2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Hungary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Fundamental Law, the country’s constitution, provides for freedom of religion, including freedom to choose, change, or manifest religion or belief, cites “the role of Christianity” in “preserving nationhood,” and values “various religious traditions.” The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and speech violating the dignity of any religious community and stipulates the autonomy of religious communities. The constitution also states children must be guaranteed an “upbringing based on values stemming from our country’s constitutional identity and Christian culture.” There are four tiers of religious groups, all of which may receive income tax allocations from taxpayers and may conclude cooperation agreements with the state. The two highest categories are also eligible for state subsidies supplementing the income tax allocations, and religious groups in the highest tier may offer religious education classes in schools.

In September, Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (MET) and Oltalom Charity Association leader Pastor Gabor Ivanyi, a critic of Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s policies, told media the government owed the two organizations approximately 384 million forints ($1.1 million) for performing services on behalf of the state and was withholding the funds in retaliation for their criticism of government policies. The Budapest-Capital Court of Appeal upheld a lower court ruling finding that the Data Protection Authority (DPA) violated the rights of the Church of Scientology (COS) when it alleged the group illegally obtained the personal data of victims of a 2017 bus accident and their families. Members of the Autonomous Orthodox Jewish Community of Hungary (MAOIH) described the February election that ousted the group’s president as a hostile takeover by the Association of Hungarian Jewish Communities (EMIH), a Chabad-affiliated and government-aligned Jewish organization. MAOIH filed a suit against the government for recognizing the election, which MAOIH claimed was illegitimate.

The Organization of Muslims in Hungary (OMH) said prison staff and other inmates subjected Muslims serving prison sentences to humiliation and physical abuse. Works of writers widely viewed by academics as antisemitic remained mandatory reading material in elementary and secondary public schools. Government officials including the Prime Minister continued to make statements referencing the “defense of a Christian Europe” and criticizing Muslim immigration. In May, the National Assembly adopted a declaration “on the rejection of migration” to “defend the Christian culture of the country.” In September, Minister of Transport and Construction Janos Lazar praised the country’s World War II leader Miklos Horthy, who aligned with the Nazis and implemented laws that resulted in the deportation and deaths of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust, as “an exceptional head of state, a real Hungarian patriot, and a heroic soldier.” A nongovernmental organization (NGO) criticized as “propaganda deeply tainted by antisemitism” a government billboard campaign launched in November that caricatured the NGO’s chair.

In February, counterterrorism authorities apprehended a Polish citizen who attempted to enter the Great Synagogue in Budapest with a knife. Muslim organizations reported that while physical assaults against Muslim individuals were rare, verbal insults were frequent, particularly against women wearing headscarves or persons who had darker skin and spoke a foreign language. On February 11, extreme-right and neo-Nazi groups clashed with antifascist counterprotesters on the “Day of Honor” commemoration marking a battle between Hungarian and German forces against Soviet troops in World War II. In September, the OMH opened a new mosque and cultural center in Pecs.

In meetings and discussions with the government, including officials from the Prime Minister’s Office in charge of church and Jewish issues, U.S. embassy representatives advocated for the government to negotiate a settlement to compensate Holocaust survivors and Jewish communities for Jewish property seized during the Holocaust that was heirless or unclaimed. They also discussed how provisions of the religion law impacted religious groups. The embassy maintained regular contact with leaders of various religious communities, including the four historical groups, Muslims, the COS, and religious groups that lost incorporated church status in 2011, to understand their concerns and discuss the effects of the religion law, antisemitism, and anti-Muslim rhetoric. The Ambassador conducted numerous outreach events throughout the year with Jewish, Christian, and Muslim communities.

The U.S. government estimates the total population at 9.9 million (midyear 2023). According to the 2022 national census, which included an optional question on religious affiliation, of the 60 percent of the population that responded, 50 percent identified as Roman Catholic, 16 percent as Hungarian Reformed Church (Calvinist), 3 percent as Lutheran, 3 percent as Greek Catholic, and less than 1 percent as Jewish; 27 percent reported no religious affiliation. Other religious groups together constituting less than 5 percent of the population include Greek Orthodox, the Faith Congregation (a Pentecostal group), the COS, the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (MET or Hungarian Evangelical Brotherhood), Russian and other Orthodox Christian groups, other Christian denominations, Buddhists, Muslims, and the Hungarian Society for Krishna Consciousness. The Hungarian Pentecostal Church has approximately 8,900 members, according to the 2022 census. Local Jewish organizations estimate approximately 100,000 citizens with Jewish heritage live in the country, primarily in Budapest. According to Boston University’s 2020 World Religion Database, 4.2 percent of the population is atheist. Other religious groups practice throughout the country.

