking law and some recent efforts to improve enforcement, authorities have not always proactively identified or protected human trafficking victims, particularly among migrant and household workers. The US State Department’s 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report noted that authorities had failed to secure any convictions for forced labor involving migrant workers for five consecutive years.