 

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Fundamental Law, the country’s constitution, provides for freedom of conscience and religion, including freedom to choose or change religion or belief, and freedom – alone or in community with others and in public or in private – to manifest religion or belief through religious acts or ceremonies, or in any other way, in worship, practice, and observance. It prohibits religious discrimination, as well as speech “aimed at violating the dignity” of any religious community.

The constitution’s preamble states, “We recognize the role of Christianity” in preserving the nation and “value the various religious traditions” in the country. The constitution stipulates separation between religious communities and the state, as well as the autonomy of religious communities. According to the constitution, the state may, at the request of religious communities, cooperate with them on community goals. A 2020 constitutional amendment states that children must be guaranteed an “upbringing based on values stemming from our country’s constitutional identity and Christian culture.”

The law prohibits both incitement to violence and incitement to hatred against a religious community or its members, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment. The law provides a maximum punishment of three years in prison for impeding others through violence or threats from freely exercising their religion or abusing individuals because of their religious affiliation.

An assault motivated by the victim’s actual or presumed religious affiliation is a felony punishable by one to five years in prison. Violence against a member of the clergy is classified as violence against an “individual providing public service” and is also punishable with a prison sentence of one to five years. Any person who engages in preparation for the use of force against any member of a religious community is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not exceeding two years.

The law prohibits public denial, expression of doubt, or minimization of the Holocaust, genocide, and other crimes against humanity committed by the National Socialist or Communist regimes, punishing such offenses with a maximum sentence of three years in prison. The criminal code makes wearing, exhibiting, or promoting in public the swastika, the logo of the Nazi SS, or the symbol of the Arrow Cross – a fascist, antisemitic party that allied with Nazi Germany – in a way that harms the human dignity or the memory of Holocaust victims a misdemeanor, punishable by five to 90 days’ detention.

The law provides for the lifting of official immunity of a member of the National Assembly who incites hatred against religious groups or publicly denies crimes of the Communist or National Socialist regimes. To date, no member has been the subject of such a proceeding.

Per a 2019 amendment, the law on religion establishes a four-tier system of, in descending order, “established (or incorporated) churches,” “registered churches” (also called “registered II”), “listed churches” (also called “registered I”), and “religious associations.” The term “church” in the law refers to any religious community, not just Christian ones, and religious groups in any category may use “church” in their official names. The National Assembly must approve recognition of churches as established. The Budapest-Capital Regional Court has jurisdiction to rule on applications for registration within the other three categories. Religious groups in all four tiers have legal personality, which grants them legal rights, such as the right to own property. Following the 2019 amendment, all previously incorporated religious groups retained their status in the first tier of the system as established churches.

Religious entities that do not apply for, or that apply for and do not receive, legal status in one of the four tiers are still able to function and conduct worship but are not eligible to receive state funding or income tax contributions from taxpayers. The law states constitutional protection of freedom of religion also applies to unregistered groups.

To qualify for established church status, a religious group must first have registered status and then conclude a comprehensive cooperation agreement with the state for the purpose of accomplishing community goals. The government submits the comprehensive agreement to the National Assembly, which must approve it by a two-thirds majority vote. A registered church becomes an established church from the day the National Assembly approves the comprehensive agreement. Established churches are eligible to benefit from significant state subsidies for the performance of public service activities.

To qualify for registered church status, a religious group must have received tax allocations from an average of 4,000 persons per year in the five-year period prior to the application. This status also requires that the group either have operated as a religious association for at least 20 years in the country, or at least 100 years internationally, or have operated as a listed church for at least 15 years in the country or at least 100 years internationally.

To qualify for listed church status, a religious group must receive tax allocations from an average of 1,000 persons per year in the three-year period prior to the application for status and have operated as a religious association for at least five years in the country or for at least 100 years internationally.

To qualify for religious association status, a religious group must have at least 10 members.

The law allows the government to negotiate individual cooperation agreements with all four tiers of religious groups for the performance of public service activities and support of faith-based activities. The agreements’ duration depends on the status of the religious community, ranging from a five-year maximum for religious associations to 10 and 15 years for listed and registered churches, respectively, and unlimited duration for established churches. These agreements may be renewed.

The law allows taxpayers to allocate 1 percent of their income taxes to any religious community in any of the four tiers. Religious groups may use these funds as they wish. Only established and registered churches (the two highest tiers) are eligible to receive a state subsidy supplementing the 1 percent tax allocations.

Religious groups that agree not to seek EU or state funding (including personal income tax allocations) for their religious activities may qualify as registered or listed churches without fulfilling the requirement regarding the number of personal income tax allocations. The applicant religious community must perform primarily religious activities and may not be a criminal defendant or have been convicted of a crime during the previous five years, under sanction for “repeated violation of accounting and management rules,” or considered a national security threat. The court decides whether to grant status as a registered or listed church based on an examination of the criteria above. In reviewing these applications, the court may consult church law, church history, or ecclesiastical or academic experts, and may also seek the opinion of the national security services.

Religious groups that initially agree not to seek government or EU funding but accept financial support at a later stage must report it to the court within 15 days of the disbursement of the aid. To avoid losing its status or a reclassification to the lower association tier, the religious group has eight days to declare to the court that it has returned the funds, requested cancellation of its religious registration status, or complied with the individual tax allocation requirement to become a registered or listed organization. The religious group or prosecutor’s office may appeal the court’s decision on the status of the group to the Budapest-Capital Court of Appeal.

The law stipulates the government minister responsible for church issues in the Prime Minister’s Office, based on information received from the court, shall manage an electronic database of religious groups with legal status, accessible to the public free of charge.

According to the law, the Budapest-Capital Regional Court may dissolve a religious community with legal status, with the exception of established churches, if its activities conflict with the constitution or law or if the court rules its registration should have been denied. The National Assembly may dissolve an incorporated church if the Constitutional Court finds it is operating in violation of the constitution. If a religious community is dissolved without a legal successor, its assets, after satisfying creditors, become the property of the state and shall be used for public interest activities.

Thirty-two churches have established (previously known as “incorporated”) status. These include the Roman Catholic Church; a range of Protestant denominations; a range of Orthodox Christian groups; other Christian denominations such as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Seventh-day Adventists, and the Salvation Army; three Jewish groups – the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities (MAZSIHISZ), Unified Hungarian Jewish Congregation, and MAOIH; two Muslim organizations; a Buddhist umbrella organization; and the Hungarian Society for Krishna Consciousness, the sole Hindu group registered as a church.

By law, the state may neither operate nor establish any institution for controlling or monitoring religious groups. Their doctrines, internal regulations, and statutes are not subject to state review, modification, or enforcement. Copyright law protects their names, symbols, and rites, while criminal law protects buildings and cemeteries.

The constitution establishes a unified system for the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (ombudsperson). The ombudsperson investigates cases related to violations of fundamental rights, including religious freedom, and initiates general or specific measures for their remedy. These measures do not have the force of law.

Treaties with the Holy See regulate relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church, including financing of public services and religious activities and settling claims for property seized by the state during the Communist era. These treaties serve as a model for regulating state relations with other religious groups, although there are some differences in the rights and privileges the state accords to each of the religious groups with which it has agreements. The state also has formal agreements with the Hungarian Reformed Church, Hungarian Lutheran Church, MAZSIHISZ, and four Orthodox churches, covering issues such as religious education and payments from the state to churches performing educational or social services on behalf of the state.

According to the law, established, registered, and listed churches may perform pastoral services in prisons and hospitals. Other laws indicate religious associations may also provide services at these facilities.

Military and law enforcement personnel may freely practice their religion in private and also at their workplaces if their religious practice does not violate their mandatory service duties. The Roman Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran Churches as well as Jewish congregations (which the government generally calls “historical churches”) may provide chaplain services to the military without seeking permission. Other religious groups must seek permission to offer such services.

Penitentiaries generally allow inmates free practice of religion and provide them with special diets, such as kosher, vegetarian, and pork-free meals. Historical churches may provide pastoral services in prisons without special permission, but other religious groups may do so only within official visiting hours as outlined in individual agreements and with permission from the penitentiary. Similarly, historical churches receive automatic access to patients in hospitals to provide pastoral services, while other groups may do so only under certain conditions, such as providing services only during visiting hours.

One hour per week of education in faith and ethics or general ethics is mandatory through the first eight grades of public school. Parents and students choose between the faith and ethics class offered by an established church of their choosing or a secular ethics course taught by public school teachers. Other religious groups are not entitled to provide religious education as part of the mandatory curricula in public schools but may offer extracurricular, optional religious education in public schools at the request of parents or students. Private schools are not required to offer faith and ethics or general ethics classes.

All religious groups registered in one of the four categories have the right to open their own schools. The state provides a subsidy, based on the number of students enrolled, for employee salaries at all such schools. Only established churches automatically receive a supplementary subsidy for the schools’ operating expenses. Other religious groups may apply for a supplementary operational subsidy, and the Ministry of Interior may sign an individualized contract with them to cover these costs.

The law also affords all religious groups with legal status the right to assume operation of public schools if more than 50 percent of the parents and adult students enrolled at the school sign a petition to do so and the Ministry of Interior approves the change. In these cases, the state may continue to fund the schools. Whether newly established or converted from public status, religious schools are free to conduct their own religious teaching without government input and to make faith education mandatory and not substitutable with an ethics class. The state inspects both religious and public schools every two years to ensure they conform to legal standards.

The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

GOVERNMENT PRACTICES

Abuses Involving Violence, Detention, or Mass Resettlement

In February, Counter-Terrorist Center agents apprehended a Polish citizen who attempted to enter the Great Synagogue in downtown Budapest with a knife. Police did not release further details on the incident.

According to press reports, two former leaders of the Hungarian Pentecostal Church, one of the smallest incorporated churches, remained in pretrial detention, with both men suspected of budget fraud and money laundering. The Church elected new leaders in March.

Abuses Involving the Ability of Individuals to Engage in Religious Activities Alone or In Community with Others

In September, MET and Oltalom Charity Association leader Pastor Gabor Ivanyi announced at a press conference that the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) was withholding nearly 384 million forints ($1.1 million) the government owed to these organizations for performing services on behalf of the state. Ivanyi said the NAV justified the withholding as covering late-payment penalties and other MET debts stemming from MET’s loss of established church status following the adoption of the religion law in 2011. He said the withholding left the fellowship and association unable to pay salaries to approximately 1,000 employees. Ivanyi, who had earlier admitted MET owed social security payments on employee payrolls, told media the government continued to punish his organizations, in part, for “standing up against the arrogance of those in power.” Ivanyi, once a friend and ally of Prime Minister Orban, who performed Orban’s marriage and baptized two of his children, subsequently became a critic of the Prime Minister and his nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

In September, the Balkan Insight Reporting Network (BIRN) published a report titled Religious Freedom in Hungary: Hell Hath No Fury like a Prime Minister Scorned. In it, a professor of Christian Ethics at Texas Lutheran University said, “Orban’s Church Law forced many minority religious groups to close schools and sell property more than a decade ago.” According to the professor, MET managed to hold out longer against closure partly due to its size relative to other minority groups and also “because of Ivanyi’s enormous personal prestige as a Communist-era dissident.” In the report, Ivanyi, noting the NAV payment withholding, said only the Jewish community had expressed solidarity with MET. Ivanyi told BIRN other religious groups were afraid of government retaliation. He said, “Orban’s treatment of MET is a useful tool for disciplining the churches – a warning example of what can happen to you if you step out of line.”

During the year, the COS continued to seek the return of religious files the DPA, NAV, and National Bureau of Investigation seized in raids conducted during the previous six years. The raids were related to an investigation into the COS’s alleged criminal abuse of personal data and alleged tax fraud. The COS filed two lawsuits concerning the DPA seizure in 2021 and 2022 at the European Court of Human Rights; these remained pending at year’s end. In April, a Hungarian court ordered the DPA to allow one COS member to access to their files.

The COS also reported the Budapest-Capital Court of Appeal, in a binding ruling, upheld a lower court finding that the DPA violated the rights of the COS when it alleged the COS illegally obtained the personal data of victims of a 2017 bus accident and their family members. The court ordered the DPA to pay 100,000 forints ($290) to the organization and post an apology on the DPA website, which it did.

The COS also reported one of its members filed a police report against the DPA, alleging, as part of an investigation, the DPA had shared files containing privileged information with the NAV without redacting the COS member’s personal information, even though the individual was not involved in that particular investigation.

A list of religious associations and listed churches remained available at a dedicated webpage maintained by the Prime Minister’s Office. Court decisions regarding the registration process for registered churches, listed churches, and religious associations were available at the central website of the courts. Following its reclassification from a listed church (third tier) to a registered church (second tier) in 2022, MET remained the only religious group classified as a registered church.

The Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), an NGO that represented some religious groups deregistered following the 2011 adoption of the religion law, continued to monitor the enforcement of the 2014 European Court of Human Rights ruling that the law violated freedom of religion and caused monetary damage to the deregistered churches. The 2014 judgment required the government to reach an agreement with applicant churches on the restoration of their status and on just compensation for any damages. The HCLU also provided legal representation in individual cases concerning freedom of religion and belief.

The ousted former president of MAOIH, Robert Deutsch, sued the Office of the Prime Minister, claiming the office should not recognize Gabor Keszler of the EMIH, a Chabad-affiliated and government-aligned Jewish organization, as the new MAOIH president following what Deutsch said was an illegitimate election held in February. Deutsch said the election used deceitful tactics and was not recognized by rabbinical courts in Jerusalem and Antwerp. Despite this, the government recognized Keszler as the new president. Some members of the community reported concerns that in addition to their resources, including synagogues and government payments, MAOIH’s traditions and autonomy were at stake. In August, EMIH supporters told the media outlet Times of Israel that EMIH’s financial assistance to MAOIH was vital.

February 28 was the deadline for churches, under a law passed in 2022, to request the free transfer to them of ownership of buildings they were already using for faith-related or educational activities. State and local governments handled these requests. While no central list of properties transferred to the churches under the law was available, press reports stated the Hungarian Reformed Church expected to take ownership of approximately 60 buildings nationwide, with an additional 18 properties requested by various churches from the state. The Lutheran Church stated it would not request the transfer of any properties.

According to statistics published by the tax authority on September 15, 154 churches and religious groups received the 1 percent of personal income tax allocation as directed by individual taxpayers during the year. As in previous years, the churches receiving the most allocations were the Roman Catholic Church, with 803,070 persons contributing 6.04 billion forints ($17.4 million); the Hungarian Reformed Church, with 348,482 persons contributing 2.7 billion forints ($7.8 million); and the Lutheran Church, with 92,581 persons contributing 743 million forints ($2.1 million). MET, which collected 1 percent of personal income tax allocations for the third time since the 2011 modification of the religion law, ranked fourth, with 73,381 persons contributing 718 million forints ($two million). The Hungarian Society for Krishna Consciousness ranked fifth, with 86,005 persons contributing 691 million forints ($1.9 million). Among Jewish groups, MAZSIHISZ received the largest allocation, with 12,612 persons contributing 132 million forints ($382,000).

During the year, the government repeated its position that the 2007 interim compensation agreement with the World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) on heirless property represented “a definitive satisfaction of compensation claims” of formerly Jewish-owned assets confiscated by the Nazis during the Holocaust and/or subsequently nationalized by the Communist regime after the war. The WJRO disagreed with the government’s position and requested that the government resume negotiations, but by year’s end, the government had not responded to the WJRO’s request for a follow-up meeting. In 2021, the government shared a summary report with the WJRO of research that estimated the scope of heirless and unclaimed assets. On its website, the WJRO stated, “Now that the [government’s] research is complete, the next step is for the government and WJRO to establish a clear joint roadmap to conclude negotiations, with an equally clear target date.”

According to the COS, the Csongrad County government office again failed to act on a certificate of occupancy application by the COS for its headquarters in Budapest. The application had remained pending since 2017, despite a 2017 Budapest Administrative and Labor Court ruling that the county office process the COS’s application by March 2018. The COS said it had received no explanation for the continued delay. An extant court order allowed the COS to continue to use the building.

The OMH reported the issue of limited cemetery space for Islamic burials remained unresolved. In the capital, the municipality-owned Budapest Funeral Institute provided cemetery space for Muslims, but Islamic burials required a permit issued by the Hungarian Islamic Community (HIC), the other Muslim organization. OMH members expressed concerns regarding this practice. Other than in the capital, the OMH reported there was a limited amount of cemetery space in the city of Pecs. The HIC stated the community was concerned about existing cemetery space for Islamic burials filling up and reported the Budapest Funeral Institute and the Office of the Mayor of Budapest had been unresponsive to its requests to expand available space.

Works of writers widely viewed by academics as antisemitic, including members of the Arrow Cross Party, Jozsef Nyiro, and convicted war criminal Albert Wass, remained mandatory reading material in elementary and secondary public schools.

In a study published in the European Educational Research Journal in 2022, Eszter Neumann of Hungary’s Centre for Social Sciences Institute for Minority Studies wrote, “While education has traditionally been a key area of national identity-building and forming nationally minded citizens, reinventing education as the domain of Christian and national identity politics has become a central and explicit agenda of the government since 2010.” The study found that between 2010 and 2021, the share of Christian church-run primary schools rose from 8.6 percent to 16.6 percent, the share of secondary schools rose from 10 percent to 26.1 percent, and kindergartens from 5.6 percent to 10.5 percent.

According to media reports corroborated by the Budapest Jewish Community (BZSH), in February, BZSH, affiliated with MAZSIHISZ, offered to take over as operator of an elementary school in Budapest’s District 13, an option made possible under a 2022 law. The school’s faculty publicly indicated they did not support the transfer of the school to BZSH and, according to BZSH, refused to engage with community representatives to discuss the proposed school operator change. Some teachers reportedly told parents they would leave the school if the transfer were implemented. In April, only 20 percent of parents voted to transfer the school to BZSH, with 79 percent of parents either voting no or staying away. As a result of the vote, the local government of the district remained the school’s operator. BZSH reported the debate surrounding the transfer included “antisemitic overtones.”

HIC reported it was pursuing state government assistance to open a Muslim school in Budapest after a Budapest district and the city government rejected its request.

Abuses Involving Discrimination or Unequal Treatment

In May, the government issued a decree providing a one-time supplementary payment, to help offset increased utility costs, of 19,854 forints ($57) per child to schools, preschools, and child welfare institutions run by established churches. In August, the government issued a decree providing a supplementary payment, again to help offset increased utility costs, of 42,631 forints ($120) per child to schools, preschools, and child welfare institutions run by established churches. On both occasions, the government did not provide supplementary payments to schools not run by established churches.

According to the OMH, Muslims serving prison sentences experienced humiliation and physical abuse by staff and other inmates. HIC reported the community’s financial circumstances made it impossible for the organization to continue to provide Muslim chaplaincy services in correctional facilities.

In March, following an appeals process that returned the case to the first-instance court, the Budapest-Capital Regional Court again ruled in favor of Gaspar Bekes, a member of the Hungarian Atheist Society, who stated his employer, the city of Budapest, fired him in 2021 for practicing his right to freedom of religion and belief and freedom of expression and thought. In January 2021, the Christian online site vasarnap.hu made accessible articles regarding Bekes, who prior to his dismissal worked in the Climate and Environment Department of the mayor’s office. The articles stated he had offended religious sensibilities by sharing memes in Facebook groups dedicated to political satire and asserted Bekes would ban baptism. The Budapest city administration appealed the ruling, stating it fired Bekes because he refused to make clear the views expressed were his own and not those of the city government.

Government officials continued to make statements referencing the “defense of a Christian Europe” and criticizing Muslim immigration. In May, at the initiative of Christian Democratic People’s Party members, the National Assembly adopted a declaration “on the rejection of migration” to “defend the Christian culture of the country.” In September, at an annual retreat of right-wing intellectuals, Prime Minister Orban spoke of the danger of “Islamization” in Europe and said Hungary would soon see an influx of Christians fleeing from the West.

In March, speaking at an event in New York, President Katalin Novak said Hungary was a Christian nation in terms of lifestyle and culture, regardless of the number of regular churchgoers.

In September, following an event commemorating the anniversary of interwar and World War II leader Miklos Horthy’s 1993 reburial in his home village, Minister of Transport and Construction Janos Lazar praised Horthy as “an exceptional head of state, a real Hungarian patriot, and a heroic soldier,” adding that Horthy’s achievements were “unquestionable to this day.” Without referencing Lazar’s comments directly, the Chief Rabbi of Hungary’s largest synagogue, Robert Frolich, pointed out on his own Facebook page Horthy’s avowed antisemitism and promises to Hitler to “gradually phase out the Jews” in Hungary during World War II. The Embassy of Israel wrote on social media that “glorifying a person whose actions brought tragedy to the Hungarian people…has no place in modern Hungary,” but did not directly criticize Lazar or the Hungarian government. According to news reports, newly elected head of MAZSIHISZ Andor Grosz subsequently reminded Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister Gergely Gulyas that recent remarks regarding Regent Miklos Horthy made by Fidesz party officials did not accord with the government’s stated principle of zero tolerance toward antisemitism; Grosz said the government must make its position clear.

In September, following comments by Speaker of the National Assembly Laszlo Kover concerning the “ideological descendants of the murderers of Jesus … wanting to eradicate people’s yearning for God and their faith,” MAZSIHISZ in a statement called on the Speaker to apologize and expressed its concern regarding the reverberations of Kover’s words, noting public responses to them showed how easy it was to interpret such rhetoric, “even if not ill-intentioned,” as antisemitic.

In November, the government launched a nationwide billboard campaign depicting the current chair of the NGO Open Society Foundations (OSF), who is the son of a Jewish American businessman, as a figure hovering over European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, with the slogan: “Let’s not dance to their tune.” The OSF called the billboards “propaganda deeply tainted by antisemitism,” with domestic observers likening them to a previous government campaign depicting the businessman as a billionaire puppeteer manipulating the Hungarian opposition.

The country is a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.

Other Developments Affecting Religious Freedom

Media reported in June that Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill awarded Prime Minister Orban with the First Degree of the Order of Glory and Honor of the Russian Orthodox Church for the Prime Minister’s focus on the “preservation of Christian values in society and the strengthening of the institution of family and marriage.” In September, Kirill presented an unspecified honor to Prime Minister’s Office State Secretary for Church and Nationality Issues Miklos Soltesz. In 2022, the government blocked EU sanctions against Kirill stemming from his support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, citing concerns regarding religious freedom.

In February, press reported unknown persons transformed the Budapest grave of the widow of wartime fascist leader Ferenc Szalasi into a memorial site for Szalasi, the Arrow Cross party leader, who was executed in 1946 for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Police investigated the matter and determined that “no crime was committed.” In March, members of the youth section of the opposition Democratic Coalition party sprayed black paint on the photograph of Szalasi displayed on the grave; they subsequently reported receiving death threats on their social media pages from far-right sympathizers.

According to press reports, two self-identified American white supremacists, with a public record of making antisemitic comments enrolled in a Hungarian Language and Culture summer school program of Budapest’s ELTE university. Following reports by concerned fellow course participants who felt uneasy, the university reportedly concluded that its code of ethics did not apply to the summer school. In response to students’ continuing concerns, the university reportedly canceled the closing ceremony of the course.

Muslim organizations stated they did not collect statistical data on attacks and abuses against Muslim individuals because, according to one member, they lacked the capacity to do so. The OMH reported anecdotally that while physical assaults were rare, verbal insults were frequent, in particular, against women wearing headscarves or person who had darker skin and spoke a foreign language.

As in previous years, domestic and international extremist and neo-Nazi groups marked the anniversary of the breakout attempt by Hungarian and German troops on February 11, 1945, during the Soviet army’s siege of Budapest. Police halted a “Day of Honor” event planned for February 11, on the grounds that the organizer presented misleading information to the authorities regarding the nature of the commemoration. Media outlets reported that despite the police ban, several hundred extreme-right and neo-Nazi sympathizers gathered in the Buda Castle to commemorate the “Day of Honor.” Police successfully prevented them from clashing with a group of 100-200 Hungarian and international counterprotesters in the area. According to statements by police, antifascist demonstrators elsewhere in the city assaulted several individuals they assumed to be affiliated with the extreme right. Similarly, extreme right sympathizers reportedly attacked groups they took to be antifascist demonstrators.

In May, the U.S.-based Anti-Defamation League (ADL) issued the results of its survey of antisemitic prejudice in Hungary. According to the survey, approximately three million Hungarians harbored antisemitic attitudes, based on data collected in November and December 2022. The survey asked approximately 500 respondents whether 11 stereotypical statements about Jews were “probably true.” Based on responses, the ADL estimated 37 percent of all individuals over 18 in Hungary agreed that six or more statements were “probably true,” compared with 42 percent in 2019 and 40 percent in 2015. Among the statements were: “Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Hungary” (51 percent); “Jews have too much power in international financial markets” (57 percent); “Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust” (60 percent); “Jews don’t care about what happens to anyone but their own kind” (30 percent); “Jews have too much control over the global media” (35 percent); and “Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars” (19 percent).

During the year, the Budapest-based NGO Tom Lantos Institute supported the publication of a teachers’ guide for the permanent exhibition at the Synagogue of Pecs titled “Living Together Then and Now,” the creation of the traveling exhibition “Pictures and memories from the past of the disappeared Jewish community of Sarbogard,” and the Hungarian translation of the book The Jews of Timisoara: A Historical Perspective.

According to media reports, in September, the OMH opened a new mosque and cultural center called al-Furqan in downtown Pecs, reportedly purchased with the financial support of the government of Kuwait. According to reports, the National Heritage Protection and Development Nonprofit Ltd., a state-owned entity, forced the community to stop using the state-owned Yakovali Hasan Mosque in 2019 to allow its transformation into a museum.

Throughout the year, the Christian-Jewish Society, an informal platform for discussion among Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed, and Baptist Churches and Jewish groups, held a number of events promoting interfaith dialogue, including an online conference on “Abrahamic Religions.”

On April 16, observing Holocaust Remembrance Days, several thousand individuals took part in the March of the Living in Budapest to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust.

In meetings and discussions with the government, including officials from the Prime Minister’s Office in charge of church and Jewish issues, embassy representatives advocated compensation regarding heirless Jewish property seized during the Holocaust and discussed provisions of the religion law, including the role of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court in the registration process for certain religious groups.

The embassy maintained regular contact with leaders of various religious communities, including the four historical groups, Muslims, the COS, and religious groups that lost incorporated church status in 2011, such as MET and Sim Shalom, to understand their concerns. During these discussions, embassy officials discussed the effects of the religion law, antisemitism, and anti-Muslim rhetoric.

In February, the Ambassador visited a Holocaust survivor couple in their home to, as he said, “hear their story, to remember, to recommit.” Highlighted on social media, the visit took place the same day as neo-Nazi groups gathered in Budapest to honor German and Hungarian fascist soldiers who attempted to break through a Soviet encirclement of Buda Castle on February 11, 1945. In March, the Ambassador visited Szeged Synagogue – the second largest synagogue in the country and the fourth largest in the world – and discussed the history of the Jewish community in the city with community leaders. In April, the Ambassador hosted a group of Jewish community leaders as well as politicians and cultural figures of various faiths for a Passover Seder at his residence, bringing together persons of different backgrounds for an exchange of views and to reflect together on the meaning of freedom.

On April 16, at the March of the Living commemorating the Holocaust, the Ambassador spoke, highlighting the need for “rededicating ourselves to summon the strength to engage those with whom we disagree, and standing up to those who target the vulnerable, to those who use hate opportunistically, to those who use the sacred individuality of each of us to divide, marginalize, and dehumanize.”

In June, the Ambassador visited the MET and its Oltalom Charity Association, led by Pastor Ivanyi, highlighting the visit on social media and noting the work of the fellowship and the association to “support vulnerable people in need.”

In September, the Ambassador attended Rosh Hashanah services, met with leaders of the MAOIH, participated in Yom Kippur services, observed Kol Nidre, and met with representatives of the Catholic and Muslim community in Pecs.

Also in September, following Minister of Transport and Construction Lazar praising interwar and World War II leader Horthy, the Ambassador on social media stated the United States was concerned by the participation of a senior Orban government official in efforts to rehabilitate and promote the “brutal legacy” of Horthy, who was “complicit in the slaughter of Hungary’s Jewish population during the Holocaust.”

Speaking at an event in November, the Ambassador referenced the government’s billboard campaign against the Jewish American chair of the OSF as an example of “storytelling turned into a tool of intentional and deliberate revisionism, which is itself a form of antisemitism.”

Also in November, referring to the recent global surge in antisemitic rhetoric following the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, the Ambassador delivered remarks at the ZsiFi Budapest Jewish and Israeli Film Festival, stating that “we must not wait for blood before we call out the antisemitism that history clearly tells us so often leads to it.”